



JOURNAL
OF
THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION
OF THE
UNITED STATES.

VOL. VIII.

SEPTEMBER, 1887.

NO. XXXI.

BATTLE-FIELDS
OF THE CANADIAN NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES.

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FIFTEENTH INFANTRY.

TOPOGRAPHY.

THAT portion of the Dominion of Canada that is included in the titles *Manitoba* and the *North-west Territories* begins at the east near Lake of the Woods and extends west and north-west to the Rocky Mountains. This region is divided geologically into three vast plains or steppes, broken and interspersed by small detached elevations and traversed in northernly and north-easternly directions by streams of varying magnitude, the drainage being toward and into Hudson's Bay. The most eastern of these plains has a width of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty miles. The soil is exceedingly fertile, having a vegetable mold of great richness, covering the entire surface to a depth of from one to two or three feet. This plain is covered with a thick growth of grasses of the hardy sort, and is barren of trees except along the water-courses. The absence of timber and the growth of grasses before referred to, being characteristic of all these steppes, has led to their being called

prairie steppes. Thus we meet with the terms *first prairie steppe*, *second prairie steppe* and *third prairie steppe*, the numerals being applied in their order from east to west. The first steppe constitutes the largest and most fertile portion of the Province of Manitoba.

Manitoba (from the Ojibway words *manito*, Great Spirit, and *waba*, echo) is traversed by a great central artery flowing north into Lake Winnipeg and thence into Hudson's Bay. This is the Red River of the North, a stream navigable throughout its length in the Province. At Winnipeg, the metropolis of the country, a city of 25,000 inhabitants, the Red River is joined by a large stream from the west known as the Assiniboine River, navigable for two hundred miles. All the larger streams have numerous tributaries, some of great length, but all carrying small volumes of water; all flow within deep banks of from forty to fifty feet and more below the surface. The Red River, at intervals, overflows its banks. Always in the spring the volume of water discharged from all the water-courses is greatly increased, due to the melting snows near the sources.

In addition to the rivers and creeks the surface is dotted in many places by lakes and sloughs. The largest lakes are Winnipeg, Winnipegosis and Manitoba—all in the northern part of Manitoba and in the first steppe.

In passing over the surface of this region one meets with many depressions covered with grass and leading to the nearest water-course. These depressions are dry for most of the year, but during the wet season they are difficult and dangerous to cross. These drains correspond to those treacherous gulleys of Arizona, New Mexico and Mexico, known by the name of *arroyas*; here they are called *coulies*.

The second prairie steppe may be described as an immense mesa of four or five hundred miles in width, raised above the first steppe some hundred or two hundred feet. The connection between the first and second steppes is made by a kind of natural glacis whose line of intersection with the second steppe runs in a north-west direction from a point on the international boundary line thirty miles west of the Red River. This glacis is known in different sections by the names of Pembina Mountains, Riding Mountains, Duck Mountains and Porcupine Hills.

About two hundred miles west of this glacis a series of detached hills is met with. Beginning at the south these hills bear

the names Moose Mountains, Weed Hills, Pheasant Hills, Touchwood Hills and Nut Hills.

This steppe is watered by the Assiniboine River, rising in the Porcupine Hills, then flowing south along the Manitoban border until it is joined by the Qu'Appelle River. After uniting the stream runs east to Winnipeg. The Qu'Appelle River rises in the approach to the third steppe and flows east till it meets the Assiniboine, as before described. The principal water-course known is the Saskatchewan, a mighty stream formed by the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers, uniting near Fort à la Corne. Both the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers rise in the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains at the western edge of the third steppe, and flow through this and the second steppe, as indicated in the accompanying sketch map. The Saskatchewan is navigable at high water as far as Edmonton, eight hundred miles west of the Grand Rapids near Lake Winnipeg. Before meeting, the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers flow so as to form a very acute angle to the south-west. In this narrow space, between the Elbow on the North Saskatchewan, and Clark's Crossing on the South Saskatchewan, occurred the chief events that led to the last rebellion (1885). It was in this angle that the affair at Duck Lake took place. On the right bank of the south branch, between Clark's Crossing and Fort à la Corne, are Fish Creek and Batoche, the principal battle-fields of the same rebellion.

The third prairie steppe extends from the second steppe to the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains, a distance of from four to five hundred miles. Most of the streams that flow through the second steppe have their origin in the melting snows and glaciers of the great mountain chain. The water from great numbers of torrents and creeks makes its way beyond the foot-hills to the east, then taking one course through the great western steppe, cutting a deep curve as it proceeds on its course east, leaves the third steppe to descend to the second, and after following a long and tortuous course in that plain is joined by other streams drawn from the melting snows, and thus before reaching the lakes at the east immense canals are formed capable of carrying large vessels.

The Grand Rapids, a few miles west of Lake Winnipeg, interrupt navigation between the Saskatchewan and the lakes. A tramway has been constructed here for the purpose of transport-

ing freight from steamers on the lake to those in the river, and *vice versa*. The actions of Frenchman's Butte and Cut Knife Hill took place in the third prairie steppe, the former a few miles east of Fort Pitt, the latter about thirty-five miles west of the junction of the Battle River with the North Saskatchewan.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

On account of the prairie character of the Canadian North-west Territories the country can be crossed in any direction by troops of all arms without much difficulty. The climate would naturally restrict active campaigning to the late spring, summer and the fall of the year. In addition to the many wagon roads and trails that cross the country in all directions, the chief lines of communication are the navigable streams and lakes already mentioned, and the railroads.

The main line of the Canadian Pacific Railway enters the Province of Manitoba at the northern end of the Lake of the Woods and follows an east and west line, nearly on the fiftieth degree of north latitude, to Medicine Hat where the railway crosses the South Saskatchewan River, thence it takes a north-western direction until it enters the mountains on the fifty-first degree of north latitude. Crossing the Rocky Mountains, the Selkirks and the Cascade and Gold Ranges it reaches the terminus, Port Moody. Steamers run thence across the Gulf of Georgia to Victoria on Vancouver. This road has a number of branches, most of which radiate from Winnipeg. From Medicine Hat there is a branch leading south-west to the coal-mines of the South Saskatchewan. The Manitoba and North-western Railway runs north-west to Minnedora and Birtle from Portage la Prairie. The Red River, Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan River form a long line over which the greater number of the troops engaged in suppressing the last rebellion were transported to Winnipeg from the field.

The vast region that has thus been so indefinitely described is divided politically into divisions, for the administration of local laws, called Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Athabasca, and a vast undivided region to the north of Saskatchewan and Athabasca, that is called the North-west Territory, all corresponding to our Territories; and Manitoba corresponding to one of our States.

The importance of Winnipeg and the Grand Rapids of the

Saskatchewan as points that it would be desirable to take and hold by an enemy at war with Canada would at once appear to strategists. Only one hundred miles intervene between our international boundary line and the southern point of Lake Winnipeg, and the city of Winnipeg occupies a place half-way between and commands all the main lines of communication to the east and west within that space. The Grand Rapids held by an enemy would prevent the use of the water line commanding the Lake of the Woods and the country west of the Saskatchewan.

HISTORICAL.*

Until the middle of the seventeenth century the country west of Lake Superior had been visited for the purpose of obtaining the furs the animals of the region furnished. The fur country was reached from Lake Superior along the courses of sluggish streams and lakes and over many portages. The fur hunters were generally French. Their descendants, by marrying squaws, have produced a race that has become quite an important factor in the history of the country. This race of people is known by the name of The Half-breeds. In 1666 two Frenchmen made the canoe voyage from Lake Superior to Hudson's Bay, passing through the Lake of the Woods and down the Winnipeg River to Lake Winnipeg, thence through Nelson River to the Bay. Having thus demonstrated the practicability of reaching the "heart of the fur country" by the way of Hudson's Bay, a charter was applied for to the French king, but it was not obtained. A similar application to the English authorities by the same parties was successful, and the charter of the famous *Hudson's Bay Company* was granted by Charles II., 1670.

The French afterward claimed the country covered by Charles's charter, and in the year 1686 they captured Forts Rupert, Moose and Albany on James's Bay. By the treaty of Ryswick, 1697, these forts were secured to the French. Sixteen years later, by the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, the country was transferred to the English.

It was but natural to expect that the French Canadians and other fur hunters penetrating the country from the east would come into collision with the hunters of the English company ap-

* The chief facts in this brief sketch have been obtained from Macoun's "Manitoba and the Great North-west," pp. 687, and "Reminiscences of the North-west Rebellions," by Major Boulton, pp. 530.

proaching from the north. The French were very energetic in exploring the country and erecting trading-posts. Fort Rouge (now Winnipeg) was built at the forks of the Red and Assiniboine in 1734. But they did not stay at the Red River but pushed far to the north-west, ascending the Saskatchewan and erecting Fort à la Corne, near the junction of the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers.

By the Peace of Paris, 1763, Canada (that portion of the country lying east of Manitoba) was ceded to England. Thus by the Treaty of Utrecht and the Peace of Paris, England obtained both Canada and what is now Manitoba and the North-west Territory.

In the meantime the Hudson's Bay Company had been busy building up their fur trade. Posts were established at many points and the Indians taught to bring in their furs. It had been the policy of the Company to suppress information concerning the country and the fur trade. The enterprising Frobisher (1775) penetrated the region to the west and north-west of the Hudson's Bay stations and intercepted the Indians on their way to sell their annual catch of furs, clearing fifty thousand dollars. Following this, other traders did likewise, and in 1784 a rival company, called the North-west Company, was formed. Then began a long period of rivalry and bickering between the agents of the two companies.

Lord Selkirk, after having visited the country, purchased forty per cent. of the Hudson's Bay Company's stock. He then got the directors to grant him 116,000 square miles of the territory on condition that he would establish a colony (1811). This grant would have extended south two hundred miles into the United States! The grant was confirmed. The North-west Company protested, claiming prior occupancy. Lord Selkirk's first colonists arrived in 1812. Two years afterward hostilities began between the rival companies by the act of the Hudson's Bay Company in taking supplies by force from the post of the North-west Company at the mouth of the Louis River. The North-west Company retaliated by shipping the discontented Selkirk settlers out of the country. The next year Lord Selkirk re-established his colony and began a vigorous war upon the North-west Company's posts, attacking and capturing Fort Gibraltar and the fort at the mouth of the Pembina River (the site is now occupied by the town of Pembina, U. S., one mile north of the U. S. military post of Fort Pembina). An attack was also made upon the

North-west Company's post of Fort Qu'Appelle at the junction of the Qu'Appelle and Assiniboine Rivers, but it was not successful.

A party of Half-breeds and Indians sent from Fort Qu'Appelle to Lake Winnipeg to escort supplies back to the fort, was passing around the Hudson's Bay post on Point Douglas,* when a Hudson's Bay Company party of twenty-eight men were met under the command of one Temple. The Half-breeds formed their line in semi-circular shape with the extremities enveloping the flanks of Mr. Temple's forces. Mr. Temple attempted to withdraw by marching backward, endeavoring to extend his line at the same time so as to keep the Half-breeds in his front; when this movement began the firing opened. The Hudson's Bay party was totally defeated, losing twenty-one men killed and one wounded, with the remainder prisoners. The Half-breeds lost one killed and one wounded. This affair is known as the Battle of Seven Oaks.

In 1821 the two companies were consolidated under the name of the Hudson's Bay Company. Forty shares of the stock went to the old North-west Company's members and sixty to the old Hudson's Bay Company's members.

From 1821 to 1869 the country rapidly increased in population and wealth. In 1867 the British North-American Act united a number of the eastern Provinces for the purposes of local government, under the title of the Dominion of Canada. In 1869 the Dominion Government proposed to purchase, and unite with the Dominion, the territory of the Hudson's Bay Company. The Company was offered three hundred thousand pounds, provided the consent of the English Government could be procured within one month. One-twentieth of the land was to remain the property of the Company. The servants of the Company, whose interests had not been consulted, were opposed to the transfer; also "the French party desired to be left as they were, or if annexation had to take place, let it be to the United States." The French party, or Half-breeds, had gradually settled along the banks of the water-courses, making for themselves comfortable homes. The advent of surveyors, who began to divide the land up into square blocks, after the United States plan, created a sense of insecurity among them. The suggestions of

* Now in the city limits of Winnipeg, occupied by Ogilvie's Mills.

the surveyors that some arrangement should be made with the Half-breeds were not acted upon.

The Half-breeds, under the leadership of the since famous Louis Riel, assembled at River Salle and built a barricade across the road. The Canadian Government, having appointed a governor for the territory and sent him out to Winnipeg or Fort Garry, let the matter rest, never supposing that acts of a revolutionary character would be resorted to. The government had also resolved not to pay over the purchase money unless the Hudson's Bay Company should turn over the country as agreed to. A revolution had not been bargained for.

Riel ordered the surveyors to cease their work, and as soon as the Governor (Mr. Macdougall) entered the territory, he had him (the governor) to be sent across the line into the United States. The cold winter season having set in, the Governor remained all winter at Pembina.

Riel having then collected a force of a hundred men proceeded north to Fort Garry and took possession without opposition although the authorities at the fort had known for some time that Riel threatened such a course. Large quantities of supplies fell into Riel's hands together with a number of cannon and small-arms and ordnance stores. It is this surrender without opposition that led to the supposition that the Hudson's Bay Company's *employés* were opposed to the surrender of the territory to the Dominion Government. Others hold, that as the small number of Canadians were the only ones in the territory favorable to the transfer the Company did not desire the Half-breeds and Indians to make war upon them and drive them from the country. After getting possession of Fort Garry, Riel made prisoners of a number of the citizens of the country. To release these prisoners, a company of Canadians was raised at Portage la Prairie and proceeded to Kildonan, a few miles north of Winnipeg. Here a demand was made upon Riel for the release of all he had confined. Riel promptly complied, but as the company was returning to the Portage a party was sent out from Fort Garry by Riel to overhaul the members (who at the time were not all armed) and bring them into the fort. Riel's orders were complied with.

Archbishop Taché, a man who had lived a number of years among these Half-breeds and Indians, and had great influence with them, being on his return from Rome was delegated to restore peace and grant a general amnesty to all the insurgents. The

terms finally granted the Half-breeds patents to their homes; to each head of family one hundred and sixty acres, and to each child two hundred and forty acres.

In the meantime Sir Garnet Wolseley had been dispatched to the disturbed region with a force of British Regulars and Canadian Volunteers. "Sir Garnet Wolseley selected the route for his expedition by the way of the chain of lakes and rivers which have been so frequently used during the early explorations, as well as by the traders of the North-west Company. * * The history of the expedition is an exceedingly interesting one." Sir Garnet had in his recent expedition up the Nile a number of these Canadians with him, he having witnessed their powers of endurance and their success in getting boats, etc., over the portages and rapids. Colonel Wolseley arrived at Fort Garry on the 24th of August, 1870, and Riel gave up the reins of power a few moments before his arrival.

The Canadian Government then created Manitoba a Province. Riel was disposed of by paying him several thousand dollars, on condition that he would leave the country. He took up his residence in Montana, there to await a second call from his people to lead them. Thus ended what is known as "Riel's first rebellion."

Late in the year 1870 a party of Fenians under O'Neal made a raid into Manitoba, taking the Hudson's Bay Company post, a few miles north of the boundary line (West Lynne). As O'Neal had made his raid from United States territory, he was promptly followed by our troops and compelled to return.

To enforce the laws over the newly acquired territory the Canadian Government created the "mounted police" force. At present this body of troops consists of one thousand men.

THE REBELLION OF 1885.

Fifteen years (1870-1885) had passed away and the spring of 1885 again found the Half-breeds confronted by the surveyors, this time near the junction of the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers. The same Half-breeds and their descendants having sold their scrip and their farms (at rates far below the real value), had collected their household gods in their Red River carts and set out for pastures new on the streams far back in the North-west. There they took up land in irregular strips along the banks of the various water-courses. The surveyors not having any instructions

concerning the lands of the Half-breeds continued their work. The Half-breeds then dispatched a few of their leaders to Sun River, Montana, for their old leader, Riel. The latter agreed to take charge of the Half-breed affairs, and set out at once for Batoche, the headquarters. In March he formed a provisional government with himself at the head. It had been his plan to wait for at least a month before beginning hostilities, then the prairies would be free of snow and would furnish all the forage needed for the Half-breed and Indian ponies. But the necessities of the moment required that he should obtain supplies in the immediate vicinity, and to that end he sent out foraging parties who brought in what was needed, together with a number of persons as prisoners who had not given freely to the support of the cause.

A party of thirty Half-breeds under command of Gabriel Dumont, was sent out (March 20) to collect supplies near Duck Lake. Duck Lake is about half-way between Batoche and Fort Carleton. Near the lake are a number of Indian reserves. On nearing Duck Lake a squad of men from Fort Carleton were encountered. The sergeant in charge of the squad sent to the fort for re-enforcements. Major Crozier, of the Mounted Police, commanding Fort Carleton, promptly responded to the call. Upon approaching Duck Lake his advance-guard was driven in. Thereupon Major Crozier attempted to "reason with the enemy" by "holding a parley." During the Major's conversation the Half-breeds attempted to surround the Canadians, and were partially successful. Upon perceiving the intention of the enemy the Canadians fell back, but in doing so they were exposed to a heavy enfilade fire from a house on one of the flanks that the Half-breeds had secured. The Canadians lost twelve men killed and twenty-five wounded. Major Crozier continued the retreat to Fort Carleton. There he was joined by Colonel Irvine with re-enforcements. Fort Carleton was then abandoned, the garrison retiring to Prince Albert. Riel's forces took possession of the fort on the 3d of April.

The Canadian Government foreseeing that great trouble was in store, determined to take prompt action. The available forces being from 2,500 to 3,000 miles away from the scenes of the insurrection no delay was permissible in forwarding both troops and supplies. Major-General Sir F. Middleton, a British Regular officer detailed to command the Canadian forces for a period of five

years from 1884, was directed to proceed with all available forces to the disturbed territories and suppress the insurrection as quickly as possible. He proceeded over the Canadian Pacific Railway, collecting additional troops at Winnipeg and other points. He stopped part of his forces at Qu'Appelle, forwarded others to Moose Jaw, Swift Current, and Calgary. From these points he ordered an advance to the north. This disposition was made to re-assure the peaceable settlers along the line of the Saskatchewan and at the same time to prevent, if possible, the Indians on the various reserves from proceeding east to join the leaders. The Qu'Appelle column was under the immediate command of the General himself.

The columns from Qu'Appelle and Moose Jaw were to proceed north to Clark's Crossing, in the neighborhood of the Half-breed headquarters. Thence an advance was to be made down the South Saskatchewan toward Batoche, the command to be divided into two columns, one to advance down the right bank and the other the left bank; a large scow to be used as a ferry in case either column was engaged in force, was to accompany the two columns.

General Middleton's column had made an excellent march from Qu'Appelle, covering two hundred and ten miles in ten days. The ground was in a bad condition, rapid advance being impossible, as the mud, due to the melting snows, would freeze during the night, thus rendering the march still more difficult.

Disturbances had been reported from the vicinity of Prince Albert, Fort Carleton, Battleford and Fort Pitt, all places situated along the North Saskatchewan River, two hundred and fifty miles north of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Fort Carleton is forty miles west of Prince Albert, from Fort Carleton to Battleford is one hundred miles, and Fort Pitt is one hundred miles west of Battleford.

MOVEMENTS OF THE QU'APPELLE COLUMN.

The command, divided as stated above, accompanied by the scow, advanced down the river, in the direction of Batoche, leaving Clark's Crossing April 23. The right column, General Middleton commanding, had scouts in advance covering half a mile front. The scouts had intervals of fifty yards. Next came the main body of scouts at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards. Three hundred yards further to the rear came the infantry

advance-guard, and three hundred yards to their rear came the main body and the transportation. On the march this formation was always maintained. At night strong pickets were always posted. Upon going into camp a *sareba* was formed in the following manner: The teams follow one another round and round in a spiral, the leading team turning inward, followed closely by the others. The teams are thus finally closed upon each other forming a deep and unmovable mass. The camp is pitched in front, cavalry on the right, then artillery, then infantry, headquarters in rear.*



Eighteen miles were passed over the first day out from Clark's Crossing, leaving only twenty-two miles to Batoche. An early start was made on the 24th. Indications of an enemy soon began to appear. After marching about four miles, upon approaching the south side of Fish Creek the deployed scouts were fired upon by a detachment of Half-breeds stationed at the edge of some timber at the left of the trail upon which General Middleton's command was advancing. (See sketch.†) This position of the Half-breeds is shown at A. The scouts immediately, at command, made a half wheel to the left, charged and drove the detachment to the edge of the abrupt incline leading to the bed of Fish Creek. Fish Creek is a sluggish stream of ten feet width with vertical

* Boulton's "Reminiscences."

† Canadians — Half-Breeds . . .

banks about five feet. It flows in a tortuous course through a bottom of a hundred yards wide. Near the Clark's Crossing trail, where the Half-breeds had selected their position, the bottom is covered with a thick growth of brush and high grass. A short ravine with precipitous sides leads to the creek from the south side. Along the edge of this ravine, through the brush and following up Fish Creek for a quarter of a mile, the Half-breeds had selected their position, increasing the natural strength by digging a number of rifle-pits.

Upon the retreat of the Half-breed pickets to the main position, the Canadian scouts were dismounted and a heavy fire kept up in the direction of the enemy to prevent his coming out and attacking the scouts and driving them upon the advance-guard and main body before their deployment.

All this time the Half-breeds had kept up a heavy fire, doing some execution by leaving their rifle-pits occasionally and taking a snap shot. They also attempted to turn both the right and left flanks of the Canadians, concealing part of the movement by sending troops up and down the stream covered by the timber and the southern slope. This attempt was discovered and frustrated by sending two companies of infantry to the left, as indicated in the sketch. In this, part of the Half-breed forces were cut off, some of the Canadians getting between them and their main body. These Canadians crossed the creek and ascended to the prairie level on the other side; there they took up a position giving an enfilade and reverse fire on a part of the Half-breed position. Three companies were sent off to the right to check the enemy's advance in that direction. The Half-breeds were driven back, fifty of them, with their commander, Gabriel Dumont, leaving the field "to return to Batoche for re-enforcements." The Canadian right then advanced down the creek toward the enemy's position. The troops that were engaged in the Half-breed front gradually advanced and took up a position along the edge of the slope, assuming the position shown in the sketch. The guns raked the bottom with good effect, and part of the time was enabled to enfilade a part of the short ravine. The General refused to grant permission to have a charge made to drive the Half-breeds from their rifle-pits, as it would cause the loss of more lives and not affect the work of the day. About four o'clock he gave orders for the firing to cease. The enemy then withdrew to Batoche.

The column on the left bank of the river hearing the firing made every effort to get to the relief of their comrades, but the scow proved to be of little value, and it was not till the afternoon that a portion of the column had crossed the river and was ready to march to the aid of those engaged.

Camp was formed for the night near the scene of the action; the hospital was put into shape for work, and suitable arrangements were made to repel a night attack.

The Canadian troops engaged at Fish Creek numbered forty-five officers and four hundred and seventy-two men; the Half-breeds, two hundred and eighty. The Canadian loss was eleven killed and forty wounded; the Half-breeds, eight killed and eleven wounded.


If an effort had been made to drive the Half-breeds from their main position by a charge early in the action, it would have been successful beyond a doubt. Such an effort would probably have been made if the Canadian commander had known more of the enemy's strength and had reconnoitered the ground. An all-day's fight would have thus been avoided and the loss of life would, probably, have been less. As it was the fight lasted nearly all day, and then the enemy was permitted to withdraw.

On the 5th of May a steamer with supplies, re-enforcements and a Gatling gun, the last in charge of Captain Howard, a representative of the American firm, arrived from Saskatchewan Landing, a point on the South Saskatchewan, thirty miles north of Swift Current. The same day a reconnoissance, in the direction of Batoche, was made by General Middleton. Two days later (May 7), having again divided his forces as before, the General took up the march. The camp that night was pitched about six miles from Batoche. The next day another reconnoissance was made and the camp shifted still nearer the enemy. Before leaving Fish Creek the steamboat had been arranged with a view of having a combined attack from the river and land, the attack being fixed for the 9th. A mistake was made by the officer in command of the boat in not anchoring or stopping his boat soon enough. So, when the troops were advancing toward the enemy on the morning of the 9th the noise of the attack by the Half-breeds on the boat was heard, but as the distance separating the two forces was too great, nothing could be done to aid the boat. The boat finally managed to escape down the stream.

The land on the east side of the South Saskatchewan near

Batoche, consists of two mesas or benches rising one above the other. The lower one reaches half a mile back (east) of the river, measured on a line running through the village perpendicular to the river. The second or prairie bench rises abruptly from the first in an incline, the slope of which is covered with timber. This wooded incline surrounds Batoche in the shape of a semi-ellipse. The second bench, for some distance from the river on both sides of the Clark's Crossing trail, is so heavily timbered that the open prairie to the east of the village (right of the trail approaching Batoche) cannot be seen from the trail. Neither can the lower bench be seen until the crest of the slope is nearly reached, near the river on the left, about a thousand yards from the village.

The Half-breeds had taken up a position along the crest of the slope at the edge of the timber where they had dug their rifle-pits. At the foot of the crest near the Clark's Crossing trail they had massed part of their reserves. They had also advanced parties in barricaded houses in front of the crest. Their line of rifle-pits had been formed somewhat peculiarly; the right faced toward the approaching Canadians, while their left was formed to face the river, in this manner :*



The force of circumstances caused them to afterward change their pits so that the line would face toward the enemy. The object of this peculiar arrangement seems to have been in case their right was pierced or forced to give way the left could protect the retreat and give Riel and his staff in Batoche a means of escape to the Birch Hills.

On the morning of the 9th the Canadians made an early start, leaving the camp undisturbed. When about half a mile from the point where the trail begins to descend the slope toward Batoche, it was discovered that the houses were barricaded. The troops were then hurrying to the aid of the steamboat. The guns were promptly brought into action and the houses emptied. The scouts advanced to near the crest, but the heavy fire they met with forced them to retire to the neighborhood of the church and there assemble. In the meantime another heavy skirmish line had been sent forward, but just upon entering the timber a heavy fire

* The arrows indicating the direction of their front.


from the concealed rifle-pits caused it to halt. The artillery having received orders to change its position, began to limber up, but while doing so a heavy fire was poured into the command by a body of the enemy that advanced close to the edge of the timber. "The Gatling, which was just getting into action, with Captain Howard at the crank, turned its fire on the concealed foe, and for the moment silenced them. Captain Howard on this occasion showed his gun off to the best advantage and very pluckily worked it with great coolness, although the fire from the enemy was very hot for a time. This is the incident that was magnified into 'the Gatling saving the guns.' The illustrated papers drew vivid pictures of our artillery surrounded by a horde of savages and Captain Howard's Gatling pouring forth its bullets for their salvation and 'mowing 'em down.' These absurd illustrations and absurder comments unfairly reflected upon our artillery and their officers; but Captain Howard did nothing more than was repeatedly done by our gunners, and were it not that he was an officer belonging to the American Service, partaking of our hospitality and serving with us, I do not suppose his name would have been mentioned."*

The Canadian position occupying about the broken line, S B C, was held during the day. In the afternoon the camp was advanced to the position shown in the sketch. At the end of the day the troops were withdrawn to the camp, which was carefully intrenched. On the 10th the Canadians took up a position, A B C, in rear of the one occupied the day before, the enemy having advanced their line to S. No attack by either party was made during this day. During a reconnoissance the open plateau P, on the right, was discovered. General Middleton again withdrew his line in the evening.

On the morning of the 11th the General made a reconnoissance to the newly ascertained position of the open ground on the right, accompanied by the Gatling and some mounted troops. Upon reaching the plateau, a skirmish line was thrown forward to develop the strength and show the position of the enemy. This disposition caused the Half-breeds to face their rifle-pits "the other way." After capturing a herd of cattle the troops were assembled and then withdrawn. The main body, during this day, occupied their former position on the left, facing the crest.

* Boulton's "Reminiscences."

The assault was determined upon for the morning of the 12th, and to divert the attention of the enemy the General accompanied a body of troops to the plateau before mentioned, directing that while he was engaged on the right the main attack should be made by his left. Owing to some mistake this part of the programme was not carried out. The General, after losing one officer, killed, returned to find that nothing had been done.



About 1 P. M. six companies were ordered forward. They advanced and took up the position shown on the sketch from A to C. Then the lines A and B were rapidly wheeled to the right, driving the enemy before them until they assumed the positions A, B, C and D. The artillery and the Gatling were placed on the crest between A and B. From these positions the advance to the attack was made as indicated by the dotted lines and arrows. The Half-breeds made a short stand at the village and then escaped to the Birch Hills (north-east of Batoché). The Canadian loss was four officers killed and nine men wounded; the Half-breed loss was about twenty killed.

After a short stay in Batoché, Gen. Middleton moved down the river about ten miles, and crossed, going to Prince Albert. In the meantime Riel had had himself conducted to the General's camp, and there he surrendered himself. Gabriel Dumont escaped

to the United States. With the fall of Batoche the Half-breed rebellion of 1885 virtually ended.

In this fight Gen. Middleton thoroughly reconnoitered the ground, and ascertained accurately the position of the enemy before he ordered the final attack, and had not the steamboat failed ignominiously to perform the part assigned to it, the victory would have been even more complete. This failure on the part of the Navy no doubt caused the repulse and loss of life in the first day's advance. The commander of the steamer attributes his failure to the insubordination of his alien crew.

After relieving Prince Albert, the march was taken up for Battleford.

COL. OTTER'S ADVANCE FROM SWIFT CURRENT.

Col. Otter, having received orders to march to Battleford and relieve that place, he collected transportation at Swift Current and proceeded north with over five hundred troops, two pieces of artillery and a Gatling gun. At Saskatchewan Landing, where his route crossed the South Saskatchewan, several days were consumed in crossing his command, but, once over, he made the intervening one hundred and eighty miles in five days.

The supply trains that followed this command were not properly escorted, and hostile Indians were enabled to take one of these trains and a large supply of much-needed provisions.

Previous to Col. Otter's advance, Poundmaker's band of Indians had committed a number of depredations and had murdered a number of citizens in the vicinity of Battleford, and, on the arrival of Col. Otter, they were surprised in looting and burning the houses on the south side of the river at that point.

The Indians then withdrew to Cut Knife Hill, and there awaited Col. Otter's approach. The Colonel determined to surprise the Indians, if possible, and then attack them and withdraw to Battleford. He was successful in his surprise, but his attack must be recorded a failure. In fact, his advance was so incautious that he came near leading his troops to a massacre instead of to a victorious battle-field.

It had been the design of Poundmaker's Indians to join Riel but the fight at Duck Lake brought out the Canadian forces fully a month earlier than was expected.

Cut Knife Hill is thirty-five miles west of Battleford, on the west bank of Cut Knife Creek, a small stream flowing north of

the Battle River. The vicinity of the creek is much cut up by a number of *coulées* leading to the creek from both sides. From bluff to bluff, measured across the stream, is probably two hundred yards. The intervening valley is covered with poplar timber. Poundmaker had his camp on the west side of the Creek, and concealed behind a small stretch of timber. (See sketch.)

At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 2d the advancing column of Canadians began descending the slope leading to the creek bottom. Following the trail that ascends the inclined plane to the prairie level on the west side, the troops met the Indians rapidly filing out of their camp and taking up positions in the *coulées* that flanked the Canadian advance. Had Poundmaker been on the alert he would undoubtedly have had these flank *coulées* already occupied, and the ambuscades would have been followed by the usual massacre.

Col. Otter, discovering the designs of the enemy, promptly formed his line so as to form three sides of a square facing the positions taken by the Indians. Several successful charges were made on the Indians at different points, but as fast as they were driven from one point they appeared in force at another. The Indians then attempted to get in the rear of the Canadians, and this caused the deployment of the reserves, and a charge by the latter drove the enemy from any further attempt in that direction.

After six hours' fighting the Colonel determined to retire, and, to prepare the way, he ordered a gun and some troops across the creek to occupy the bluffs at G and B to cover the movement. The Indians, perceiving the intention of the Canadians, "pressed upon them with great vigor." The withdrawal was made in detail and in skirmishing order. The position of the guns and troops on the east bank was a good one, commanding, as it did, the line of retreat and permitting the successful accomplishment of the movement. The Gatling gun in this fight rendered good service. The Canadian force numbered three hundred and twenty men; "the number of the enemy was fully five hundred fighting men, including fifty Half-breeds."* "If it had not been for the precautionary measures in placing the guns and the Gatling in so good a position, it is doubtful if it (the retreat) could have been accomplished with so little loss of life. The guns dropped their shells into the advancing Indians and the Gatling

* Col. Otter's Report.

swept the face of the hill, down which they were following our troops."* The Canadians lost eight killed and thirteen wounded.

THE CALGARY COLUMN.

The object in advancing a column from Calgary north was to re-assure the peaceful citizens of Edmonton and vicinity, as there are a number of Indian reserves in that region; also to relieve Fort Pitt further east on the North Saskatchewan. On the 13th of April a massacre, in which thirteen white males were killed, occurred at Frog Lake, thirty miles north of Fort Pitt. The Indians then laid siege to Fort Pitt, which was shortly afterward abandoned by the commanding officer, Inspector Dickens, of the Mounted Police, a son of the great English novelist.

Gen. Strange, in command of the column, left Calgary April 20th, and reached Fort Pitt the 25th, to find it in flames. He learned that the Indians, under Big Bear, had gone east to Frenchman's Butte, taking the supplies that the fort contained.

Taking with him one gun, twenty-nine cavalry and about two hundred men, Gen. Strange started in pursuit of the Indians. His scouts soon reported the presence of the hostiles, whereupon the wagons were ordered to be packed, and an advance of four miles was made. The next day (28th) the advance was resumed. From the many trails converging in the direction of the enemy, the General was convinced that heavy re-enforcements had been received by them. "About 7.30 A. M. I found the Indian forces occupying an impregnable position at the forks of the Red Deer and Little Red Deer, presenting a salient with a natural glacis, crowned with brush and rifle-pits, covering the front and flanks of the position, which extended about three miles. I deployed the little force at my disposal. * * The gun made excellent practice, silencing several rifle-pits. Finding the direct attack impracticable, I ordered Major Steele to retire his men, mount and make a detour to endeavor to turn the enemy's right flank while occupying the attention in front. After being absent for some time he returned and reported the enemy's position extending for a mile and a half with a muskeg in front, impassable for his men, the enemy's position being about three miles in extent and defended, the scouts informed me, by at least six hundred, some of whom crept through the wood around me, and opened fire upon

* Boulton's "Reminiscences."

the wagons corralled in the rear. * * I judged it advisable to retire to more open ground." *

The Canadian forces were now concentrated at Battleford under command of Gen. Middleton, and at Fort Pitt under Gen. Strange. Gen. Middleton then determined to pursue Big Bear, he being the only hostile chief that had not surrendered. Pound-maker had surrendered about the time of the General's arrival at Battleford. Gen. Middleton then proceeded to Fort Pitt. Col. Otter was ordered north from Battleford to Turtle Lake, with orders to intercept any Indians escaping east. Gen. Strange was to start north from a point some distance west of Fort Pitt to Cold Lake and Lake des Isles. Col. Irvine was to go to Crooked Lake from Fort Carleton, while Gen. Middleton proposed to follow Big Bear's trail from Frenchman's Butte north to Loon Lake and beyond.

Big Bear succeeded in making his escape east, passing south between the columns of Col. Irvine. He crossed the Saskatchewan a little west of Fort Carleton, and shortly afterward gave himself up to an officer of the mounted police.

Gen. Middleton's pursuit of Big Bear was through a very rough country, numerous muskegs, lakes and streams had to be crossed. For the transportation of supplies *travoies* had to be used. "A *travoie* is two long poles crossed and attached to the neck of the horse, the ends dragging to the ground, the load being bound on behind the horse. This is the Indian mode of transport over these roads."

The rebellion having been suppressed, the troops were ordered home. The line of the Saskatchewan River to Grand Rapids, thence by the lakes and Red River to Winnipeg, was the one selected for transporting the larger part of them.

Thus closed Riel's second rebellion within a few months of its conception. Riel's only hope of success lay in uniting the Indians and Half-breeds, in driving the settlers and the Hudson's Bay Company from the territories; and in protracting the conflict until the Canadian Government would agree to terms. He evidently did not anticipate such prompt action on the part of the authorities. He permitted hostilities to begin before the prairies were clear of snow, thereby depriving himself of his main supply of forage for his horses and ponies. Then after the fight at Duck Lake had precipitated matters he quietly waited at Batoche till the Canadian

* Gen. Strange's report.

forces were on the ground, instead of taking the field promptly. The force he sent to Fish Creek to ambush a portion of Gen. Middleton's divided command was altogether inadequate. This was Riel's one great chance after his fatal delay after Duck Lake. His position at Batoche was faulty; first, because he attempted to cover too large a front; second, because he did not make use of the natural advantages of the position to strike the Canadians on their right flank as they approached. He must have known that after Fish Creek his success must lay in forming a junction with the other forces of the rebels. In fact his whole course shows him to have been a cowardly commander without brains or energy. And why such an individual should be voluntarily sought to lead in a great movement is incomprehensible.

Too much praise cannot be given the Canadian Government for the prompt and sufficient means taken to suppress the uprising. By this action the rebels were found unprepared. The authorities seem to have avoided the course so often fatally pursued by governments both powerful and weak. As modern instances take the case of our late Civil War, and Russia in her last War with Turkey (1877), Great Britain in the Soudan and South Africa.

After leaving the railways and rivers, ten dollars a day with forage and rations were paid for teams. Therefore those possessing means of transportation were quick in responding to the call. Such a mode of procedure saved much more in the end than the regulation process of advertising, with so many days notice for the lowest bidder. Gen. Middleton evidently intended that there should be no failure in the logistics in his campaign.

THE CANADIAN TROOPS.*

Gen. Middleton's command was composed of the mounted police, three hundred strong, in the way of Regulars, part of the Canadian militia, and the various schools of instruction.

The mounted police has now been increased to one thousand. The "schools" are located in various portions of the Dominion for the purpose of giving instruction in the military art to those desiring it. The officers of these schools are permanent, while the men are enlisted for stated terms. The schools, with the mounted police, now afford a permanent regular force of two thousand men.

* See also a number of able articles that have appeared in the JOURNAL from a foreign correspondent of Council.

All the Dominion troops acquitted themselves well in the last rebellion, though most of them were under fire for the first time.

The commander of all the Canadian forces is selected from the distinguished officers of the British Army, and is detailed for a period of five years.

Gen. Middleton, the present Commander-in-chief, is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and has served with distinction in India, New Zealand, Burmah, and elsewhere. His rapid and energetic movements, and the thorough way in which he finished his work, need no comment.

THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF ENGLAND IN INDIA.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. LAZELLE, U. S. A.,

TWENTY-THIRD INFANTRY.

THE people of India are of the great Aryan race and belong to the same stock which to-day extends westwardly from India to the Atlantic Ocean and is rapidly absorbing Africa. But commerce, religion and sometimes language impress a great resemblance upon people of different origins, and a general kinship of customs has been maintained up to the present time, from the Nile to the Indus, among all those nations through which have run, for thousands of years, the routes of great caravans which to-day, however, seem to be kept up for the sole purpose of trading off goods of Eastern Europe for the Asiatic cholera. Thus the manners and customs of Egyptians, Turks, Arabs, Persians and Afghans assimilate closely to those of the natives of India, and especially is this the case among those professing the Mohammedan religion. They extend to dress, methods of salutation; to dwellings and mosques; to the shops of merchants; to the mud houses of the poor laborer; and to the vast social gap between the aristocratic and the humble. The methods of agriculture are identical; and one sees in India the railroad laborer excavating and carrying out earth and rock on his head in baskets, in the same manner as canals are now dug and ancient tombs excavated in Egypt. Marriage customs, among Mohammedans especially, are similar, and some words, as "back-sheesh," used in begging, and the "salaam," or the salutation, are the same. Nothing in this is surprising, since a similar civilization everywhere follows great roads of travel; and the caravan routes used to-day have been those of both trade and conquest for thou-

sands of years, and are the same as traversed by Alexander the Great, by Xenophon and by the lieutenants of Ghengis Khan.

The natives of India are a gentle, refined, art-loving people. In no country, Italy not excepted, is the love of art more innate; and nowhere is there presented a higher standard of taste in figure posing and of effect in color combination, whether in embroidery, weaving or painting. In pottery and brass work their patterns are those which, for thousands of years, have most pleased mankind—combinations of slender, graceful, curved parts with massive parts—the same as are found in the pyramids of Egypt, in the tombs of Cyprus and in the ruins of Pompeii, and as to-day are imitated in the art pottery of Dresden and Worcester. Nothing can exceed in richness of coloring, delicacy and perfection of work, their paintings on ivory, especially figure painting—the most difficult of all. They are passionately fond of ornaments, of dress, of music, of flowers and delicate perfumes. They love illuminated books; are fond of coin collections, and the dwellings of the wealthy are models of exquisite taste in furnishings and decorations; and in architecture, the world might be challenged to produce the equal of that dream in marble—the Taj of India. Perhaps I need not say that such high knowledge of art implies a knowledge of the ideal in art, or the power of culling beauty from individual objects and uniting them in one. Wherever in the world's history this high-art power has been manifested by a people, they have been found to be cultivated and refined, the race homogeneous and of fixed national character with rigid political forms, and inflexible religious dogmas.

That the political condition may be understood, one must know something of the governmental parceling out; of race distinctions, and of religion, as well as of the social status, based on caste. For fifteen hundred years before the English conquest India was merely a geographical expression. The present government has all the elements of a military despotism as arbitrary as any on earth. The sole power, civil and military, resides in the Viceroy and his Council of a few advisers, their acts being subject to the final approval of the Home Government. Measures of political significance only, receive attention in England, everything affecting special affairs or local in character being decided by the local governors or by the supreme English authority.

For better administration India is divided into three general

Presidencies: Bombay, Bengal and Madras. Each of these, together with the North-west provinces, having a governor and a separate organization for local government. Final decisions upon their affairs, however, are in the hands of the Viceroy and his Council.

One-fifth of the dominion of India is under the nominal government of native princes, though a part of the English Empire. At the capital of the territory of each is a trusted and able English military resident, perfectly conversant with the native language and familiar with the Rajah's methods of control. All of his governmental acts, and all others affecting the people at large, are at once reported to the supreme English Council, and are there either approved or suspended.

Each native prince maintains an army by direct taxation, the largest numbering about twelve thousand men.

The armament is, however, in no case modern; the infantry being armed with the muzzle-loading percussion lock rifles, and the artillery with smooth-bore guns.

The entire area of India, except the territories of the native Rajahs, is subdivided for the collection of revenue and local control into provinces.

All land devoted to cultivation is claimed by the Crown, an idea and system inherited from native rulers. It is rented on leases running indefinitely. The Crown, represented by the Viceroy and Council, claims the right to tax the producer for his privilege of tillage and for protection. Leases are usually taken by the principal men of the native villages, who subrent to the poorer dependents. The land for which the inhabitants of each land-tilling village must pay, is re-assessed every thirty years, on the basis of annual production, cost of labor and yielding returns. The tax usually amounts to far more than the amount paid to the Government by those who first lease. It must be paid in coin, or the tenant goes, unless he can bargain with the principal lessee. To remain, he usually borrows money at a high rate of interest, and in case of failure to pay, he is arraigned before the civil magistrate, and is usually compelled by the law to work out the claim. Thus, through improvidence, or the failure of his crop, the low-caste laborer becomes a serf or bondsman, with his condition of peonage indefinitely and legally prolonged.

There is but little income to the State from other sources, but that from land taxation is enormous, and is steadily increas-

ing as the country is brought nearer the markets of the world, and is stimulated by the hope of ready profits to extend her areas of cultivation.

India is a territory of many religious sects and of hundreds of communities, differing even in the dominant religion of Brahma, and it is a territory of many languages and race differences, though races have many points of affinity in temperament, color, customs, and much in common, springing from climatic influences and from those brought about by common grievances.

The people have not been accustomed to resisting authority, nor to the rule of their own princes but to a limited extent; for, during the past 2300 years there has been no less than eight invasions, the first of the Mohammedan inroads being in 1001 A. D., which marked the end of both the isolation and of the independence of India. There have been two great Mussulman conquests and one great Hindoo reaction against Mussulman power and the Mohammedan religion.

The Brahminical system of religion extends over the whole country, though there are fifty millions of Mohammedans and seventy millions of Buddhists. Brahminism is the creed of the common majority, and is the germ from which Indian nationality will spring, for the pressure exerted upon it by Islamism and Buddhism seems only to force its activity. Caste separation applies to the Brahminic native classes, though the rigid separation of society through distinction arising from conquest, labor, religion and wealth, extends to the whole population.

Caste originally was based upon color; and, as in ancient times, a conquered people became the slaves of the conquerors, caste probably originated in wars and conquests, and has been strengthened by industrial distinctions, diversity of race and forms of religion; and "its strength still rests on the religious as well as the social idea that certain functions of society should be committed to particular classes, upon ideas of physical and moral purity, and upon the idea that an indelible stain rests on certain orders of men from their birth." According to a recent census there are 1929 different castes in India, embracing over one hundred and thirty millions of people, about forty-five millions of whom belong to three great castes.

Many caste divisions have originated in religious departures, springing up now and then from some new incantation of

Brahma, gotten up by the priesthood to revivify faith and strengthen their own power.

A native may follow the trade or occupation of a higher or lower caste without "losing caste," provided that he recognizes and practices the particular rules and customs of his own caste, and adheres to their religious observances in the preparation of food, association with his fellows, marriage forms, etc., etc.

The laws of caste prohibit a man from marrying a woman of higher caste, though he may marry one of lower caste; they prohibit social intermingling between castes, and the eating or cooking of food together; and if, in the preparation of food by those of one caste, even the shadow of one of a different caste is thrown upon it, the food is considered polluted, and is thrown away.

The code of caste clearly defines the relative positions and the duties of the several castes, and determines the penalties to be inflicted upon transgressors, the punishments for trespass upon the rights of the higher castes always being the more severe the lower the offender stands in the social scale.

Early religious writings of the Brahmins represent but four original castes, and these as having sprung from the mouth, arms, the thighs and feet of Brahma, the primary source of the universe. These castes were those of royalty, of the priesthood, of the military and of the common people; and it will doubtless be observed that they exactly correspond to the four social class distinctions of the ancient Egyptians.

Whatever the origin of caste, the idea was made very early a fundamental part of the Brahministic religion, as well as of its social system, and it has been consolidated by the growth of wealth, by the division and classification of labor, by the dominant influence of the priesthood, in whose hands it has been a powerful weapon, and whose purposes it has suited to perpetuate as one of the chief sources of their influence and subsistence; and above and more than all has it been riveted upon the people by their dense ignorance and consequent helplessness.

The religion of Brahma, though it has undergone essential modifications to conform to the progress of the people, has, since its development into Monotheism and Pantheism, been absolutely fixed—if there be left out of consideration the pretended revelations presented from time to time by the priesthood, and it is easy to see that a system of religion, for ages immutable in form,

the ally and supporter of caste, has aided, by the surpassing ignorance of the people, to absolutely transfix thought.

The tendency of this absolutism in religion has been to prevent change, to make a homogeneous people more homogeneous; to domineer opinions, to fix manners, to maintain customs, to perpetuate classes, to control literature, to retard progress, and to crystallize civilization. It has first imposed the *form* of mental life, and then regulated its *order*, shaping every kind of activity, whether in art or whether social or industrial; and yet little in morals can be purer than the lofty doctrines of Brahminism or the sublime teachings of Buddha, abounding, as they do, in exalted ethics, and urging morality of living, refinement and purity of conduct. They enjoin equity and universal charity toward all, as well as the broadest benevolence; even the golden rule was taught by Buddha five hundred years before the Christian era.

What is wanted to free these people from the thralldom of caste is education—knowledge, and knowledge only; this alone will arouse them from their lethargy, and unite them into one nation and one people.

That caste restrictions, based upon the religious element, are gradually relaxing, however, is seen in the growing disregard of marriage prohibitions between castes, and in the abolition of Sutteeism; in railroad traffic, the telegraph, and in thousands of recent Western innovations; in the rapid increase of public schools, and interchange with European ideas. All these influences assist in the silent neglect of sacred temples, in the growing contempt for the muddy waters of the Ganges, and are hurrying out of sight many superstitions once formidable.

In railroad travel, of which the natives are very fond, classes and castes are associated in a personal contact hitherto abhorred. In the crowding of the public schools, in their greedy thirst for knowledge, and in the new channels of trade and industries open to the people, they are rapidly forgetting caste divisions, and their superstitions are everywhere weakening in their intercourse with vigorous Western thought.

There are already 12,000 miles of railroads in India. Wheat, cotton, indigo and jute industries have extended in every direction. European methods are replacing old ways, and the development of trade and manufactures brings people of all castes into intimate business relations. Two hundred and three incorporated native and foreign banking, commercial and manufacturing

companies exist in Bombay alone ; and in the same city there are eight immense cotton mills, in Calcutta twenty operated by native labor ; while in one valley alone, the production of wheat, in a few years, has extended from ten to sixty millions of bushels.

The native religions of India have reached the supreme limit of their domination, and their authority is rapidly waning. Already a native reformed religion—the Brahma-Somaj, or Church of the New Dispensation—has arisen, broad enough to embrace all other forms of faith, whether of Buddha, Brahma or Mohammed, and its fascinating doctrines are spreading with great rapidity. Other influences, more or less destructive to the native religions, are Christian Churches, but more especially the immense number of native common schools, recently established and rapidly increasing ; and even colleges, open and available to all classes. And, finally, contact with European civilization, which is a perpetual school to the native in the blessings of peace, and possibly, in future methods of War.

Whatever the origin of religious ideas, there are few communities where religious superstition is powerful enough to overshadow ideas of utility and material enjoyment, and placed together, ideas presenting the most substantial benefits will always dominate those merely sentimental or emotional.

It is plain that India is rapidly trending toward dissolution of caste and religious differences, and toward unity and nationality. Whether its increasing strength is to be lent to prolong English dominion, is a question, but probabilities do not incline to an affirmative answer. The controlling native races and their leaders will not voluntarily submit to the yoke of foreign intruders, and in this they will be supported by the instinct, race and religious differences, and the traditions, habits and social tendencies of the populace, all antagonistic to those of the Anglo-Saxon.

No element of strength to England's Indian Empire resides in the attachment of the natives. The great masses have, for thousands of years, been oppressed by tyrants, either native princes or Tartar or Mohammedan conquerors, and, as they are reconciled to a servile condition, the question with them is simply *who* are to be their masters: they find nothing in their English rulers to engender attachment or to separate them from conditions of life imposed for ages. The higher classes are haughty and sensitive, and do not forget either their former importance in the land, the

rule of their native princes, or the stately traditions of their religion and race. Excluded now wholly from a share in the government, their sensibilities frequently shocked by infractions of ancient customs, by mandatory requirements and invasions of ideas wholly unsympathetic, they can hardly be expected to fraternize with, or to sustain a people, in every feature of whose rule they see the conqueror.

Those sufficiently intelligent recognize that better and safer government, wiser laws, and more rapid progress toward comfort and wealth prevail under English than under native rule; but, at the same time, they give more credit to their own industry, to the resources and native richness of their country for these benefits, than to the English rulers. In fact, high or low, there is no intermingling in India between the English and the native, either social, religious, governmental, or industrial, except as between servant and those served.

So long as no convulsion stirs the strength and passions of these slumbering people, even were it possible for them to remain in their present state politically and socially, so long will be repeated the ascendancy of the white over the dark races, of the stronger over the weaker civilization.

But whenever they do draw the breath of one people, whether under the influence of sweeping fanaticism, or the rising rhythm of race hatred, the power of England will be brushed away in an hour, and her Eastern Empire will dissolve like vapor.

In the rebellion of 1857, the Sepoys alone mutinied; not a man of the native troops of the Madras Presidency but was loyal: yet, had it not been for the determined hatred of the Mussulman—the Sikhs of the Punjab—for the Sepoys, who were Hindoos, and for the ready help which these Mussulmans gave to the English, their power in India, even then, would have been overthrown.

India has been conquered more by her own weaknesses than by the strength of her conquerors. England's control hitherto has resided, and still resides, in the variety and separation of races, in the variety of former petty principalities, in the variety and hostility of religions, in the division of the people by caste, in the incapacity of the natives for leadership, and in the antagonisms and jealousies springing from these sources—which England has carefully fostered and encouraged for her own purpose, since

such antagonistic elements, though obstacles to the framing of general laws, have been safeguards of tranquillity.

As English colonization is, of course, impracticable, owing to the immensity of the native population, the only possibility of the permanence of British power is in a future development of attachment of the people to a system of government which must, of necessity be, and remain, despotic; and in their voluntary adoption of English ideas and views of empire. But since the three ties which bind together States are, community of interests, community of religion, and community of race, it seems altogether illusive to suppose that the native will, in spite of these opposing influences, voluntarily submit his neck to foreign rule. Sooner or later, therefore, through the operation of natural causes, India must cease to be a part of the British Empire.

The immediate danger to British rule is, that civil administration may too rapidly fall into the hands of dominant native classes; that concessions and privileges may be granted them too quickly, and that the natural fermentation of the people may gather too soon in strength around local centers, and precipitate rebellion and separation.

This danger avoided, steam and electricity may, for many years, prolong England's rule. Her grip now is one of iron and guns. Her dominion one of force. Her road from England a mighty marine turnpike, bristling with the means of War, and provided with great resting-places for her armies and swift ships: Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden are impregnable road-bed links, binding India to England.

The military power which at once represents and sustains English rule was, until within a few months past, about 66,000 British and 135,000 native troops; the army has, however, been recently increased by 10,000 British and 20,000 native troops, representing a total of 231,000 men to keep in subjection 265,000,000 of people. This force is regularly organized and highly disciplined, and is distributed throughout India with due reference to the repressive effect sought; in the north more regard being paid to defensive and aggressive purposes: strategic centers being the points of concentration of large bodies, from which radiate smaller garrisons or temporary stations. A carefully considered system of railroads of 12,000 miles in aggregate, is constructed, which confers great military advantages upon the dominant race as well as commercial advantages to the natives.

To a large extent, in arms, equipment, and munitions of War, the Army is supplied from England, though the rapid development of industrial life in the direction of European arts, promises soon to supply even these in India.

The Regular military force is supplemented by many volunteer organizations, which are in every way fostered and encouraged. They are composed wholly of English and foreign residents and of their descendants, and are inspired by the spirit of the English rule. Besides these are the railroad *employés*, who are either English and foreigners, or natives wholly devoted to English interests. They are all armed, and partially organized as police or railroad guards, for the safety of the lines and stations. The latter are stone buildings and places of arms, and could readily be transformed into strong points of defense.

For the administration of the local laws and the collection of taxes, a vast army of civil officials is required, who are, of course, staunch supporters of British rule, for not only are they all English, but they are afforded an agreeable employment at princely salaries. To sum up, therefore; the aggregate material power of England in India is represented by her Army; by the volunteer and railway organizations; and by the functionaries of the civil government: a power wholly arbitrary, despotic and uncompromising, and which has in no manner either the sympathy or the support of the people. But England will wield it as a task-master so long as she finds it for her interests to regard India as a continuation of the soil of England, into which she may pour unrestrained the produce of her home labor and gather rich profits in return.

Continually menacing the British Empire in India is the overshadowing power of Russia. It is true that, between the two nations, the people see nothing to prefer in the rule of Russia, for they well understand that if Russia was to add India to her territory they would in no way be benefited; hence, during the recent period of threatened hostilities, the native sentiment was almost wholly English. From a military point of view, the only present advantage to Russia, in advancing her forces toward the northern frontiers of India, is to secure a dwelling-ground for her armies with those of England.

What the danger to British rule will be fifty years hence, is quite another matter. Russia is already a colossal power among nations. In fifty years she will have a population of one hun-

dred and fifty millions, homogeneous and united under one will, while England has already reached the summit of her strength in the East, and cannot hope to extend her nationality in India one jot farther than now. It must appear, therefore, that the power of Russia will steadily increase in the East, while that of England as steadily decreases.

If Russia is formidable now, what can she do then? England must then, as now, defend Afghanistan, while Russia will attack from a much more advanced railroad base. Russia, at present, does not desire seaports in India, or on Asiatic sea-board; they would be too remote, too far from her wealth and interests. But what she does want are the Bosphorus and a sea-board in the Mediterranean. She arms in the East to gain these in the West, as she can strike effectually at England in no other way than through India.

The battle-ground will be on the Helmund River, far beyond the Indus, for England can on no account afford to merely defend that line. This would be at once the surrender of all the sacrifices she has made to place Afghanistan in the breach as a buffer; and it would be to reveal to the natives of India her inability to protect their boundaries.

England well understands this, and has prepared for it by the construction of a railroad beyond Quetta, directly west, another to the north of that point in Beloochistan, and still a third to the mouth of the Kyber Pass in Afghanistan.

India can be approached in no other direction, so isolated is she by the sea and the impassable Himalayas. These have the effect of making of the whole territory a peninsula, with a neck at the Kyber and Quetta passes. On ground in that region, therefore, are to be fought bloody battles, on the part of Russia, for supremacy on the Bosphorus; and, on the part of England, for the preservation of her Eastern Empire; unless, indeed, before that period, vivified India should slip from her grasp and become lost to her forever through much nursing in the civilization of the West.

Briefly viewed, India of to-day is a vast territory, densely populated, its people the fragments of former despotisms, but now under a Western military despotism, and with the seams of former ruptures among the people kept open by religious, social and race differences.

But its countless multitudes are slowly rousing from lethargy

and dreams, and are eagerly grasping education and elementary self-government, already begun in municipal government. They are looking with growing indifference upon sacerdotal restrictions and superstitions and the iron rule of caste, and are steadily solidifying into one nationality.

In their midst stand their masters, a greedy but resolute race, few in numbers but giants in capacity, who, fully aware of the commotion in the swarming multitudes and its cause, are yet steadfastly determined to maintain their rule and their empire. They are struggling perpetually to overcome the disorders, the confusion and recklessness of former governments, to modify their methods and set aside their traditions, but are constantly admonished that changes, however important, must be gradual, to avoid dangerous shocks to the sensibilities of the people.

Colonization is impossible. There is, therefore, the persistent necessity of yielding to the prejudices and interests, to conciliate the people, and to preserve tranquillity, trusting the rest to the natural struggle between the Eastern and Western civilizations.

THE ENLISTED SOLDIER.*

BY COLONEL RICHARD I. DODGE, U. S. A.,

ELEVENTH INFANTRY.

PHENOMENAL as has been its development in natural science and mechanical appliances, the future historian of the nineteenth century must accord its chief honor and glory to lie in the wonderful amelioration of the condition of the so-called lower classes of the human race.

But little more than one hundred years ago, the right of might, of the powerful and wealthy to rule, was co-existent with the duty of the masses to submit to that rule.

The right of one man to hold another in bondage, dominating alike his person and his will, is even now conceded and exercised in more than half the nations of the world. The United States, "the land of the free," and which we proudly claim to be in the very vanguard of civilization, has but just abandoned the idea at the expense of the most gigantic war of modern times.

And how did that idea affect the soldier? From time immemorial the common people had been driven to war "like sheep to the shambles." "I am the State." "The King can do no wrong." These and similar expressions show the meat on which royalty was fed. The subject had no rights as opposed to the will of the sovereign. Troops were "levied" at the will of power. Every able-bodied man without wealth or powerful influence was forced into the ranks regardless of the sufferings of those dependent upon him. Frederick William I. of Prussia recruited his armies with giants shamelessly kidnapped from every nation and people; and even within the memory of men

* This Essay received *Honorable Mention* in competition for the Gold Medal of 1885.

now living, the boats-crews of her men-of-war recruited the British Navy by night raids, remorselessly carrying into hopeless captivity every able-bodied man they chanced to encounter; wounding, even killing, those who attempted resistance or escape.

The subject was entirely in the hands of a power from which there seemed no escape. "Once a subject always a subject," was the dogma of sovereignty, and though a man might change his residence, the country of his birth still claimed his allegiance and his obligation of duty, and exercised the right to take him wherever found, and force him to perform service.

This dogma yielded its virility, if not life itself, in the War of 1812, and at the present time, the right of expatriation, of changing allegiance at the will of the subject, is (at least tacitly) recognized by every civilized nation.

This conceded, the right of search for, and of impressment of the former subjects on board the ships, or within the territories of foreign nations, was necessarily abandoned. By expatriating himself a man can now escape the military and naval service of the land of his birth.

But "the mills of the gods grind slow." In all the world England and the United States are the only countries in which the words, "The Enlisted Soldier," express an idea and have a positive meaning.

For several hundred years the British Army had been recruited by a quasi voluntary enlistment, but until the beginning of the present century the recruiting was in the hands of middlemen, who received a bounty for every able-bodied recruit. Under this system untold crimes against the rights of individuals were perpetrated. The term "voluntary" was the merest sham, the men being habitually supplied, as, it is said, are sailors to the merchant marine of most countries at the present time, made drunk, to find, when sober enough to appreciate the fact, that they had bound themselves. In 1802 the Government took the recruitment of its armies into its own hands, enlisting for life. It was only in 1847 that the present system of enlistment for a term of years was instituted.

From its very nature the government of an army must be despotic—a one-man power. Formerly it was an absolute despotism, the will of the commander being the sole law; now it is a legal despotism, the will of the commander being shaped and restrained by rules, regulations and laws.

The foundation-stone of an army is obedience, its key-stone discipline. Whatever the nature of the institutions of a country, however entitled each citizen may be to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," he must, on entering an army, surrender his liberty, his independence of action, entirely into the keeping of his superiors.

ENLISTMENT.

The right to demand for its defense in time of war, the service of every able-bodied citizen, is, I believe, a fundamental principle of every government. It is eminently just and right, but the proud sense of freedom of the American citizen led many able men to doubt its applicability to American institutions.

As early as 1861 the Government asserted the right by ordering a draft of men for nine months, but listening to its fears, natural in the then most critical condition of the country, it compromised the point by permitting drafted men to furnish substitutes, or exempted them from service on payment of a certain money equivalent.

That this was a grave mistake is known to all military men, and it was supplemented by yet another. The Government, though still claiming the right to demand service, offered bounties for volunteers, and permitted any and every State, county, township, hamlet or individual, to offer further bounties. The consequence was that the quotas of States were seldom filled—the rich sections buying and getting credit for the men furnished by the poor sections to such an extent as prevented these latter sections from obtaining any credits on their own account. Thus the so-called "wild cat" regions of Pennsylvania though furnishing thousands of most excellent troops, were always deficient in their quotas. The men, almost invariably selling out to the highest bidder, were credited to the wealthy portions of the State. The enormous prices paid for credits by rich cities and communities resulted in numberless frauds and thefts, in a general laxity of moral tone, in bounty jumping, in an increase of probably one-fourth in the ultimate expense of the war, and more serious than all, in failure to obtain the troops called for.

This is a kind of enlistment that I hope the country will never see again.

The Regular Army of the United States is recruited by voluntary enlistments for a term of five years.

Is there any business in life in which a reasonably sensible man could be expected to bind himself to remain in the most subordinate position for five years? a business of which he is entirely ignorant and in which he is to yield his liberty and will to the absolute control of superiors of whose temper and disposition he knows nothing?

And when he is told that this surrender of self must be so absolute and binding that a violation of his contract will lead to his arrest and imprisonment for one of the most dishonorable of military crimes, the only wonder is that any man dares to enlist.

Our system of enlistment is supposed to be based on the voluntary act of the individual. Re-enlistments are, as a rule, purely voluntary, but the first enlistment being "a leap in the dark," is, in nine-tenths of cases, "voluntary" only in being a choice of evils.

The contract of enlistment is not in itself a wrong, but it is provocative of wrong. It is too rigid, too binding. There should be some loop-hole of escape. To hold a man for five years with Shylock tenacity to the letter of a bond signed through impulse, or want, or desperation, is too much like slavery to meet the requirements of the charitable enlightenment of our age and country.

The causes of enlistment are as various as the men themselves.

Some enlist because they really believe the life will suit them; others from disappointment in business or love affairs; others, again, to hide themselves from the consequences of some youthful scrape; but the large majority are driven to enlistment by absolute want.

Admitted that at the time of enlistment each and all were in serious earnest, intending faithfully to serve the five years. One who enlisted after reading "Charles O'Malley" becomes disenchanted when ordered to clean the company privy vault. Another, whose sweetheart proved obdurate in prosperity, finds that "pity is akin to love," and is invited back to consummate his happiness.

When the enlisted man finds that he has made a mistake in his choice of, or is unfitted for, his profession; or when personal or business affairs offer him opportunity to better his condition, or even on his simple inclination, he should have the absolute right

to claim his discharge from the Service, on payment to the Government of such sum as shall insure it against loss.

Under present ruling, nothing is easier than to get into the Service; nothing harder than to get out of it. Except on the application of Senator or Congressman, on a surgeon's certificate of disability, for fraud in enlistment, or by expiration of service, discharge is practically unknown to our Service.

By permitting enlisted soldiers, or their friends, to purchase their discharge, we open the door to a better class of recruits, men who would like to enter the Army, but are too sensible and wary to bind themselves for five years to a mode of life of which they know nothing; and we practically abolish desertion. Few men will risk the pains and penalties attached to that crime, when by patient economy they can save sufficient money to purchase their freedom.

The sum fixed as the price of discharge will be a matter of future consideration and regulation, but it should be so scaled as to give the soldier credit for the time he has served.

Thus, if, say five hundred dollars be fixed as the price of a discharge during the first year of enlistment, it should be diminished to four hundred the second, three hundred the third, two hundred the fourth, and one hundred the fifth year of service.

The proposition recently agitated, to diminish the term of enlistment, making it three instead of five years, would, if adopted, prove of no practical value to the Service. The length of term is a matter of little importance either to the Government or to the soldier. The fault, and cause of complaint, is the absolute inflexibility of our present system. To the soldier tired out and disgusted with the Service, desertion now offers the one sole means of escape. It is not a matter of marvel that desertion is common.

The present system of recruiting is not calculated to bring into the Service as good a class of men as can and should be secured. The rendezvous are almost invariably in large cities, and the recruits obtained are very frequently of the "rough and tough" element, lazy, intemperate, vicious and reckless. Recruiting officers should be active and unmarried (domestic felicities and domestic duties are sadly at variance with the active duties of a soldier). There should be no fixed rendezvous, but with a good sergeant and two or more men, these officers should move about the country, visiting preferably the smaller towns and

villages, where the character of each applicant for enlistment can be thoroughly ascertained. Even should the original cost of such recruiting considerably exceed that at present, it would be much more than compensated by the greatly better class of recruits obtained. This plan is pursued with great advantage in the purchase of cavalry horses. Surely the quality of our soldiers should be of at least as great importance to the Government as the quality of our horses.

More than once of recent years the proposition has been made to divide the territory of the United States into recruiting districts, the recruits from each to be assigned to one and the same regiment. The arguments put forth in behalf of this plan are very plausible, but nothing could be worse for the Army and the country than its adoption. The Army is the creature and servant of the Government. In it there should be no sectionalism—no North, no South, no East, no West, no State, nor Territorial nor District lines. Duty and fealty to the whole United States, without consideration of section or politics, should be the pole-star of every soldier.

District regiments would at once develop sectional pride and rivalry, which, in case of local disturbances, must necessarily impair their efficiency as the great national police force. However well such a plan might work in an Army to be employed solely against a foreign enemy, it would be simply preposterous in an Army likely to be employed only in preventing local and communistic disturbances in our own country. Send to the disturbed locality the regiment recruited in that district and there is no guarantee that it would not affiliate with the disturbers, while a regiment recruited in another district might prove unnecessarily severe and intolerant. In every respect sectional regiments are out of place in a country whose aim and object is to make a grand homogeneous nationality out of heterogeneous elements collected from every quarter of the globe.

A married man cannot be enlisted, or re-enlisted without the special authority from the War Department. This is a most unnecessary and futile assumption of the Department, for though it might prevent a married man from entering the Service, it cannot prevent an unmarried man from marrying immediately after enlisting. The woman question is a serious one. It is especially so in the Army, for Congress has entirely ignored her, and the War Department seems afraid of her. What concern can it pos-

sibly be to the Government, whether the enlisted man be married or not, so long as he does not burden the Service with the care of his family. Congress has done too much or too little. It has abolished the office or position of laundress, taking from the women who held these positions all rights and emoluments previously granted by law, but has left the women themselves still in the Army, hangers-on and dependents. Some of these women, wives of old and faithful soldiers, came into Service as legitimately, as legally, as any officer or soldier. To abolish their offices, take away their allowances, and yet leave them in the Army, was neither politic nor just. If it is the intention of Congress to get rid of the wives of enlisted men, it should make that fact patent by the discharge of all married men, or by prohibiting Post Commanders from allowing the wives of enlisted men to remain at the posts. These women are not now a recognized burden on the Government, but they are a most onerous tax upon the consciences of the Post Quartermaster and Commanding Officer. They are at the posts with the knowledge, and therefore with the consent, of the War Department, and must have shelter, stoves, fuel, etc. The "yes and no" lack of purpose in the Government forces every Post Quartermaster to make, every month, certificates as to the expenditure of public property which he knows are not true, and every Post Commander must approve, or be inhuman. Such a state of things should not exist.

The order of comparatively recent date, requiring recruits to be kept at Depots for four months after enlistment before being sent to regiments, is most excellent. It breaks in on the arrangements of a class of impecunious persons who enlist to be sent West, with full intention to desert upon arrival; and it enables medical officers fully to test the condition of health of recruits before the Government is put to the expense of their transportation. This is very important. The number of recruits sent to regiments, and discharged within a year thereafter, "for disease or injury existing prior to enlistment," constitutes an item of expense well worthy the consideration of authority.

Recruits are generally sent to their regiments in the first half of the fiscal year, or between July and December. It seems impossible for "the Powers" to realize that our country is so large, covers so many degrees of latitude, that its soldiers should not be everywhere treated in exactly the same way. From Fort

Brown, in latitude 25, with temperature of the torrid zone, to Fort Assiniboine, in latitude 49, with temperature almost arctic, soldiers are issued the same food, the same clothing, are required to do the same duty, and are expected to be equally expert in all the details of their profession.

To send recruits to extreme northern posts in fall or winter, is just as inhuman as to send them to extreme southern posts in spring or summer. It is even worse, for aside from the bodily illness to which both are exposed in becoming acclimated, the recruit sent north is plunged during the long winter into a confinement as dreary and uneventful as if he were behind the bars of a prison. A stranger to the other men of his company, ignorant of his duties, weighed down by inaction and nostalgia, what wonder if the opening spring, with all its glorious promise, should stir his torpid blood to desertion, to anything to get rid of such another winter. Send the same recruit to the same post in the early spring; put him through the rapid and continuous routine of drill, target practice, etc., necessary at posts which have to do in five months the work that troops in more favored localities do in twelve, and he welcomes the long winter as a time of delicious rest. He has learned to know his comrades and his duty, and is probably a happy and contented soldier.

Send recruits to the extreme north in early spring, to the extreme south in autumn and winter.

Every Continental State demands military service from all its able-bodied men, with some loop-hole of escape for the wealthy, and some special partialities in favor of nobility. We take our system of recruiting from the British Service, and it is based wholly on the voluntary action of the individual. The general result is good. For its numbers, there is no better Army in the world than that which serves the United States. But at what an enormous cost of men! Our Army of a maximum of twenty-five thousand rank and file is enlisted, each man for five years. An average of something over five thousand men should go out of service each year, their places being supplied by re-enlistments and recruiting. The fact is that nearly nine thousand men are discharged, or get away from the Service every year, of which number nearly one-third is by desertion. To obtain one single reliable, valuable soldier, we are obliged to enlist two men.

EQUIPMENT.

Since the introduction of gunpowder as the common engine

of War, and most especially since the invention of breech-loading arms and metallic cartridges, the proper equipment of the soldier has been a subject of close study, unlimited experiments, and multitudinous essays, by those interested in the profession of Arms. In the nature of things it is one of those problems which can never be solved. There is no limit to invention, each success serving but as a stepping-stone to something better. The best arms we had in the War of the Rebellion would now be rejected as wholly unserviceable, and it is quite possible that the arms we so glory in to-day may be similarly rejected twenty years hence.

From the present stand-point of the world, our troops can boast of offensive weapons inferior to none; but as regards the other items of necessary equipment of the soldier in the field, we are in a worse than transition state, scarcely any two companies in the Army being uniformly equipped, and very often two, three, even four, kinds of experimental equipment being in use at the same time, in the same company. The real anxiety of the War Department to get the very best, to keep pace with the most advanced progress of the age, is undoubtedly the prime cause of this state of things, but the fact remains, that the importunities of inventors, and the kind-heartedness of officials, saddles the Army with an un-uniformity of grotesque and impracticable bags, boxes and absurdities of all kinds.

At a recent inspection of four companies of infantry equipped for field service (and at which the writer was present), one company had blanket bags, another rolled blankets, as in the War, another the cumbrous shoulder-braces and bags, while the fourth had men equipped in all these styles. These different articles were in the hands of the men by proper orders, and regular issue; but however effective the command might have proved in the field, its appearance was incongruous, even ridiculous.

With all these experiment bags and boxes, the Army of the United States has practically no field equipment. Our soldiers will not carry the load (from fifty to one hundred pounds) forced by stringent discipline on their European compeers. The very first skirmish or accident is excuse for the loss (deliberately thrown away) of all these cumbrous bags and encircling straps, that take the "vim" out of the most stalwart soldier. The rolled blanket was an innovation growing out of marches and battles unprecedented in modern warfare. In it the soldier carried all his

necessaries, except rations, water, and ammunition, and he had learned by hard experience how little is really necessary.

In time of peace the Army of the United States has the very minimum of experience in the use and management of a field equipment. The outbreak of a band of Indians may force a few companies into the field. They are provided with wagons or pack trains, ostensibly to carry rations and forage, but into or on to which, the soldiers manage to smuggle so much of their equipment as they feel indisposed to carry.

Almost every year Congress is sufficiently liberal to provide for the exchange of stations of two or more regiments. The means provided are almost invariably railroad and steamboat; or, if rigid economy requires that a march should be made, it is with an amount of transportation second only to that required for the movement of troops in India. This in itself is not objectionable. If the transportation is at hand, it costs the Government no more while in the field than when standing in the stables of the post.

The rigid accountability for public property to which all company commanders are held, is a reason, and an excuse, for the accumulation of at least three times the amount of property that any company ought to be burdened with. Men are sentimental and accumulative animals. There is scarce a soldier who has not specimens, mementoes, and "odds and ends," of personal baggage, to an amount quite double his proper kit. Marriage is a recognized institution (though wives are officially ignored), and when a regiment is moved the married officers and men must take their families, and the officers must always have with them such household appliances as to enable them to make at least the outward appearance of gentlemen. To move a regiment is therefore a matter of serious expense to the Government, and to the officers, and to avoid this, moves are of rare occurrence.

The objection to all this lies solely in the fact that the troops are kept in ignorance of field duties, or the use of field equipment; and if by chance a few companies are ordered out on an Indian expedition, it is at the expense of unnecessary suffering and hardship, the result of that ignorance.

A Department Commander has not performed his whole duty to his command when he orders each company to provide itself with a field equipment. He must also, each year, order those

companies into the field for a time sufficient to enable the men to learn the use of that equipment.

CLOTHING.

The system of clothing its Army, adopted and in use by the United States, is a most excellent one. By fixing a money value for the allowance for each year, charging against the soldier everything drawn over that allowance, and giving him credit as pay for clothing not drawn in kind, the Government has hit upon an admirable means of inculcating careful economy on the part of the soldier.

But while the system is good, there are several grave errors of administration, the most serious of which is the entire immunity accorded to purchasers and inspectors of Army clothing. The goods purchased may be of the merest shoddy, and of all shades, from almost black to nearly red, but the troops must accept and wear them. Reports of captains and protests of commanders have no more effect than the Pope's anathema against the comet. The line of the Army has at last settled down into a disgusted, despairing and almost un murmuring acceptance of any quality or shade of goods that may be sent to it as uniform.

Even the Inspector General's Department, the hope and refuge of the Army against inefficiency and un-uniformity, seems to have yielded this point in despair. At the very last inspection of the post where the writer is serving, the Post Commander pointed out to the Inspector the various shades and qualities of goods that go to make the uniform of a company. "That," said the Inspector, "is a matter I no longer touch upon. For years I have reported and protested, not only without effect, but without the slightest notice being taken by the authorities. I have finally given it up as an evil for which there is no remedy."

The purchase of this shoddy is always leniently accounted for as "an error of judgment" of purchaser and inspector. A fraud on the soldier is perpetrated, and will be continued to be perpetrated, until Congress shall pass a law making "errors of judgment" as liable to the penitentiary as other more open and glaring frauds.

The untraveled resident of the East thinks and talks about Chicago as in the far West, the Missouri River as beyond the confines of civilization. It is impossible for a man not in, and with it, to keep pace with the marvelous growth of our great West.

As, however, most of the Chiefs of Departments in Washington have, in their younger days, served in many and widely-separated portions of the country, the persistence with which all insist that soldiers in latitude 25 or latitude 49, at the sea level, or eight thousand feet above, shall, in all things, be treated exactly the same, is really very remarkable.

The *uniform* of the United States soldier is exactly the same, wherever he may be serving. It is true that, in the high latitudes, a concession is made, fur caps, gloves and buffalo overcoats being provided for sentries; but the uniform of the troops is the same, whether the soldier be serving in torrid or arctic temperature, in summer or in winter.

This should be changed. Every soldier should have two complete sets of external uniform, and two complete outfits of underclothing, one adapted to heat, the other to cold.

The long and terrible winters of Dakota and Montana necessitate the thickest and warmest clothing; but the short summers are as hot as those of Texas or Arizona, and even more unbearable from the contrast; and clothing adapted to the ordinary climate of these hot localities will not prevent the soldier from freezing to death if exposed in it to the fury of the occasional norther. It is inhuman to force a man to wear the same clothing when the thermometer marks 100° as he does when it marks 40°.

A very grave error of detail, and one to which much of the desertion of the Army is directly attributable, is the system now in vogue of settling the clothing accountability but twice a year—30th June and 31st December. A man enlists in July or August, and draws at once from thirty-five to forty dollars in clothing. Notwithstanding this indebtedness to the United States, he receives from the Paymaster all the money due him on the August muster-roll. On the October muster-roll he again draws all the money due him as pay. He has two or more months' pay in cash, and may have drawn clothing to the amount of fifty or sixty dollars. He is rich, has money and a surplus of clothing which he can convert into money. On the December muster-roll will be charged against him all this clothing. If he remain in Service it is with the knowledge that he can receive no money from the Paymaster for the next four or six months, or until the whole debt is paid. Possession of means sufficient to enable him to get a start elsewhere, and the poor outlook, if he

remain in Service, determines many a man to desert who has no complaint, and who would probably have never thought of desertion but for the temptation forced on him by the present very bad system. I am not in possession of the data necessary to positive proof as regards the whole Army, but, in my own experience, more than one-half of the desertions are within six months after enlistment, and, in nine cases out of ten, soon after pay-day.

The clothing account should be settled, as far as possible, on every muster-roll. No man should receive pay from the Government while in debt to the Government. John Randolph's philosopher's stone, "Pay as you go," is a good rule everywhere, and nowhere better than in the Army of the United States.

A tailor should be enlisted for every company in the Army, and no made-up clothing should be sent to companies. Every ready-made suit has now to be altered at the expense of the soldier. These tailors should be enlisted as tailors, not as soldiers. It is simply impossible for any man to perform the ordinary duties of a soldier and do also the tailoring for forty or fifty men. They should receive pay, clothing, rations, etc., of a soldier, and, in addition, thirty-five to fifty cents for each working day, to be paid by the Quartermaster's Department. For this they should be required to make or alter the clothing of the whole company without charge to the men. By the terms of enlistment the Government agrees to supply the soldier with clothing. It is not performing its part of the contract when it forces the soldier to pay for making and altering that clothing.

The remarks as to tailors may be repeated as to company shoemakers.

In a review of a proceedings of a Clothing Board, published in General Orders, No. 74, Headquarters of the Army, July 21, 1879, General Sherman (then commanding the Army) made the following remarks:

"There is no article of dress so valuable and material to the soldier as the shoe or boot, and it is not deemed wise to prescribe any fixed patterns, but to allow the Quartermaster's Department to manufacture the shoes of the Army of the very best materials and of the best patterns possible, almost regardless of cost. There is no necessity of adopting any shoe as *uniform*. Soldiers should be permitted to buy any kind of shoe they please with their own money."

Nothing could be more apropos or better expressed. The shoe furnished the enlisted soldier is a disgrace to the civilization of the age. In the teeth of the experience of professional walkers, of baseball and cricket clubs, and of all others who have been forced to learn that the proper shoe for work must fit the foot, the feet of our Army are thrust into ill-made clogs of stiff, unyielding leather, without shape, fit, or any redeeming quality except economy.

The "country shoe" of the North, the "plantation shoe" of the South, it is the expression of what was thought to be the correct thing for common laborers about a hundred years ago. There are some officers of our Army who have ideas of about that age, and, so far, they have kept the shoeing of the Army just so far behind the times. It is to be hoped that in the progress of this wonderfully progressive age, it may finally dawn upon those in power that the shoe of one hundred years ago can be, and has been, improved upon.

Imagine the feelings of a natty, well-built soldier, proud of his uniform, and vain of his personal appearance, when he is obliged to finish his toilet by encasing his feet in a pair of so-called shoes, which make each leg look, as an old friend used to express it, "like a straw stuck in a ginger-cake." There is no reason why the Government should be niggardly about the expense. The soldier refunds the cost price of every article of clothing he receives; and there is scarcely a soldier who would not willingly pay even ten dollars for a really good pair of shoes, rather than be forced to wear an article just one degree better than the wooden clogs of Germany.

Stiff, ill-made, and badly-fitted shoes are the cause of corns, bunions, indeed of almost all diseases of the foot. Many a man is discharged from the Service, a cripple for life, from having been forced to wear the things called shoes now furnished by the Government; and within my own knowledge one soldier died from injuries to his feet, caused by two days of forced march after Indians, in a new pair of Government shoes.

In spite of the latitude given to soldiers by the quoted remarks of General Sherman, and which were legalized by the approval of the Secretary of War, some old-styled Post Commanders yet force the enlisted men under their commands to wear, on all duty, the regulation (?) shoe. When not forced to wear it, soldiers, as a rule, prefer to purchase other and better shoes wherever

they can be found. In a company fortunate enough to have a good shoemaker, no pair of Government shoes is worn by any soldier who has regard for his comfort, or pride in his appearance, until they have been ripped up, and re-made to fit the feet of the man drawing them ; and this at his own expense.

Either permit the men to buy and wear the shoes most comfortable, or arrange to have decent and well-fitting shoes made in each company. Better for the active Army, that the prisoners at Fort Leavenworth remain idle, than continue to furnish a never-failing cause for discharge for disability, "contracted in Service."

SUBSISTENCE.

The United States has the best-fed Army in the world. Congress has been liberal, even prodigal, in its ration, affording means for a variety in the bill of fare not obtainable in any country by the class of people of which the greater part of the rank and file of the Army is composed. But this bountiful provision of Congress is not permitted to inure altogether to the benefit of the soldier, as was undoubtedly intended, but by the manipulation of "inferior powers" is made to subserve a great many ends not contemplated by the law-making power.

The ration of flour is eighteen ounces, and the soldier is legally entitled to it, or its full equivalent. "Inferior powers" see their opportunity and volunteer to do the baking, delivering to each soldier eighteen ounces of bread, "appropriating" the 20 to 35 per cent. gain, and diverting it to other unexpected and most illegitimate purposes. With the money gained by this "conversion" there is established a post, and ultimately a regimental fund, this latter being applied to the establishment and maintenance of a regimental band. Outside of its illegality, there could be no objection to this, where a regiment concentrated at one post, but scattered as the Army is, in small garrisons, it follows that the majority of the soldiers of a regiment are taxed to maintain a band at regimental headquarters, which they probably do not hear one single time in all their five years of service.

The saving of the ration, bread, as well as other items, should inure to the benefit of the company that makes it. Each company should be obliged to contribute to the formation of a post fund for the maintenance of post schools, purchase of books, maps, etc. ; the establishment of a gymnasium, the encouragement of lectures, debates, theatricals, anything calculated to give

a hearty and pleasurable tone to garrison life; but this contribution should not be a percentage of the savings, for then the company that makes most savings has the heaviest tax, and this constitutes a sort of premium on making no savings. The contribution should be in the nature of a direct tax, each company being assessed in proportion to its strength at the post. Only that portion of a regiment that enjoys its benefits, should be taxed to support a band.

The proceeds of the savings of a company not assessed as post fund, should be disbursed by the company commander (with the approval of the post commander), solely for the benefit of that company as a whole. The articles necessary to the comfort of a company at Fort Assiniboine will likely differ entirely from those needed by a company at Fort Brown, yet the "powers" in Washington, prescribe exactly the same things for both. In persistent and most patient determination to reduce the wants of all companies to a schedule of its making, the Adjutant-General's Department has built up quite a bureau of officials and clerks at a cost to the Government of a very considerable percentage of the whole savings.

If the company officers assembled as a board, with its action supervised by the post commander, are not to be trusted to properly disburse the fifteen or twenty dollars average monthly savings of the company, then all should be summarily dismissed from the Service. The money belongs to the soldiers of the company, and I can see nothing but tyranny in those regulations which permits its expenditure only on rules fixed by the Adjutant-General.

The authority to sell to companies and individual enlisted men so-called "officers' stores" has wonderfully improved the *ménu* of the soldier, but the purchasing agents of the Subsistence Department are apparently quite as liable to "errors of judgment" as those of the Clothing Bureau. The stores are generally good, but the prices are exorbitant. At almost any little frontier village, the articles comprised in the general term "officers' stores," can be purchased equally good, and at lower prices, than they can be had from the post commissary; and this though the merchant pays freight, and makes his per centage, which the commissary is not supposed to do.

The great lack in our Service is proper cooks. The Regulations require that the cooking of a company shall be done by privates

of that company, detailed in turn. This is practically a dead letter, for the large majority of the men of each company cannot, and will not, cook. The consequence is that the cooking of each company is done by a soldier, who either has a taste for that sort of drudgery, or prefers it to military duty. When such a man is found who can accomplish even a tolerable meal, he is pretty sure of the detail as long as he remains in Service.

The hygienic value of proper cooking is just beginning to be appreciated in the Army, and it is a fitting time for the "powers," who have influence with Congress, to urge a much needed reform. Congress has provided a ration ample and good. It should now provide a person to cook and serve it, with consideration for the health and comfort of those who are to partake of it. Each company should have a cook enlisted for the sole purpose of cooking, and not expected, or required, to perform any military duty. Enlisted men preferably take their meals at hours that give a shock to modern fashion; breakfast immediately after reveille, or about sunrise, dinner at 11.30 A. M., and supper as early as military duty will permit. The one cook of a company is fully occupied for an average of not less than sixteen hours out of the twenty-four. He must be up at least two hours before reveille, and is never free for a single moment until after retreat. Yet with full knowledge of this fact, some commanders are so unreasonable as to require cooks to attend drills, inspections, &c. It is simply impossible for any man to cook for a company of forty or fifty healthy men, and attend, besides, to the ordinary duties of a soldier.

The original underlying idea, to render each man of the company entirely independent of the cook, and so far able to take care of himself when detached is a good one, but impracticable. Cooking is a fine art. To be a good cook, a man must have a taste for the business. It is absurd to expect that taste to be developed in the whole company, and in every company in Service.

The company is a permanent unit. A good cook will inure to its health, comfort, and content. Detachments are exceptional and occasional, they must look out for themselves.

With the utopian idea of forcing every man to become a good cook, the present Regulations condemn the whole company to suffer indefinitely from ignorant cooks and wretched cooking.

I regard the addition to each company in Service of one good cook, enlisted or employed solely to do the cooking, as more important to the health and general well-being of the enlisted sol-

dier, than any other question or point that has been, or will be, discussed in this paper.

QUARTERS.

The condition of "the enlisted soldier" of the United States of to-day is, an infinite improvement over that of his compeer of thirty years ago. He has more than double the pay, better arms, better clothing, a better and more abundant ration, but in nothing has his condition changed so materially for the better as in the matter of quarters of troops stationed on the frontier.

General Sherman always insists that the Pacific Railroad would have been cheap to the United States had it cost a thousand millions of dollars. It was the greatest possible boon to the Army, for like Columbus' problem, "how to stand an egg on its little end," once solved its ease was demonstrated; and now with four transcontinental railroads, there is scarcely a military post in the United States that has not at least comparatively good transportation facilities.

In the "good old times" a frontier post was constructed by the labor of the troops, and of such materials as happened to be most convenient. If timber was available, the walls of quarters were constructed of posts stuck in the ground (Mexican, *Jacal*) and daubed with mud. When timber was not to be had, the walls were made of sun-dried bricks (*adobies*). The roofs were of dirt, the floors "the lap of mother earth." Oftentimes the quarters were holes (dug-outs), scooped out of the sides of hills or banks; and even since the war a command has been "recommended" by a department commander "to house itself for the winter in huts of sage-brush and mud." The doors and window-shutters were made of canvas, or clothing and subsistence boxes; there was no glass, no stoves; and in these dirty, smoky, vermin-infested holes, the "old Army" eked out its existence.

When we see the beautiful and commodious barrack-rooms in which the frontier soldier now takes his comfort, we are obliged to admit with the Richmond professor, "The world do move."

When so much improvement has been made in so few years, it may seem hypercritical to find any fault whatever, but there is still a point that needs the attention of the Powers. The War Department has thousands of plans of posts and dwellings, but no plan of officers' or men's quarters has been ever officially adopted.

Advancing settlements, or an important road needs protection; or a threatened Indian outbreak requires the presence of troops. A command is sent, its strength proportioned to the importance of the situation. The difficulty develops the necessity of a military post, and the commander of the troops on the ground is ordered to forward plans. All commanding officers are not born, or educated architects, and in the absence of any officially recognized plans, those produced are sometimes unique, if not remarkable. They are sent to the Quartermaster-General, and in due time come back with the approval of the Secretary of War. (I have never heard of any change being made in the plans forwarded.) The consequence is that the plans of buildings in the Army are as various as the peculiarities of the builders. There is no uniformity of buildings at any two posts, and the same post frequently presents two or three different styles and plans, the work of different commanders.

It is impracticable to adopt plans of posts (though these should always be made with reference to danger by fire, and the probability of enlargement), but the plans of quarters should be practically the same throughout the Army. Personally I prefer two-story quarters for men, the living rooms on the ground floor, the dormitories above. These are in my experience more cleanly, more healthy, cooler in summer, and more easily heated in winter.

But the point I make is uniformity. Plans should be adopted by the War Department and rigidly adhered to.

EDUCATION.

This term has of late years been especially applied to a feeble effort to give to "the enlisted soldier" the rudiments of a common English education. Some good may have resulted to the soldier, and, by reflex action, to the Government, but though a vast deal of fuss has been made over it by over-sanguine or interested officials, the attempt is a practical failure.

With rare exceptions education is a "bitter pill" to man. Shakespeare's school-boy "creeping like a snail, unwillingly to school," is simply a type. What man does not pleasantly remember the days when he "played hookey" from school; and by adroit prevarication (to use a mild term) escaped the deserved punishment.

Education to be effective *must* be compulsory. It is only

when "boy and man" has been forced to drink deep of "the Pierian spring" that he acquires a taste for the waters, and voluntarily continues his studies.

Compulsory education in our Army is impossible at present: *first*, because of the variety and multiplicity of other more immediately pressing duties; and *second*, because if all enlisted men were required to attend school, every teacher now furnished by the Government would find himself confronted by knowledge superior to his own. Many men, far above the common, drift into the Army. Edgar A. Poe was a private soldier, and at one time there was in my company an ex-professor of geology of one of the foremost colleges of the world.

There must be some starting point. Every man who does not know how to read and write should be forced to learn these absolute requisites to a valuable soldier, even if some other duties are thereby neglected or omitted, but compulsion should stop on fair attainment of these rudiments.

But what is fair attainment? And just here comes in the difficulty of compulsory education. Matter should always have precedence over mere manner. A man may be brilliant, learned, well-posted in his business or profession, and in the affairs of the world, yet be most woefully lacking in the merest rudiments. No one would seriously insist that the late Horace Greeley, or a recent distinguished Quartermaster-General of the Army, should have been forced to go to school in the days of their best usefulness, yet (if common report be true) neither could spell nor read their own writing.

So far the educational movement has been based upon the purely voluntary action of the enlisted man. Many of these fully realize the importance of educational progress, to their own ends and ambition in life. Half a dozen or more talk the matter over, decide to make up a class, and attend school. All goes well for a short time, though guard-duty sadly interferes with regular attendance. Then one is detailed on detached service to go on an Indian scout, or after supplies to the nearest railroad station, or to build a road, or to cut fuel or hay for his post. He is absent days or weeks, and returns to find the class hopelessly ahead of him. Utterly discouraged, he stops attendance at school. In the course of a few months, and in the natural order of things in the Army, each man has been on detached service, and the class is no longer in existence.

To repeat: all education must be compulsory, at least in its elemental stages. It is impossible to have compulsory education in an Army whose time is fully employed in the military duties and manual labors required of our soldiers.

No one can doubt for an instant the importance of rudimentary, or even of advanced, education to every man, whether soldier or civilian. To do anything in this direction, Congress must first recognize the Army as a body of soldiers, and do away with its multifarious duties as mechanics, laborers, teamsters, clerks, cooks, nurses, etc., and then provide a corps of capable teachers.

Pending this needed legislation it is not urged that the present system be abandoned. It may do some good, and it certainly can do no harm; but the friends of the system have nothing, but their own sanguine temperaments, on which to ground any great hope for the future.

Within the last five or six years a few prominent men have mounted the Army educational hobby, and by dint of vociferous "tally ho's" and persistent lung-work have "run to earth" an educational *something*, so diminutive as to excite only ridicule. Plodding over A B C's, and making "pot-hooks and hangers," is not Army education, though it is now the fashion in high places to call it so. The proper scope of Army education is to convert the good citizen into the good soldier. If he lack the A B C's, the "pot-hooks and hangers," it is well to instruct him in them, not as part of Army education, but as supplying a deficiency of his civilian education. However learned a man may be in all that is necessary to successful civil life, he must, on entering the Army, begin at the A B C's of a new study, to the mastery of which his previous knowledge and experience as a citizen will help him but little. The true education of a soldier consists in knowledge of how, under all circumstances, to perform his full duty to the Government, with the greatest possible comfort, safety, and advantage to himself.

DUTIES.

The first duty of a soldier is prompt and loyal obedience to authority. It is not an easy duty to the average American citizen, whose freedom is his pride and boast, and who, in subordinating his own to the will of his superiors, has to fight many a battle with pride, self-esteem (sometimes unhappily with self-respect), and to win many a victory over himself. The world will

yet have to progress many thousands of years, and human nature must materially change, before all officers are even-tempered and just, and non-commissioned officers forbearing and impartial.

It is less than fifty years since the whole military and naval world believed that discipline could only be maintained by force of whipping, knocking down, bucking and gagging, tying up by the thumbs, and various other devices of barbarous torture. These means were resorted to by many kind-hearted officers, to whom such punishments were utterly repugnant, because they conscientiously believed that discipline could be maintained in no other way.

It is told, that in the early days of the Florida War a soldier, condemned to receive a flogging, appealed to the commanding officer, asserting his innocence of the crime imputed to him. The benign old Major was racked by contending emotions. Discipline and charitable impulse were at loggerheads. At last his face cleared. Turning to the Adjutant, he ordered: "Whip him, Mr. Adjutant; the Scripture says, it is better that ninety-nine innocent should suffer than that one guilty should escape."

The actual experience of the last thirty years has demonstrated that the strictest discipline can be maintained without the infliction of such punishments. Spite of predictions to the contrary, the Army of to-day, with imprisonment as its sole corporal punishment, is at least quite equal in discipline to any the United States has ever had.

Everything tending to the mental, physical and mechanical perfection of the man should be regarded as belonging to the instruction necessary to make a good soldier. Mentally, he should be alert, self-reliant, courageous, patient and wary; physically, he should be in perfect training, able to march, to ride, to run, jump, climb, swim and to use rifle, ax or spade with equal facility; mechanically, he should be so thoroughly instructed in all essentials of drill as to understand and give prompt obedience to every command.

In our Service the purely mechanical part of the soldier's instruction has heretofore usurped the foremost place. Knowledge of duty is measured by mechanical perfection of movement, and interminable drills in the manual and wheelings take the time which could be more profitably employed in learning some other essential of the profession of arms.

The introduction into armies of the long-range breech-loading

rifle and carbine has evolved some new principles in the Art of War, and very greatly modified some old and deeply-seated ideas.

It has often been said that Napoleon gained more victories with the legs than with the Arms of his troops, and the new rifle has opened the eyes of even the most obstinate and prejudiced of "old-style" soldiers to the fact that celerity is now, more than ever before, the first necessity of warfare.

Under the influence of these new ideas the old ramrod-stiffness of the soldier is gradually disappearing. He is no longer buttoned, breeched and belted as if poured into a mold; his little fingers, for generations pinned to the seams of his trousers, have at last gained some freedom of play, and his rigid arms are permitted some natural swing. It is being demonstrated that the unity of movement formerly thought absolutely essential to a company, is not the sole evidence of perfection. More careful study of physical ethics is demonstrating the uselessness, as well as the barbarity, of laying every soldier on a Procrustean bed, requiring the long, loose-jointed man to be absolutely on time with his quick, compactly-built companion.

The object of the drill in all marching evolutions is to give that unity and solidity which is absolutely necessary when one man has to handle several hundreds as one. The length and cadence of step must therefore be a compromise to which all must be brought. The object of the drill in the manual is to teach the soldier the easy and entire control of his weapon. In this, time is secondary to perfection of movement. If both can be had (without disgusting and disheartening the men with over-drill) so much the better, but if one is necessarily slighted, it should be time.

In our Service are all makes and shapes of able-bodied men. Some have been handling arms all their lives, and not a few have contracted habits which, however convenient to the men, or valuable in battle, are most difficult to conform to the manual. Of these the most trying are those who have learned to fire from the left shoulder. As it is more difficult to unlearn than to learn, these are most frequently the "gross" men of the company, those who give the captain most trouble in their instruction. Yet oftentimes these "gross" men are magnificent shots, who in battle would make terrible marks on an enemy; but then the manual is discarded, and the butt of the rifle flies instinctively to the forbidden shoulder.

The men who accomplish the best manual are usually those who never handled a gun until after entering the Service. They have nothing to unlearn. This, and the fact that much more care is taken in the selection of recruits, are the reasons why some of our crack militia companies drill with more perfect mechanism than any Regular troops in the world. The militia captain selects as his recruits young men of good habits, each inspired by military ardor and ambition. Regular Armies are obliged to accept such recruits as may be sent to them.

Some high officials of the Army seem to regard mechanical perfection in drill as the *summum bonum* of the Art of War. Any recommendation or effort of an inferior commander to give a broader scope to instruction, or a wider field of duty for the soldier, is frowned down as likely to interfere with the fixed routine of drill. This cannot last. Rank is always conservative, holding to the *statu quo*. Progressive inferior commanders, taking comfort from the knowledge that all really valuable innovations are forced from below, can bide their time with the full assurance that, sooner or later, rank will have to move with the world.

WORK.

Every great business in which numbers of men are employed must rely for its success on careful and judicious distribution of labor. In a large foundry or machine-shop each man is put and kept at the special part of the work for which his knowledge and skill best fit him. On the farm some plow, others plant, some reap, others bind. Even in our small domestic households each servant has his or her special duties.

It is only in the Army that every man is expected and required to be a "jack-of-all-trades." Drilling, guard duty, target firing, and all other legitimate duties of the soldier; building quarters, making gardens, cutting hay for the animals and wood for fuel, putting up telegraph lines, making roads, scouting after Indians, driving mules, loading and unloading wagons, cooking for his company and nursing the sick in hospital, are but a portion of the duties which may be, and not unfrequently are, required of the same soldier in the course of his five years' term of service.

There is no more serious drawback to the efficiency of the Army than this, and it is yet a disputed point whether this condition is forced on the Army by the niggardliness of Congress or by the

conservatism of rank in the Army. Without committing myself to either side of this dispute, I may say that I doubt if there be any Congressman who does not know enough not to order a puddler to run a nail machine, or who would insist on his cook's going to drill with a company of soldiers. The facts are so patent, and the result so absurd, that if properly represented by rank, Congress would undoubtedly do something in mitigation of the present evils.

Differing in this from every civilized country, the United States enlists men only as soldiers, a fraud in itself, for when enlisted they are forced to become "hewers of wood and drawers of water," to do anything and everything they are ordered to do.

Great Britain enlists almost all the employees of its Army, even to the servants of the officers, and each for the duty he is expected to perform. The United States will not enlist (except as a soldier) a carpenter, mason, blacksmith, wheelwright or teamster, yet these men may be found at every military post (where there are no soldiers competent for the work), citizens, receiving three, four, or five times as much money for their services as they would had they enlisted as mechanics, not soldiers.

Congress carefully restricts the rank and file of the Army to twenty-five thousand men. It seems to know or care nothing about the rank and file of the quartermaster's employees. If rank would present a few statistics in the matter, Congress would quickly see the propriety and economy of a proper distribution of labor; of enlisting mechanics, teamsters, cooks, nurses, etc., in their proper capacities, and not as soldiers.

Every military post is a workshop of the Government. Building, supplying, and keeping in repair, require the services of men skilled in specialties. There is no evading the fact that such men must be had. The question is, shall these skilled men be enlisted as specialists (not soldiers), or shall we continue to employ them as civilians, paying for their services four or five times the sums that would be required to pay the same men if enlisted as mechanics?

It may be objected that skilled labor cannot be obtained at the price paid to enlisted men. I believe it can. At least it is worth the experiment. At nearly every military post there are among the enlisted soldiers a few excellent mechanics and specialists. They are contented because they have permanent jobs and their pay is sure. While this paper is being written a bake-oven

is being constructed at this post, a specialist (civilian) being employed by the Subsistence Department. Working with this man is a soldier, handling his trowel with equal skill, and apparently as much at home in all the requisites of the work. The civilian would like to make his job interminable. The soldier contentedly goes through his daily routine, doing, simply as a matter of duty, nearly twice the work done by the citizen. The citizen is paid five dollars a day; the soldier with regular and extra pay, something less than a dollar. Yet the latter has no jealousy. The civilian dallies with his work because he knows not where to look for another job; the soldier works faithfully because his jobs and pay are sure.

At this post is an extraordinarily good painter, a soldier. Some few years ago he thought he saw a fine opening in a growing Western town, and when his term of service expired he went there, opened a shop, and commenced business. After about a year he returned to his old company and asked to be again enlisted. "Why," said the captain, "I thought you had a splendid thing. Could you get no work?" "Yes," replied the would-be soldier, "I got plenty of work; in fact I never worked so hard in my life, but I could get no pay. I dunned until I was ashamed of myself, then brought suit, but the sums were generally small, and the lawyers got the most of what was recovered. I have had a good lesson, and want to be a soldier for the balance of my life."

For what they now receive from the Government in pay, rations, clothing, etc., these men would gladly re-enlist as specialists; for curiously enough, the merely mechanical part of the soldier's duty (drills, parades, inspections, etc.) is the special aversion of the mechanic and specialist.

PAY, COMPENSATION.

The pay of the private soldier of the line of the Army is thirteen dollars per month. After the second year of service this monthly pay receives each year an increase of one dollar, so that in the fifth year of enlistment his pay is sixteen dollars per month. On re-enlistment he receives two dollars extra, or eighteen dollars per month. Of this pay the Government retains one dollar per month for third, two for the fourth, and three for the fifth year of first enlistment; and on re-enlistment, one dollar per month for each subsequent year of service. This money is the

property of the soldier, but it is retained as a security against desertion, and paid only on his final papers when discharged.

There is a stoppage from the pay of each and every enlisted soldier of twelve-and-a-half cents per month, which goes to the support of the Soldiers' Home. This is an unjust tax. A man who has served honestly and faithfully as a soldier for the twenty best years of his life, has earned the right to be supported for the rest of his days by his country, and the Government has no right to devolve this burden on other soldiers. The soldier is also obliged to pay the sum fixed by the Council of Administration for his washing, from fifty to seventy-five cents per month, but beyond the items enumerated, which amount to less than one dollar, the pay of the soldier is absolutely his own private property, and must be paid into his own hands, except when forfeited, as punishment, by sentence of a court-martial. Whatever the debts a soldier may have contracted, no civil process can garnishee his pay, nor can a court-martial condemn him to forfeiture of pay for the benefit of any individual, except in the single case provided for under the fifty-fourth Article of War.

Besides this pay, the soldier is furnished with a fixed money value of clothing for each year. When this value is not drawn in kind, the amount saved is credited to the soldier, and paid to him on his final papers. After the first year a careful and economical man may always have an "amount due for clothing not drawn."

The enlisted soldier is provided with a good and ample ration, comfortable mess-rooms and mess-furniture; with generally good quarters, with wire-woven bed-springs, mattresses, sheets, pillow-cases, lockers for his clothing, chairs and tables for his comfort; with medicines and medical attendance, the very best hospital accommodations in cases of serious illness or injury, and an amount and variety of reading matter, absolutely impossible in any other Army. There is not a necessity to comfortable existence that is not provided by the Government for the enlisted soldier.

The military duties of the United States soldier are often onerous, the manual labor more or less constant and hard, but he is better compensated, better treated, and lives better than the soldiers of any other Army in the world. He has no necessary expenses, and, if he chooses to do so, he can save nearly every cent of the money paid him. The three to five dollars per day paid to civilian carpenters, masons, etc., sounds very large as

compared with the amount of money paid to the soldier for doing the same work, but when the civilian has paid his rent and board, for his clothing and medical attendance in sickness, he has little advantage in ready cash over the poorly paid soldier; and when these charges are supplemented by loss of time by sickness, or bad weather, by failure to obtain steady work, or pay for work done, the advantage is altogether on the side of the soldier.

REWARDS.

From among the enlisted men of each company are taken its non-commissioned officers, the company commanders selecting for these positions the men, in their opinion, best fitted by knowledge of duty, military bearing, good behavior, and faculty of control. This should be the greatest incentive to good conduct, and zeal in performance of duty. It fails to be so, because the pay of the private soldier is so much more than he absolutely needs, that the small increase on becoming a corporal is not sufficient to tempt some of the best and most reliable men to undertake the greater responsibility.

There being no valuable money consideration in their retention, our non-commissioned officers are singularly careless of their positions, resignations and reductions for cause being almost of weekly occurrence in a regiment. This should be remedied, and the only way to reach that remedy is by a proper Governmental recognition of the vast difference between a private soldier and even the very lowest grade of non-commissioned officer, the corporal.

In some one of his numerous speeches (wonderful for their "infinite variety") General Sherman described his sensations when appointed a corporal in the Corps of Cadets, and declares that no succession of honors and glories since crowded upon him has ever yielded the full satisfaction of that first step. And he had good reason. Mankind is divided into two great classes, the commanders and the commanded, and between the two is the widest possible of gulfs. In the days of slavery the man who owned a single slave took rank with him that owned hundreds; and so far as his function extends the corporal of a company is as much of a commander as the Commander-in-chief of all the Army. The sole duty of the private is obedience. The corporal commands, and his orders must be obeyed. He has crossed the great gulf. He has taken the first, greatest, most important step

in mounting the ladder of ambition. He has put himself beyond social equality with his equals of yesterday, for commander and commanded can never be equals, however warm the friendship between them.

The importance of this first step has never been properly recognized in the Army. The pay of the very lowest corporal should be at least twice as much as that of the private soldier commanded by him, and his messing and treatment by officers, should be in further recognition of his greatly increased importance.

For some years past a persistent, but unsuccessful, effort has been made to increase the pay of non-commissioned officers. The fault of the proposed plan was, that it attempted to grade the pay of non-commissioned officers to accord with an assumed measure of responsibility. Leaving the pay of the corporal only two dollars more than that of the private, it nearly doubled the pay of the first sergeant. Ignoring the grand fact that all non-commissioned officers are equally (though not equal) commanders, it placed the broad increase of pay between sergeant and first sergeant, instead of between corporals and privates, where it should be.

The pay of a second lieutenant is four times that of the highest paid non-commissioned officer, and properly. Another great gulf has been crossed. But the pay of a first lieutenant is only one-fourteenth more than that of a second lieutenant.

In every Army there are three classes: commissioned officers, non-commissioned, or warrant officers, and privates. These classes in their habitual social intercourse should be kept as distinct as possible, each from the other. As lieutenants, captains and colonels meet and visit each other on terms of social equality, so corporals and sergeants should associate together, and their treatment by officers should be as if they were of the same grade.

Every increase of rank should be accompanied by some increase of pay, but, from a military stand-point, it is not of the slightest importance whether the sergeant be paid one or ten dollars per month more than the corporal. The great increase of the pay of enlisted men should occur between private and corporal, and it would be better for the Army to cut down the pay of privates, than not to have the marked distinction here so earnestly advocated.

When the Government shall recognize the vast difference be-

tween commanded and commander ; between the private soldier and the man who bears its warrant of "trust and confidence" ; when the pay of the lowest corporal shall be double that of the highest private, we shall see a struggle to obtain and keep these offices which will prove of inestimable value to discipline, and redound to the credit of the Army and the country.

It is provided by law that vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant which remain after the appointment of the graduates of the Military Academy, "shall be filled by promotion of meritorious non-commissioned officers of the Army." This is the greatest reward of merit that can be offered to "the enlisted soldier," for it raises him to that class whose successful members may aspire to fill, and have filled, the highest and noblest positions within the reach of mortal man.

Unhappily, the number of non-commissioned officers who earnestly endeavor, by good conduct and study, to fit themselves for this great boon, is very small. This arises from no lack of ability or ambition. It is principally the result of our present system of cheapening the position of non-commissioned officers. Fed, clothed and lodged as privates are, and with little better pay, the non-commissioned officer scarcely realizes that he is of a different, a higher class ; that he has made the first great step, crossed the first grand gulf. With a humility begot of constant association with privates, the large majority of non-commissioned officers contemplate the position of commissioned officer as something so far off, so far beyond their even most sanguine hopes and dreams, that the idea of trying for it seems as absurd as reaching for the moon. Make the first step in the ascent more marked. Let the non-commissioned officer feel that he has made one grand successful bound toward his ambition, and many now despairing, hopeless, and inert, will gain energy and strength to attempt the second.

Other than promotion, the Government offers no reward for good behavior of soldierly conduct. Each officer and enlisted soldier is expected to do the best "that in him lies," not for hope of reward, but from a sense of duty. A judicious inferior commander may, however, produce the happiest results in his command, by instituting an unostentatious system of petty rewards, as passes, special indulgencies, etc., to the good and reliable men.

PUNISHMENTS.

Under the sixty-sixth Article of War, all soldiers charged with crime shall be confined until tried by court-martial or released by proper authority. It is the duty of every officer and non-commissioned officer to confine a soldier who is believed to be guilty of a breach of discipline, or a violation of good order. Subsequent investigation may show that the action of a Court is unnecessary, and the man is released. This confinement is not punishment; it is simply precautionary.

Except by sentence of a court-martial there can be, legally, no punishment inflicted on a soldier of the United States Army.

How fast the world moves in this nineteenth century! There are yet many officers of the Army, who were witnesses of (and sometimes actors in) the brutal punishments of thirty-five years ago, and who then firmly and conscientiously believed that discipline could not be maintained without them.

And they were right to a degree. The Army of that and previous date (numerically, not a third of the strength of the Army of to-day) was scattered in small posts all over our vast frontier. The nearest post-office was oftentimes hundreds of miles away, to and from which all mail matter was carried by express riders, who rode by night and lay hid during the day; or in wagons escorted by a force strong enough to beat off expected Indian attacks.

At the more remote posts a soldier against whom general charges had been put, not unfrequently remained in the guard-house six or eight months before a court could be assembled for his trial. Half a dozen officers had to control twenty times their number of men, whose necessarily constant manual labor (for they had to rely entirely on themselves for everything except provisions, clothing, arms and accouterments) prevented that drill and military discipline necessary to convert rough, untutored men into tractable soldiers.

Expectation of punishment at some remote period has very few terrors for hardened offenders. What wonder, then, that disheartened and disgusted with the "law's delays," the officers took into their own hands (and with good results) the punishment of the more refractory?

Railroads and telegraph lines are wonderful ameliorators of opinion and custom. It has taken less than half a century for the enlightened world to discover that crime is not lessened by

the severity, but by the certainty and promptness of punishment. Breaches of discipline which thirty years ago were thought deserving of severe corporeal punishment, are now punished simply by a stoppage by court-martial of a portion of the pay of the soldier, sometimes with added imprisonment; and this wonderful change has had the most salutary effect on discipline, and on the whole condition of the Army.

But great and sudden revolutions of any kind are dangerous from the liability of their being carried too far. To the lowest, bestial, class of humanity, *fear* is the one sole restraining influence. It is a matter of serious public concern, whether the leniency to culprits now so fashionable with both civil and military authorities will not be the prolific parent of a brood of vipers which will sting the Commonwealth to its very heart.

Of the forty Articles of War setting forth the various military offenses chargeable against enlisted men, thirty-four prescribe "such punishment as a court-martial may direct." It might be inferred from this, by one not conversant with the working of Army machinery, that the punishments inflicted would be as various as the grades and shades of offense, and that variety indefinitely increased by the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the Courts themselves. This is far from being the case. Although the law gives the Court full and absolute discretion as to the punishment awarded, the power appointing the Court uses its reviewing authority in such way as to render the law nugatory.

By dint of disapproving all other sentences, courts-martial (to assure some punishment to offenders) have been gradually forced to yield their legal "discretion" to the assumed "discretion" of higher power; and as now administered the sentence of a court-martial is not what the Court would prefer to direct, but what it believes the reviewing authority will approve.

However different the offenses, the punishments awarded differ only in degree. Except for desertion, theft, and a few of the more heinous offenses (which entail dishonorable discharge), the only punishments permitted to the legally authorized "discretion" of courts-martial are "forfeiture of pay," and "imprisonment at hard labor"; which last means eight hours per day of the merest semblance of labor, every night in bed, and entire exemption from drills, guards, inspections, and other disagreeable features of military duty. To the average military "bummer," the guard-house is a refuge and a reward; and a sentence by a

general court-martial to six or eight months' "confinement at hard labor," a "consummation most devoutly to be wished." Some men glory in the title of "guard-house birds," and every post is afflicted with more or less of these irreclaimable ruffians, who, callous to disgrace, prefer the guard-house with its all-night comfort, and its well shirked daily labor, to the duties and responsibilities that necessarily devolve upon the true and faithful soldier.

The amelioration of the condition of criminal prisoners which of late years has taken a hold on many prominent people, deeper than humanity (for it is rapidly becoming only a diseased vanity, a morbid craving after notoriety), was, in its inception, worthy of the assiduous labors of the best men. But the dungeons, the tortures, the horrible despair of a century ago have disappeared from among nations of the highest enlightenment, and the continued craze for further amelioration is fast verging on absurdity. Society confines its malefactors—*first*, for the safety of the body politic; *second*, by their punishment, to deter others from like crimes. When imprisonment fails to contain the gist of punishment, something else should be substituted.

A Washington magistrate, holding his Court one November day, said to an Army officer present, "Look at that crowd of miserable bummers. Every one is a tramp in spring, summer, and autumn, but they all come here for the winter. Each understands perfectly the law of larceny, and each steals something that will send him *up* for about four months. They have a comfortable winter at the expense of the city, and in spring are turned out to tramp again."

This is not punishment, but an incentive to, and reward for vagrancy. So the humanitarian efforts of reviewers of proceedings of courts-martial cases, have converted the punishment of malefactors into a reward for worthlessness. The very worst men in the Service have the easiest time, and as the approved sentences of courts-martial are the only punishments permitted, the matter is beyond remedy, until reviewing authorities are prohibited from substituting their assumed "discretion" for the "discretion" accorded by law to the Courts.

Let punishment be so varied as to prove punishment, not reward. Feed the "guard-house bird" on bread and water, place him in solitary confinement, or make him turn out with each relief between taps and reveille, and it may possibly dawn upon

his dull understanding that it would be easier and more comfortable to perform the legitimate duties of a soldier. Instead of the pretense "hard labor," put the worthless garrison shirk on a six to ten hours walk with a sentinel, and load him with a knapsack weighing say sixty pounds (less than the average weight carried by the good soldier in the field).

Now we *punish* most Army culprits by doing with them exactly what they prefer to have done.

A court in its sentence should endeavor to fix on something that will prove a punishment, therefore each sentence should be suited as far as possible to the known temperament and peculiarities of the individual to be punished. Courts are usually composed of officers stationed at the same post with the culprit, and each officer may have such personal knowledge of him as will enable the Court to do full and ample justice, and these sentences should be confirmed. Department commanders have no such knowledge, and for this, if for no other reason, the power to shape all sentences to suit themselves should be taken away from them.

DESERTION.

For years past every annual report of the War Department has bewailed the number of desertions from the Army, and floundered in vain attempts to account for them. "Know thyself" is one of the most admirable of scriptural commands, which in this case may well be commended to the Department, for by its persistent course in cheapening and lessening the crime, it has well earned the title of "FATHER OF DESERTION."

Thirty years ago every convicted deserter was indelibly marked, whipped, and drummed out of Service with every concomitant of disgrace. The abolition of whipping and marking was the act of Congress, but disgrace and degradation still attached to the crime itself. Soldiers true to their honor and their colors had not yet been forced to receive as companions, associates, and equals, men convicted of the highest crime known to military law. Of late years men who have been convicted of this crime by courts-martial and sentenced to dishonorable discharge and imprisonment, are frequently returned to their companies by the War Department, under pretense of serving out the terms of their enlistments. But the crowning act in the humiliation of the true and faithful soldier, is the written permission to re-enlist, given by the Adjutant-General of the Army,

to men convicted of desertion, dishonorably discharged, and who have just completed their terms of imprisonment.

If desertion is a great military crime, why play with, and cheapen it in this manner? If desertion is a disgrace and degradation, why force true and faithful soldiers to receive as messmates and equals men so disgraced and degraded?

The War Department will not answer these questions. It has tried to carry water on both shoulders. The Adjutant-General is *ex-officio* inspector of military prisons. The curt rigor of military law is visited on the deserter, but the humanitarianism of the Inspector crops out in excess of kindness and consideration for the poor prisoner.

The majority of the "enlisted soldiers" may be illiterate, but any one who takes them for fools is grievously mistaken. Every point made by Congress or the War Department, affecting their interests, or their honor, is discussed with the acumen, if not with the eloquence, of a cabinet meeting. The good men are grieved and wounded by having ex-convicts and graduates of the military prisons forced on them as equals and companions; the bad men encourage themselves in thoughts of desertion—"it don't amount to anything. Even if I am captured and sent to prison, I will have an easy time there, and be permitted to re-enlist when I get out."

Once, when on an important and arduous Indian campaign, a most excellent and faithful soldier brought me a letter, which he had just received from an inmate of the Fort Leavenworth prison, a man who had been in the same company, and was then serving out a sentence for desertion. "Why," asked the letter, "don't you desert? You march all day, and stand guard all night, in all sorts of weather, besides taking the chance of being killed or wounded by Indians. If you desert you will probably get away, but even if you are captured you will only be sent here. It is the best place in the Army. Never over eight hours work, and very light at that, better eating, and more comforts in quarters than any company in Service, no guard duty, in bed every night, and when your time is up here you can get permission to re-enlist in your old company if you want to."

This is a faithful picture. Can the number of desertions be any matter of marvel, when the authorities so cheapen and condone the crime, and provide such a delightful haven of rest for the criminal?

Besides this first greatest cause, there are many other causes and incentives to desertion, the probably next most potent and prolific being our system of payment.

Once in two months the paymaster reaches every post, and places in the hands of each soldier his pay for the previous two months. Even at the posts most distinguished for good order and discipline, the ensuing three or four days is an orgie of drinking and gambling, and nine out of ten of the disorders and violations of discipline immediately follow, and are the direct results of the visit of the paymaster. In a few days, however, the money is in the hands of the post trader and a few fortunate gamblers, and if either of these latter should have had previous intent to desert, he goes at once, for he has means to place him well away from any danger of pursuit, and to support him until he can get other work.

Our present system of payment of the troops has resulted well for the Government so far as loss and expense are concerned, but its effect on the "enlisted soldier" is such as to force every officer in command to condemn it *in toto*. There is no reason why soldiers should not be paid at least monthly. The immense army of quartermaster's employees is paid every month; and a few hours study of the British system of payment of troops might prove beneficial to "the Powers."

Except to some extreme posts, to which they are escorted by troops, paymasters rarely carry with them the money for their payments. It is sent by express, at the risk of the Express Company. A chief paymaster stationed at department headquarters could each month express to each post an amount sufficient to pay the troops at that post, and the payment could be made by a lieutenant as easily and perfectly as are now performed the duties of post quartermaster and assistant commissary of subsistence. This would, at least, save to the Government the amount now paid for the transportation of the paymaster and his clerk, and would give the troops monthly, instead of bi-monthly payments.

There are certain classes of men, loggers for example, who have steady work for only a portion of the year. This being over, and failing to procure other work, these men frequently enlist, with the full intention to desert when the season for congenial work shall re-open. Eastern men often enlist to be sent West, with like determination. Under the head of clothing, I have mentioned another incentive; and there is yet another class,

the grumbling, discontented Army bummer, who deserts from one company to avoid drill, from another to avoid work, and so *ad infinitum*. One such character acknowledged to me that he had deserted from seven different regiments in widely separated parts of the country, yet five years had not elapsed since his first enlistment.

It is impossible entirely to stop desertion, but to reduce it to lowest figures, it is necessary—

1. That the War Department recognize desertion as a crime for which there can be no palliation or condonement. That under no circumstances can a man, known to have been convicted of desertion, re-enter the Service in any capacity whatever.

2. That every convicted deserter shall be indelibly marked on some habitually unseen portion of his body; not cruelly, but so that any surgeon or recruiting officer can identify the mark.

3. That, in time of peace, soldiers desiring to get out of the Service may legally do so, by paying all expenses to which the Government has been put by their enlistment, and such other sum as may be decided upon as a fair equivalent.

GENERAL TREATMENT.

We have seen that the "treatment" of "the enlisted soldier" by the Government is admirable. The pay, clothing, food, quarters, medical attendance and hospital facilities, the certainty of pensions for wounds or disability contracted in Service, the Soldiers' Home after twenty years, and honorable retirement on comfortable pay for the real veterans, together furnish means to a comfortable and enjoyable daily life, and a reward for long and faithful service, not surely attainable by the same class of men in any other occupation or business in life.

The treatment of "the enlisted soldier" by his immediate superiors may be divided into two heads: *first*, that which is personal-official, arising from the close relationship between commander and commanded; and *second*, the purely official management of soldiers in garrison and in the field—in other words, the handling of troops.

In no business or occupation of life, in any quarter of the globe, are men in subordinate positions habitually so well treated by their immediate superiors, as are the enlisted men of the United States Army. The officers are not always such born gentlemen as to recognize and accord the respect due to inferiors,

and may sometimes be harsh, dictatorial, tyrannical, even unjust, but these are the very exceptional cases. Company commanders are obliged to look after the clothing, food, quarters, all the details for the comfort and equipment of their men, as if the latter were mere children, and the average captain is but a little while in command of his company when the paternal instinct asserts itself, to the very great comfort and benefit of all concerned. There are very few really good and valuable captains in our Army, who do not, in their secret hearts, believe that they have the very best company in the Service, and as this feeling reacts, the result is most gratifying.

There is, however, one point to be made here on behalf of "the enlisted soldier." The captain, like all other men, is not free from prejudices and idiosyncrasies. The Regulations place it in the power of a company commander to give to the discharged soldier a character or not. I have known cases where really good soldiers were discharged "without character," by captains who allowed personal ill-feeling, or the remembrance of some personal disfavor to stand in the way of justice.

A dishonorable discharge can only be given by sentence of a general court-martial, approved by the power appointing the Court. The discharge "without character" has exactly the same effect in preventing the re-enlistment of the soldier, and blasting his career. In the one case it is a proper exercise of judicial authority, in the other it may be the mere whim or petulance of an individual. By an evident oversight, the Regulations enable a company commander to usurp the function of a court-martial, and at his mere will to condemn the soldier without trial, and blast his future without giving him a hearing. In all such cases the soldier should have the right of appeal to the commanding officer, who should be authorized and empowered to force the company commander to give a good character when the investigation of a properly constituted board shall show that the official record of the soldier warrants it. We surround the soldier with all possible safeguards against "dishonorable discharge," yet place it in the power of the company commander to degrade and debase him, without trial or hearing, by a discharge "without character," which, as before stated, has precisely the same effect.

Monotony is the bane of the service. Cut off, as are all frontier posts, from the world, from all participation in any social life outside its own narrow circle; put day after day through the same

unvarying treadmill round of drill and work, work and drill, with no hope of change, what wonder if some men become reckless?

Ordinary civil life is too tame for some natures, and they enter the Service in expectation of a life of excitement and constant change. A splendid soldier, a sergeant, was discharged by expiration of his term of service. His captain urged his re-enlistment. He replied: "I intend to re-enlist, but not in this regiment. Ten years ago I left the position of bank clerk on a salary of one hundred dollars per month, because I could not stand the monotony of the business. I wanted to see the world and life, and enlisted. In all these ten years I have served at but two posts, three years at one, and seven years at this. I can't stand it any longer. I am truly sorry to leave my regiment, my officers, and my friends, but I *must* have change."

Every experienced officer knows that changes of stations have the happiest effect on both officers and men. The effect on the social life of officers and their families is so marked that it is usually possible to tell from the social condition of any regiment, whether or not it has had frequent changes. Since the War, one most fortunate regiment has changed its station on an average about once in eighteen months. It is the happiest, most united, most hospitable, most delightful of Army families.

Put four companies of a regiment at an out-of-the-way frontier station, keep them there five, ten, or fifteen years (as is not unfrequent) and the result may easily be imagined. Cut off from the world, the most unimportant events of their daily monotonous life are magnified into staple subjects of conversation and comment. All get tired of and pick each at the other, culminating in one extreme case, some years ago, in the trial by court-martial of every officer at a post, on charges put each against the other. The fault is in the dreadful prison-like monotony, the curse of the Army, and which exists simply through the lack of interest in the matter of those in power. This condition of affairs must last as long as the Government is without any fixed system or rule for the exchange of stations of troops.

There are *unnamed* reasons why changes of station of troops are not more frequently made, but the reason given is always "lack of funds." This is really no reason at all, for the changes, if properly made, would cost but little. The reasons for change are manifold, one of the very best and most important being the instruction, the education of the troops that comes from march-

ing. It is impossible to depict the utter ignorance of some of the regiments of the Army in this all-important branch of their duty. Remarkable as the statement may appear, there are to-day, companies in the United States Army which have not pitched a tent, nor made even one single day's march in five years.

Is there any reason why a regiment on the Pacific should exchange with one on the Lakes, or one in Southern Texas with another in Northern Dakota? On the contrary, are there not many, especially hygienic reasons, why such changes should not be made? Yet such are the changes usually made by the War Department, and which necessarily cost almost as much as would the movement of the whole Army under a properly digested system. For example: move a regiment from Northern Dakota into Montana, pushing one there into Idaho, that pushes another into Oregon, from Oregon into California, from New Mexico, Texas, Indian Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, and so to Dakota again. Let all these moves be made by marching, and the cost of the movement of half the Army will scarcely be greater than that now required to exchange the stations of two regiments.

Troops should never be permitted to remain long enough at any one post to acquire a home feeling, or for the development of the accumulative faculty. These are the most potent opponents to military efficiency, either of officers or enlisted men. Under the present most abominable system, or I should more properly say, lack of system, troops no sooner arrive at a post than they settle down as if they expected to remain for their lives. Making gardens, buying farms, breeding cattle, pigs, chickens, watching for favorable opportunities for investment in lands or mines, they lose sight of their duty to Government, and any order or military duty which takes them, even temporarily, from their private or personal interests, is looked upon as a special hardship, an official and personal grievance.

The accumulation of baggage of both officers and men that marks a ten or fifteen years station* at one post is something marvelous. A troop of cavalry was ordered from its permanent station to another post for a summer campaign against Indians. It was directed to march, and was furnished with four wagons to take the forage, rations, tents and property. In due time it

* This is no exaggeration. The 17th Infantry has been in the same department, and practically at the same posts since September, 1870. Other regiments are not far behind this record.

reached its new station, the four wagons loaded to the bows with household furniture of the officers and laundresses. Some days after the troop commander applied to department headquarters to have the heavy baggage sent to him by rail. This was approved, and in due time came two car-loads of boxes. I saw the opening of most of these boxes and at least one car-load or twenty thousand pounds, were filled with old horse-shoes, bridle-bits, stirrups, buckles, straps, pieces of leather, and a miscellaneous collection of odds and ends, the whole not worth the tenth part of the freight paid on it by the Government.

The only way to stop this accumulation of worthless stuff, is to force troops to march when changing stations, with transportation only sufficient to carry the authorized allowance of baggage of officers and men, the company desks, books, records, and the equipment necessary for the march.

I have known company commanders who prided themselves on always keeping full sets of equipments, camp and garrison equipage, etc., "surplus," *i. e.*, on hand, but not on their papers, and these are carried wherever the company goes, as company property, at an enormous and unnecessary expense to the Government. To put a stop to this, the commanding officer of a post from which troops are ordered should be required, either in person, or by a board of disinterested officers, thoroughly to inspect the outgoing companies. Only those things absolutely necessary on the march should be taken; all other public property should be turned into the post quartermaster. On the arrival of the troops at their new posts, the companies should be re-equipped from the property turned in to that post quartermaster by other companies.

In all military and personal aspects it is of the first importance that regiments change stations at least once in three or four years. This is not now done, ostensibly on the ground of lack of funds. By making these changes as heretofore indicated, marching the troops, and requiring each regiment and company before moving, to turn in to the post quartermaster everything except its records, field equipment and authorized allowance of baggage of officers and men, the moving of ten regiments will cost the Government scarcely more than moving one now costs.

One of the *unnamed* causes why troops are not moved is the tendency of Army rulers to run to specialties. Only a few years ago in one military department, every officer (even old chaplains)

was required to study, recite, and be proficient in the signal code. Of late years each department commander seems to be on the hunt for something that will tend to the credit to his department, differing from the specialty in other departments. One affects perfection in drill; another in proceedings of courts-martial; another in inspections, etc. At present the whole Army is afflicted with a "boom," a genuine craze on target firing, and everything has to yield precedence. It seems to be entirely overlooked that an Army should be a body of soldiers, not specialists, and that however skillful it may be in the use of offensive weapons, it is, in the field, no match for another Army that can use its legs. The mass of our foot Army is well drilled, and composed of fair shots, but the men are not soldiers, because, as a rule, they know nothing of field service.

In what does the Regular Army excel the crack militia regiments of the country? In absolutely nothing except that one most important item, discipline. They beat us in the mechanical perfection of their drill, they equal us in target firing, and they know as much of field service as most foot regiments of Regulars. It is true they have no experience in this, neither are we permitted to have any.

General Howard's idea of camps of instruction may prove an entering wedge, but it does not as yet go far enough to break up the knotty block of precedent. The target-firing craze takes in the whole Army. Each department commander, with a natural pride in his command, wishes his department to stand ahead of all others in this, the only general test of proficiency. The result of this test is published in all the prominent papers of the country. Companies that go into camps of instruction will lose days and weeks that would otherwise be devoted almost exclusively to building up a figure of merit. Few department commanders will risk the loss of position of their departments in this widely-published contest, for the sake of any other instruction, not made public, however beneficial the latter might prove to the "enlisted soldier."

Every company in the United States Army should have in every year not less than two months of instruction in campaign life. This will give practical knowledge of that most important duty of the soldier, *how to take care of himself*. It will give real knowledge of advance- and rear-guards, and flankers; of skirmish fighting as it actually occurs; of marching and camp-

ing; and make him a soldier instead of a specialist as now. To give this knowledge to each and every man of a company, we can well afford a less perfect manual, or a smaller figure of merit in target firing.

There is no part of an officer's duty that requires more knowledge, skill and discretion than the handling and treatment of troops in the field, and this is especially the case when the troops are unaccustomed to field service.

One commanding officer, mistaking nervousness for energy, will have his men on the march by two or three o'clock in the morning. It was the usual boast of a general, somewhat distinguished for his fighting qualities, that when marching a day behind, his division always got on to its camp-ground before it was vacated by the advance division. It was not by any means a thing to boast of. Day was made for work, night for sleep and rest, and no man can violate nature's plain laws without suffering to himself or some one else.

Except in War, or when (as sometimes occurs, even in time of peace in our broad and diversified country) a command has to make a long march over a waterless and torrid waste, no body of troops should ever be required to move before sunrise.

Having fixed on that as the time for commencing the march, the *habit* of being up, packed, and ready at that time should not be broken in on without serious necessity. More miles mean simply so many more hours on the road; and a very ample experience in the marching of troops warrants the assertion that from six A. M. to six P. M., or twelve hours, is an easier march and tells less on the health, strength, and spirits of the troops, than from two A. M. to nine A. M., or seven hours, which, in the opinion of some commanders, is the ideal march.

When forced to commence the march at that most inhuman hour men start sleepy, stiff, and sore. Nature has not had time, through "balmy sleep" to prove the great restorer. Arrived in camp, the whole long monotonous day is spent in nervous efforts to force themselves to the sleep and rest of which the early start deprived them, and of which they know they will again be deprived next morning. And so the march goes on, the men always sleepy, always tired, always discontented. Not so when the "sweet restorer" has had full time to perform its office. At dawn the men spring from their blankets fully invigorated, strong, active, happy, and contented. Refreshed alike in mind and body,

they spin off the day's march as mere child's play, and when camp is pitched are ready to hunt or fish, to run races, or play pranks, for they are sure of a comfortable night's rest and sleep.

Another commander, forgetting or ignoring the absolute necessity of previous bodily training, will start from the ease and physical laxity of garrison life on a march of twenty or more miles the first day. I have known some distinguished commanders who expected and required of soft troops as long a march on the first day as ought to have been made only after ten or fifteen days of hardening. Such orders not only destroy the physical condition of the command, but bring discontent and demoralization.

Habit is said to be second nature. On this the "midnight marchers" and others who affect originality or peculiarity in their mode of handling troops, build the assumption that "anything, however unnatural in itself, may be made habit and second nature by dint of persistence; that in time of War night marches are oftentimes imperatively demanded, and that therefore men should be forced into the habit of making them." The commander must break down and demoralize his men to be ready for an emergency which may not arise, and which, if it should arise, will be better met by men previously trained in a healthful and natural manner. My experience is that that commanding officer is best in the field who conforms the habits of his men, as far as possible, to natural laws.

The rate of march should never be hastened except in case of absolute necessity. The leading guide should be required to limit his step and stride so as to cover as nearly as possible two and one-half miles in the fifty marching minutes of each hour. He will then enable the column to keep well closed provided it be no longer than a regiment. When it consists of several regiments or battalions there should be a considerable interval between them, and the leading guide of each should give it the time and step. The regulation step of thirty inches should never be taken by the leading guide on a march on ordinary country roads.

The first halt should be forty to forty-five minutes after the start, and should last fifteen to twenty minutes, to enable the men to obey the calls of nature, and to change shoes and stockings if necessary. Each subsequent move should be of fifty minutes, to be followed by a halt of ten minutes. This not only

to give rest and relief to the whole command, but to enable the foot-sore and those otherwise obliged to leave the column, to catch up and regain their places in their companies. And in all these halts, the bugle sound "Halt" should mean "break ranks," otherwise it is not always beneficial to the soldiers. I have known commanders after the sound "Halt," to keep their commands in ranks for at least five of the precious ten minutes, closing up, dressing, stacking arms, etc. This is simply worrying nonsense, and should not be tolerated. At the sound "Fall in" the troops will instinctively close up, and when, after two or three minutes, "Forward" is sounded, the whole body will move together as one man.

On the second day's march (however short the first) the commanding officer will find men limping beside or behind the column. The ill-fitting shoes have made some abrasion. These men should be examined by the surgeon, and the man whose foot is chafed should be put in an ambulance, or on a baggage wagon. One or two days' disuse of the foot will heal what might have proved a serious injury had the man been forced to continue to march. In the earlier stages of a march of green, soft troops, the easiest command is the best. It is far better to overload the baggage wagons for a few days with foot-sore men, than by forcing them to march, have them at last a continuous burden. In the majority of cases the foot is well in two or three days. Shirks are exceptional, and soon found out, and no man except the veriest shirk, would care to ride on an army wagon unless forced to do so. In ten or fifteen days of such management, a judicious commander of foot troops ought to have his command in such condition as to be equal to any march that may be demanded of it.

But the most trying ordeal in the life of "the enlisted soldier" is when he is called upon to make, in the depth of winter, a campaign against Indians on the plains, or in the northern portions of our vast country. Clad in a flimsy woolen uniform, nicely adjusted by the wisdom of "the Powers" to serve alike in the torrid heats of Arizona and the hyperborean blasts of Northern Dakota, some soldiers go out every year on campaigns from which it is little short of miraculous that any return. No one but those who have had personal experience of the terrors of what is now commonly called a Dakota blizzard (but which is scarcely worse, though more frequent, in Dakota than in Nebraska or

Kansas, and which, in a greatly modified form, is the terror even of Texas) can form the most remote idea of its fury and destructiveness. Fortunately these storms last but two or three days, and are generally preceded and followed by calm, bright, beautiful days, in which good marches and comfortable camps can be made, even though the mercury be frozen in the bulb of the thermometer.

Nothing but a necessity so dire as to present a mere choice of deaths, should force a commanding officer to attempt a march, either on foot or mounted, during the prevalence of a plains blizzard. There are usually precursors to a storm sufficient to give timely warning to experienced plainsmen. At the first indications of its approach the command should be headed for the nearest deep-timbered ravine (and providentially such may usually be found within reach even of the most treeless plains), camped under the protection of sheltering bluffs and thickets, the tents and animals sheltered on the exposed side by bluffs or great ricks of piled brush, and every precaution taken that neither men nor animals should be exposed to the direct fury of the blast. It is the wind that saps the foundations of life. Exposed to it, a man or other animal will surely perish; screened from it, the temperature may not be insupportable. With care, activity, good sense and knowledge, a command will thus "ride out" without suffering, a storm that would carry death to all animal life exposed to its direct fury.

There is no one thing in which the troops of the United States vary so much as in their "field knowledge," their marching and camping arrangements. This results from the greatly different duties devolved upon troops stationed in widely separated portions of our extensive country. In an hour after reaching its camping place, one regiment will be as comfortable as if its camp were a permanent one; another is careless and shiftless, preferring discomfort to the labor necessary to insure comfort; yet another, having had no experience in camp-life is simply ignorant, and suffers because it knows no better.

As I have before urged, we cannot have an Army of soldiers, until we quit trying to make an Army of specialists. It is not necessary that every soldier shall be a sharpshooter, nor that each company shall execute the manual like a company of show militia. We want sound minds in sound bodies. We need, therefore, to educate the brain and the brawn. We want men that can

use their legs as well as their arms, who know how to take care of themselves in garrison or in the field, in torrid heat, or in arctic cold. In short, we want soldiers, men who are prepared, by previous training and actual experience, to do anything they are ordered to do.

The experiences that come of marches and camp-life are even more necessary to the officers than to the enlisted men. Our older officers have the knowledge gained in the last War, but the large mass of younger officers of foot troops are as ignorant of these matters as the veriest recruit. In a few years they will be the commanders, and how, without previous practical instruction and experience, can they be expected to instruct their juniors or take proper care of their men?

THE COMPANY.

The company is the unit of military organization and administration. On its efficiency depends that of the regiment and of the Army. Each company may be considered a family of which the captain is at once father and autocrat. He must provide for his men, and care for them as if they were children, yet rule with the will of a despot. It is impossible for a weak, nervous, undecided captain ever to have a good company. The condition of a company is always an exponent of the value of its captain (or commander). Recruits are sent from the general recruiting depots to regiments but once, or in rare cases, twice a year, and therefore in considerable squads. The Regulations direct the regimental commander to assign these recruits to the companies. Of late years, on the plea of expediency, this legal right and duty of the colonel is frequently usurped by the department commander. Supposing, however, that the distribution, by whomsoever made, is done fairly by lot, there can be no possible reason (except what is commonly termed luck) why the material of one company should be better than that of another. As a general rule nothing can be truer than the old Army proverb, "A good company means a good captain, a poor company a worthless captain."

Like any other family, each company must have its wood cut, its meals cooked, its crockery washed, its floors scrubbed, etc. All these labors, for the benefit of the whole company, are performed by soldiers detailed in turn. Each individual of the company takes care of his own things, cleans his own arms, and is in all respects his own valet and chambermaid.

For many years there has been a serious and honest difference of opinion among officers whose opinions are valuable, as to what is the proper enlisted strength of a company, or unit of organization, of the Army of the United States in time of peace. A very large majority of these officers advocate an enlisted strength of eighty, preferably one hundred men. Conceding the strength of their arguments, I am yet obliged to differ with them entirely.

It may be assumed as a settled fact that Congress will not authorize a peace establishment of more than thirty thousand enlisted soldiers. In our opinion this may be far too little, but, unfortunately for us, Congress alone can "determine and fix" the military establishment. The question, then, thus presents itself: Congress having settled on a maximum enlisted strength for the Army in time of peace, what organization of that force will give the best results to the country in peace and in War?

There are now in Service two hundred and fifty companies of infantry, one hundred and twenty cavalry, sixty artillery and five engineers, in all four hundred and thirty-five companies. To give each even an enlisted strength of eighty would require nearly thirty-five thousand men, or ten thousand more than are now authorized. If Congress will give no more enlisted men, the friends of large companies can hope for the success of their ideas only by diminishing the number of organizations.

Are the advantages of large companies, as argued and proved by numbers of prominent officers, sufficiently great to force us to dispense with any organization we now have? Shall we muster out and obliterate five regiments of infantry, two of cavalry and one of artillery, for the sake of more enlisted strength to a company? By no means! I believe and contend that our present organization, when it shall have received the shape defined in the Manderson Bill, is as near perfect as can be devised for our country.

We have now, it is true, but a skeleton Army, but each company is perfect in its organization, administration and machinery, and has its full complement of officers. In case of War, or emergency of any kind, the enlisted strength of each company may be increased to one hundred men without the slightest friction or disturbance of its regular routine, and the effective Army thus more than doubled in numbers without the addition of a single officer.

Every officer of experience knows what time, labor and patience are required to convert a company of raw recruits into good and reliable soldiers; and what a comparatively short time is required to make good soldiers of a body of recruits when injected into a company of even half their numbers of already well-drilled and disciplined men. One of our great mistakes during the War of the Rebellion was in constantly forming new organizations of raw men. Had even half the number of recruits been assigned to the already veteran organizations of volunteers, it is safe to say that the War would have been over in much less time and at half the cost.

Our true policy is to maintain, in time of Peace, as many perfect organizations as possible. These are the *nuclei* around which, in time of trouble and emergency, a large and effective Army may be built in the least possible time.

I have elsewhere spoken of the inconsistency which refuses to enlist a married man, yet permits the unmarried soldier to marry after enlistment. The presence of these women in a garrison is of such serious importance to the general content and well-being of "the company" that the subject warrants additional comment.

The Regulations require that each non-commissioned officer shall have charge in quarters of a certain squad or portion of the company, and be held responsible for its cleanliness and good order. Women are not allowed in men's quarters, but live in houses near by. Their husbands are permitted, by general custom, to live with them, and those of them who are non-commissioned officers thus get rid of an onerous part of the responsible duties of their position.

Married men draw their rations separate from the company. The savings of the mess of a company go to make company fund. The married man enjoys all the benefits of this saving without himself contributing anything to it.

The married man may have numerous mouths to fill, yet he has but his own single ration. His love for his family may become the strongest temptation to dishonesty.

The half recognition given by the War Department to this evident violation of its desire and intention to have an Army of unmarried men, and the necessity for female servants in the families of married officers, encourage and foster this matrimonial proclivity of the enlisted men. A married officer brings to a post

a woman as cook or nurse. She is sure to prove pleasing to some man of the command, and marries, still keeping her place as servant. In course of time, and in the natural order of things matrimonial, the officer is forced to procure another servant, while the first settles down in contented expectancy of being taken care of as an adjunct to the company for the balance of her life.

The Government is not doing its duty in simply ignoring these women. It should either recognize them as laundresses, giving them quarters, fuel, rations, etc., as such, or it should forbid their residence on any military reservation.

It is not proposed peremptorily to order away from each post all the women married to enlisted men. That would be unjust and *ex post facto*. Some of these women came into the Army as laundresses under the law authorizing their appointment. The rights of these should be recognized, and their allowances continued by Congress, while all accessions should be prohibited. In this way the laundresses will be gotten rid of in a few years, not only legally but equitably.

The Government has no right, and certainly no need, to inquire into the domestic relations of any man who offers himself as a recruit. His mental and bodily condition, his general character and habits (so far as can be ascertained) being satisfactory, he should be enlisted. The statement on the enlistment paper that he has "neither wife nor child" should be erased as impertinent and unnecessary. Many good soldiers have wives and children, and there is many a deserving family in our wide country almost starving from lack of work, which would be made comfortable and happy could the father enlist. In this grand progressive age only the least valuable portion of male humanity sits down supinely to a life of drudgery and poverty. The active man says: "Let me be up and doing, I but drudge and starve here. Surely in the wide world there must be some place or position in which I can make my mark, or at least better the condition of myself and family."

In the great struggle of life, how many men are forced to deprive themselves of the comforts and delights of home and family? Of the immense number of immigrants who arrive on our shores without families it is safe to say that at least one-half have left families behind them. Many of these enter the Army, necessarily making false declaration as to their domestic relations.

But how faithful they are to those left behind only the Post-office Department can know. These men make, as a rule, the best soldiers, for their service is a labor of love. Sober, careful, economical, they save every possible cent of their money to send to their loved ones in some foreign country. Are our people less true to home and love, less brave to face adversity, hardship and trial than foreigners? However hard the necessity, a true and brave man of whatever nationality will not shirk it when he knows that the comfort of those he loves best is dependent on his sacrifice.

Our present bad system had its origin in a formerly general and supposed necessary immorality in man. It has been continued through a mawkish and out-of-date sentimentality as to the separation of husband and wife. It is time to stop such trivial foolishness. Enlist men as men, without reference to their domestic relations.

Few foreign Services place any restriction on the marriage of soldiers, but the wives are generally ignored and prohibited from living in the garrisons.

There is no good and sufficient reason why a soldier should be required to pay for his washing. There is every honest reason to the contrary. A recruit is promised thirteen dollars a month as pay, and other advantages, clothing, rations, etc., but after enlistment he discovers that twelve and one-half cents per month of that pay is taken, without his consent, for the Soldiers' Home, and fifty to seventy-five cents per month is taken for his washing. This is too petty a swindle for a great Government. The laundry of each company and each regimental headquarters and band should be done by two men, especially enlisted for this work, with the pay and allowances of soldiers, but with no military duty. They should be required to do the laundry work of the enlisted men without charge, and that of the officers of the company and their families at such price as shall be fixed by the post council of administration.

THE POST.

Nine-tenths of the complaint and dissatisfaction among the enlisted men of the Army is caused by an excess of manual labor, and nearly the whole of this labor is devolved upon them by the necessities of the post. The knowledge of the Army possessed by the average citizen is of the very slightest. Most

of them believe (and I have known one distinguished Congressman who held the same opinion) that the life of the soldier is spent entirely in preparation for "the pomp and circumstance of glorious war;" that drills, guards, parades, reviews and marches occupy his whole time to the exclusion of all the meaner drudgeries of everyday life. It is best that people be enlightened.

A post is a community of from two hundred to two thousand or more people dependent entirely upon itself. Every function devolved in cities on mayor, aldermen, councilmen, police, street, school and health commissioners must be exercised by the commanding officer. Under his control and supervision are officers and their families, enlisted men and their families, citizen employees and their families. Quarters, store-houses, stables, etc., must be built and kept in repair; public animals fed, groomed, and shod; wagons and harness kept in serviceable condition; roads made; ice-houses filled in winter, ice distributed in summer; gardens on a large scale laid out and cultivated. At most posts the whole supply of water is hauled in tanks from the nearest stream. Oftentimes, especially at the smaller posts, hay and fuel must be cut and stacked; and at every post, and every day, year after year, the slop cart and police party must make their rounds. The work of carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, painters, glaziers, plasterers, teamsters, hostlers and laborers is never ending. And, as a rule, all this work must be done, and is done by the enlisted soldiers in the interval of their purely military duty. The inspector expects the troops to be perfect in all the duties of a soldier, and the post to be perfect in all its details; administrative and sanitary.

But though they complain of it, and frequently make it an excuse for desertion, soldiers do not, as a rule, object to work, however hard. Every commanding officer knows what an excess of labor he can get out of men, by promising to excuse them from a dress parade, or a Sunday-morning inspection. The true and valid cause of complaint is the forcing them to do military duty and manual labor *at the same time*. Take an every-day instance. The carpenter is very busy with pressing post work, but he is sent to the target range immediately after breakfast (about sunrise). In two or three hours he returns to his hammer and saw, works until dinner-call, has one hour for dinner and rest; works again until recall; drops his tools, hurries to his quarters, gets his arms and accouterments, and goes to company or bat-

talion drill. Recall sounds, he returns to his quarters, dons his full dress uniform, and goes to dress parade, from which he is dismissed after the sun has set. For twelve or fourteen hours he has no respite, no relief, except the one hour for dinner. So also with other artisans, with the fatigue and police parties, with the guard (who, in addition to the day's labor, must be on post and vigilant each for a third of the night).

With some commanders drill is such a hobby that every soldier, even company cooks, hospital attendants, and every man on guard is required to attend at least one drill a day. I doubt if there be an officer, who reads this paper, who would not feel the strongest temptation to desert under similar provocation. Such orders are not only unnecessary cruelty, but evince ignorance of the necessities of the Service, and the proper treatment of the enlisted soldier. What must a humanitarian think of the owner of a fine horse, who speeded the animal for two hours on the track, then put him to the plow for eight additional hours on the same day? Yet that is exactly what is done to soldiers by some over-zealous and illy-balanced commanders.

In this country military duty is but a part of the soldier's work. Manual labor is just as necessary to the well-being of the Army, and far more necessary to the comfort of the soldier, than purely military duty. Under our present economical system these duties must go hand in hand, but soldiers should never be required to do *both at the same time*. No recruit should be detailed for the post manual labor until he has been thoroughly set up, and instructed in all the minutest details of garrison military duty. When this knowledge shall have been acquired, he should take his share of manual labors.

The necessity for the pleasurable *mental* instruction of the soldier is fully recognized by the Government. Ample school facilities, libraries, and a superabundance of transient literary matter, papers and periodicals are furnished to every post; but the necessity for other than purely military *bodily* instruction and entertainment has so far been unappreciated.

There is a strong analogy between the mental and physical processes. The mind, wearied with one study, finds its best recreation in turning to some other study of a different nature. So the body, tired out with uncongenial labor, finds its best relief and rest in some interesting bodily exercise. All education, whether mental or physical, is labor. That instructor is best who

can supplement the labor, whether mental or physical, by some agreeable diversion of the same nature. All athletic games and sports should be encouraged. Every company should have its base-ball nine, every post its gymnasium, bowling alley and billiard table. In the long winters of the northern posts, every means should be employed to take from the minds of the men the sense of monotony. Lyceums, theaters, concerts, dances, temperance and other societies, all should be encouraged, and every other proper facility given for the innocent enjoyment of the soldier.

THE POST TRADER.

Nineteen-twentieths of the troubles in which "the enlisted soldier" becomes involved comes from the post trader. The order of President Hayes, prohibiting the keeping and sale of spirituous liquors by post traders, was faulty in the very serious respect that it simply changed the beverages enticingly set out by the post trader to entrap the money of the soldier. To get drunk on brandy, whiskey, rum or gin is a terrible offense, but the drunk (ten times worse in its effects on the system) on poor beer, or adulterations called wines, is still, by implication, an authorized feature of the Service. These prove quite as prolific of quarrels, disturbances, and breaches of discipline as the more potent but banished forms of alcohol, and when to these are added unlimited forms of almost purely alcoholic preparations, sold as essences, perfumes, Jamaica ginger, patent medicines, even as red ink, there is little to choose between the condition of affairs now and before the issue of that celebrated and much discussed order.

The common argument against President Hayes' order is, that some men will have liquor if it can be obtained, and that it is therefore better to leave the sale in the hands of the post trader, where it can be controlled by the post commander. Admitting the premise, the conclusion is denied absolutely, and *in toto*. It is impossible for any commanding officer to control a sale where the craving of the buyer and the pecuniary interests of the seller are in accord, and directly at variance with his wishes and orders. The sole aim and object of many post traders is to transfer to their own pockets as much as possible of the money paid to the soldier. This is easiest done when the man is under the influence of drink. The trader is already sure of all the

money of the habitual and regular drinker, but he must devise means to get *that* of those men who drink rarely, or not at all. Making excuse for some holiday or anniversary, he will give general notice that he will spread a free lunch, to which all are invited. Few soldiers can resist, or care to resist, such an invitation. Ample libations are distributed without charge. Then comes in that invention of the American devil, the custom of treating (a custom only prevailing in the United States, and the cause of quadruple the consumption of intoxicants that would result if each man paid only for his own drinks). The trader has been liberal, treated the crowd freely. A clerk or understrapper then proposes that they all drink at his expense, to the health of the generous host. A soldier, not to be outdone in liberality and good fellowship, "sets them up" in his turn, then another, and another, until what purposed to be a simple lunch winds up in a grand orgie. Some of the men get into the guard-house, and are punished, but the trader gets the money. His object is accomplished.*

Of the men who "will have liquor if it can be obtained," there is nothing to say, and from them there is nothing to be expected. The question important to the Government and to the Army, is how to protect the young and uncontaminated soldier from the machinations of the post trader and the fatality of example. The very first step is to "lead them *not* into temptation." So long as the Government maintains at each post an authorized bar-room, there will be the temptation. So long as men aspire to popularity among their fellows there will be "treating." One man is persuaded to drink because some other man is thirsty, and the thirstiest man fixes the number of drinks for the whole party.

In nine cases out of ten drinking is a habit, not an appetite. Take away the possibility of the acquirement of this habit. Put it out of the power of the habitual drinker to get his eight or ten drinks a day at the post trader's bar-room, and what is far worse, to entice, under the specious plea of good fellowship, others to take drinks for which they have no appetite.

In short, positively prohibit the sale on any military reservation of any and all intoxicants of any kind or nature (including wine and beer), and require the post council carefully to examine and

* I know post traders who are upright, honorable gentlemen, to whom the above picture does not apply in any particular; I know others to whom it does apply most faithfully. In a case like this the good must suffer for the evil work of the bad.

test the stores of the post trader to see that alcohol is not sold under another name.

THE REGIMENT.

The scattering of the companies of a regiment at small and widely separated posts, heretofore necessitated by having to cover a very large country by a very small army, has resulted in an almost abolition of the functions of the regimental commander.

The appointment of non-commissioned officers is almost the only duty devolved upon him which concerns the welfare of the enlisted soldier," and this has come to be a mere form. Some colonels have never even seen more than half the companies of their regiments, and cannot possibly know anything of the men whose names are presented. They must appoint solely on the recommendation of the company commanders.

The choice of those most responsible men, the non-commissioned staff of the regiment, is greatly hampered. The colonel must appoint those whom he personally and officially believes to be best fitted for the position. As he knows only those with whom he is thrown in contact, it follows that he is restricted in his choice to the non-commissioned officers of the companies which happen to be serving at regimental headquarters. There may be non-commissioned officers in companies serving elsewhere who are better fitted for the positions, and the now unavoidable restrictions of the choice of the regimental commander may entail wrong to the regiment and to capable and ambitious non-commissioned officers.

CONCLUSION.

Life offers no position of unqualified good or of unmitigated evil. Happiness is an inherent quality, not produced by gratified ambition, nor conferred by wealth and station. These are insatiable, each "growing with its growth and strengthening with its strength." The foundation of all happiness is content, and the happiest people are found among those who have "neither poverty nor riches," for "where there is care, there also is sorrow."

There is no position in life so absolutely free from care and responsibility as that of "the enlisted soldier." He alone of all men may "take no thought for the morrow." Pay, clothing, food, medical attendance, all the necessities, and even the comforts of life, are provided for him, and the certainty of the in-

definite continuation of these blessings is limited solely by his own will and conduct. If he prove a good and faithful soldier he will be re-enlisted again and again, and even when wounds, sickness, or age have unfitted him for active duty, this certainly is still continued in liberal pension allowances, in the Soldiers' Home, and in the most excellent recently enacted retirement laws.

To the ambitious and deserving the door to promotion is wide open.

The country has good reason to be proud of its soldiers, and Congress but accentuates the public sentiment, in making generous provision for every man who gives the best years of his life, the best powers of his mind and body, to the service of his country.

On the other hand, an economy nearly akin to niggardliness requires of "the enlisted soldier" too much manual labor; and an antiquated never learning military policy imposes too much sameness of drill. The perfect line, the constant touch of the elbows, the clock-work accuracy of the manual, belong to the days when soldiers were mere machines.

War is the greatest of all evils, the most serious business that any country can engage in. It should be "short, sharp and decisive." We do not need men who can wheel as if tied to a straight-edge, or whose every movement in the manual is as regular as the beat of a clock. We want men, strong, alert, quick and knowing; sufficiently well drilled in all company and battalion movements to comprehend and execute together all orders, but whose military instruction has gone far beyond the mere machine drill of a hundred years ago. The shoulder-to-shoulder courage that comes of discipline and steady drill is indispensable, but it must yield precedence to the courage that comes of intelligence and self-reliance, of perfect knowledge of the use of weapons, and of what the individual must do to protect himself while inflicting the greatest possible damage on the enemy.

With numberless points yet wanting "the touch of the master hand," it is a grand thing to be able to say truly that "the enlisted soldier" of the Army of the United States is subjected to no real abuses, except the re-enlistment of convicted deserters, and the temptations that come from the post trader's authority to supply intoxicants. The frauds in clothing and subsistence are petty, and probably inseparable from any system. The excess of

manual labor, the present condition of the woman question, the lack of knowledge of field service, and the retention of troops at the same posts for ten or fifteen years, while serious evils, resulting in great and permanent injury to the Service, can scarcely be called abuses. So, also, most of the criticisms made in this paper are not against abuses, but against points and practices liable to abuse.

The future greatly improved condition of "the enlisted soldier" must result from :

1. Less rigidity in enlistment. Permit enlisted men to purchase their discharges under proper restrictions and regulations.
2. No condonation or palliation of the crime of desertion under any circumstances whatever.
3. Less manual labor for soldiers.
4. Less monotony, both of instruction and of station.

Concentrate the troops at regimental, or if possible, at brigade posts, at points where, strategic and hygienic necessities being satisfied, they can have most months of every year for out-door work.

Enlist for each company and band, not as soldiers, but for their own special work, a cook, two laundry men, a tailor and a shoemaker. For each post the necessary number of bakers, hospital cooks, nurses and attendants, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, teamsters, etc.

These special enlistments should be made for no fixed time. Each man should have the right to claim his discharge at any time on reimbursing the Government (as already recommended in the case of the regularly enlisted soldiers), and the commanding officer of each post should be authorized and empowered to discharge any one of them at any time for neglect of duty, drunkenness or inefficiency, and to enlist others to fill their places. Men capable of filling these positions can usually be found in the vicinity of every military post ; the expense of enlistment would, therefore, as a rule, be nothing. Aside from the immense advantage to the companies, as already explained, the result of such action would be the incorporation of the immense Army of quartermaster's employees into the service, paying them soldier's wages instead of the extortions now demanded and paid.

Let the time of the soldier be occupied in fitting himself for his awful business. Let the never ceasing and never successful effort in rule-and-line clock-work precision of movement give

place to a wider and better instruction. Let the never ending monotony of "Support arms," "Carry arms," be supplemented by something that will interest as well as instruct.

Establish camps of instruction, at which each company shall be required to remain for at least one month in each year, and require in addition, that every company shall have at least one month of marching and real campaign service in each year. The march to and from the camp of instruction will in most cases give this full measure of campaign knowledge.

Each day's march should be a drill. Now forming to the front for attack, now to the rear for defense, now sending lines of skirmishers to front and flank, over hills and through ravines; making, in short, the march of each day a counterpart of what it would be in the face of an active and aggressive enemy.

By judicious selection and proper routine, every company in each department can have the instruction here indicated, without reducing the garrison of any permanent post below what is necessary for its protection and care.

In every permanent garrison there should be a gymnasium, and every man should receive some instruction in athletics. All out-door sports hunting, fishing, rowing, riding and games of every kind should be encouraged. Constant occupation in this varied round of instruction and amusement will give healthy tone to both mind and body. "The enlisted soldier" will learn content, and the Army will be on the high-road to perfection.

There is no position in life where "the laborer is (more) worthy of his hire," where the rewards and compensations are more fully balanced by the services rendered, than that of "the enlisted soldier" of the United States Army. In time of war, his labors in marching, road-making, bridge-building, his days and nights of toil and unrest, are supplemented by the chances of wounds or death on the battle-field, or worse still, in hospital. The honor and glory of his achievements are gathered like garlands of laurel to deck the brows of his superiors. In time of peace (so-called, for when has there ever been a time of peace for the Army of the United States?) his labors are enormously multiplied by adding to those purely military other labors of every kind and character. In the performance of these, and while the country at large is enjoying all the blessings of profound peace, he is liable at any moment to be ordered into the field, to put down an uprising of Indians, or to save some frontier settlement

from the scalping knife of the same savage foe. It is in these casual but desperate emergencies that he evinces his true heroism and fidelity. No winter's storm too severe to be encountered, no desperate march too long to be overcome, to save the women and children of some remote hamlet, or to succor comrades beleaguered by the blood-thirsty enemy.

From the inception of the Government until to-day the Army of the United States has been the pioneer of the progress of civilization, standing like a guardian angel between the feeble settlements and the savages.

And what does not the country owe to its enterprise, its surveys, its discoveries? The sources of the Missouri and a path to the Pacific were made known to the world through the marvelous exertions of two captains and eighteen enlisted soldiers of the Army, and that wonderful work has been followed up, until in all the length and breath of our wide domain there is scarcely a mountain height or canyon depth that has not been trod by the foot of "the Enlisted Soldier."

A PENAL CODE FOR THE ARMY.

By R. MCKINLAY POWER, A. M.

"When men see no distinction made in the nature and gradations of punishment, the generality will be led to conclude there is no distinction in the guilt."—SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE.

A COMPETENT knowledge of the elementary principles of military law is nowadays presumed to be possessed by every officer of the United States Army, and, when we reflect that the large majority of these officers by their detail upon courts-martial, almost daily hold in their hands the liberty and reputation of both officers and men, the importance of such knowledge is at once made manifest.

The subject of military law, despite the fact that it is quickly coming into greater prominence and being more and more revealed to the civilian, has not, it appears to the writer, received from the military magazines of the country that attention which its importance merits. "The Military Service Institution of the United States," both by its public meetings and through the medium of its excellent Journal, has already taken its place as a well-recognized and successful educating institution. Volumes one and two of its journal contain some sterling articles upon important topics connected with the law military, but in the five succeeding volumes—for the seventh is now complete—no further contribution to the subject appears. The hiatus is assuredly not due to lack of material, for of that there is abundance, and if the writer of these papers does no more than succeed in directing the earnest attention of the many members of that institution, separated for duty though united for the good of the Service, to the important point of which he can now undertake to present merely a few notes, he shall be amply rewarded and pleased, knowing that he may thereby revive—if revival it be—an interest in, and attraction for, what so great a general and so excellent a writer as William T. Sherman correctly deems "the most interesting subject possible to all Army officers and students."

The Rules and Articles governing the Armies of the United States now in force—which is the code of 1874—contain one hundred and twenty-eight articles, and of these forty-three are *discretionary*, that is, they leave to the discretion of the court the punishment which shall be meted out to him who violates their provisions. Under these articles as they stand it is quite within the power of a general court-martial to inflict as heavy a punishment upon the soldier who, without leave, lies out of his quarters, or, through neglect, loses or spoils a part of his clothing, as upon him who is found drunk on duty, quits his guard without leave, or commits, in time of peace, what is justly and universally regarded as the most heinous of military crimes, to wit, desertion. And there is really nothing to hinder the members of such a court from condemning to imprisonment the man who has unfortunately lost a button from his blouse, while at the same time it lets off with a trivial fine or brief term in the guard-house the man who strikes his superior officer or disobeys his lawful command. So far as these discretionary Articles are concerned, the doctrine of *ultra vires* practically finds little or no application in military jurisprudence. Not long ago a general court-martial sentenced a soldier to be dishonorably discharged, forfeiting all pay and allowances, and to be confined three months at hard labor for the remarkable and unique offense of drinking “a pint of whiskey, more or less, without taking the bottle from his mouth,” while the same court imposed upon a soldier who had been convicted of the felonious crime of forgery a fine of only a few dollars. In the single instance of desertion the most extravagant and marked variance prevails. Two soldiers are arraigned before a general court each charged with this crime, committed under equal and similar circumstances. The first receives a sentence to confinement for six months or one year, the second is condemned to three, five or more years in the Military Prison. Again, despite of orders and regulations to the contrary, it is no infrequent practice for a general court to sentence a soldier to confinement in the penitentiary for a period greatly in excess of that which the law of the State wherein the offense is committed says a citizen shall be confined for the perpetration of the same crime. Even in the case of the minor offenses triable by *garrison* courts-martial, the disparity is sufficiently alarming as to be a serious and much commented-upon evil. For getting drunk on the occasion of his bi-monthly pay, or for shortly overstaying his pass, one soldier may

escape with a fine, while for the same offense another may by the same court be sentenced to confinement in addition. No one who has given intelligent or observant attention to military proceedings can fail to multiply instances of this nature *ad infinitum*. Courts-martial orders are full of such anomalies, and reviewing authorities are well aware that courts-martial are seldom consistent or equable in their distribution of punishments for offenses, *in pari materia*, committed under similar or like conditions. The doings of such tribunals, like the ways of Providence, are not seldom inscrutable; consistency cannot be said to be their peculiar jewel, and the ordinary Army officer, upon whose legal attainments it is not customary to place a very high estimate, may not altogether appreciate, as it ought to be, the remark of Major-General John Pope, that "the discretion with which, by law, courts are vested in awarding punishment for offenses implies that its measure is intended to be adjusted to the degree of criminality and aggravation, and a just and careful discrimination by such courts in this respect is only commendable." In short, so curiously has the exercise of this discretion been displayed that the disparity of punishments inflicted by courts-martial has passed into a proverb, and has gone far toward justifying Sir William Blackstone's dictum concurred in by Sir Matthew Hale, that "military law is no law at all," and makes one wonder by what process of reasoning the writer of an article upon courts-martial, which appeared in a prominent magazine some years ago, arrived at his conclusion that he would rather stand trial before a military than before a civil court.

Such being the condition of affairs, what, it is asked, must be the remedy for the evil? I answer—nothing short of the enactment by Congress of a definite and carefully digested code of punishments for each and every military offense. Experience has shown that arbitrary punishment is less efficacious in deterring from crime than punishment that is fixed and determinate, and it is just as true now as it was when Blackstone wrote that "crimes are more effectually prevented by the *certainty* than by the *severity* of the punishment." England, France and Germany has each in greater or less degree made statutory provision for specific and uniform punishments for military offenses, and one of the best and most satisfactory, if not the very best, of military codes is that adopted by the Federal troops of Switzerland, which, like the "Penal Code of the State of New York," not only defines

the various crimes but affixes the punishments therefor. I hold that one of the most serious defects—as well as a grave and unjust anomaly—of American military jurisprudence is the absence from its Articles of War or Codified Regulations of a well-defined and systematic scale of punishments for crimes committed in the military service. If the offenses of the citizen have specific punishments for their commission, *a fortiori*, should the soldier's crimes be followed by known and definite punishments? The writer will yield to none in his respect for the law military, and in a desire to preserve the same untrammelled by the dangerous technicalities of the civil procedure; but, in spite of the assertions of such authorities as General Sherman and Colonel G. Norman Lieber that "military law is founded on the idea of a departure from the civil law," and that it is "a grave error to suffer it to become a sacrifice to principles of civil jurisprudence at variance with its object," he holds that the system of arbitrary punishment permitted by the former is wrong and that the system of statutory penalties prescribed by the latter is right, and to this extent he would wish to see the two systems assimilated. It is certainly not a "sacrifice" to the principles of any intelligent system of jurisprudence for courts-martial to render righteous and impartial justice. Military law can in nowise be "emasculated" by the introduction of the practice in the civil court of criminal jurisdiction of visiting specific crimes with specific punishments. The power reposed in general courts-martial, whose members are judges as well of the law as of the fact, to inflict arbitrary and discretionary punishment is an unwise and dangerous one. Abuse does and must attach to the exercise of such a power. Better were it that resort be had to the English practice, which was formerly the American custom as well, of designating, by name, the president of the court, and that, deprived of his vote with the members thereof, he be constituted the sole arbiter of the prisoner's fate, so far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the court to consist, in all cases where manifest injury to the Service will not result, of twelve members, thus assimilating it to the civil judge and jury whence this military tribunal took its origin. To inflict such "punishment as a court-martial may direct" is certainly a very large discretion, and is one which is conferred upon no civil magistrate of the land. Neither a maximum nor (unless in the case of the crimes mentioned in the 58th Article of War) a minimum is mentioned, and this single feature, criticised by O'Brien

"in good set terms," is an evil which alone conduces to uncertainty and equality of punishment. If the Legislature of the State of New York, or of any State in the Union, were to pass an Act vesting in civil magistrates discretionary power of punishment upon all offenders brought before them, whether accused of felonies or misdemeanors, the people would stand aghast at the spectacle and would demand the instant repeal of such an odious measure. And yet this is exactly what has been done by the Congress of the United States in intrusting to general courts-martial the power to punish as it may direct. The measure of punishment should be determined by the same power that created the Army and made Rules and Articles for its government, and the only "discretion" which ought to be allowed to military courts should be as to whether the particular circumstances of each case merit the infliction of the maximum or the minimum sentence, for where imprisonment is decreed *plus* and *minus* limits should be clearly marked.

The want of an uniform penal code for the Army has been felt in many quarters, and none recognized the desideratum more than General C. C. Augur, who, while in command of the Department of Texas, promulgated, for the guidance of officers "in the discharge of their duties as members of garrison courts-martial," a table of fines and penalties, "the inequality in the award of punishments, for minor offenses, by garrison courts-martial, at the same stations and throughout the department" having "become a serious evil, requiring correction," and it is several years since (1881) the War Department declared it to be "the desire and effort of the Executive Authority to equalize the punishment in similar cases, so that justice shall be administered as evenly as possible." Much has been written, and more has been spoken, upon the prolific subject of *desertion and its cure*, and the question is still, and is likely ever to remain, an unsettled and vexed one; and I am not alone in my opinion that the creation of a code of punishments for military offenses will largely diminish the number of desertions. It is well known that in time of peace a large percentage of our soldiers enter the Service because they are homeless, houseless and penniless, and, should they have the misfortune to be dishonorably discharged therefrom, they are thrown back upon the world in no better condition, save, perchance, in the case of those who receive the small money and clothing donation. Adding another to the recommendations,

already "thick as leaves in Valambrosa," which have been made to mitigate this mighty evil, I believe the adoption of a definite punishment for this crime, which shall in all cases include imprisonment for a long period, will not be without its good effect; for, with the knowledge of a certain period of confinement before him, besides the other penalties which, by law, now attach to the crime, the intending deserter will choose the better part and continue in service until the expiration of his enlistment, knowing that the chances which he now enjoys of receiving, if apprehended, a lenient punishment from a lenient court will be taken away. Every adjutant-general knows that applications for remission of sentence form a numerous class of papers daily coming to his office, and the number of these will be very materially lessened when men who have broken the law are aware that the law-makers of their country have affixed to their offense a definite penalty, wherefrom there shall, in ordinary cases, be no reduction beyond the statutory abatement now allowed.

It has been remarked by the present acting head of the Bureau of Military Justice that "the fundamental principle of a code of military punishments is the enforcement of *prompt obedience* by *prompt punishment*"—a statement which none will gainsay. But, if the punishment should be *prompt*, it should likewise be *just* (and this was the point made by General James B. Fry in his argument in favor of the establishment of "A Military Court of Appeal"), and without an authoritative and legal scale of punishments, prescribed by the wisdom of Congress, it is impossible for it to be so. I therefore repeat that the creation of such a code of punishments is a military necessity, and that the remedy for the present anomalous sentences must come from Congress. There is no code of laws which demands so much amendment and revision as the military code; there is no code of laws which has received so little. How many of our few Articles of War are antiquated, nugatory and obsolete! Each one of them should be thoroughly sifted and revised, and an appropriate penalty annexed to such as relate to the commission of crimes. Unlimited discretion is a dangerous weapon wherewith to arm any court. It is all very well and very pretty to say that courts-martial are courts of honor (long may they be!), of chivalric descent, *et id genus omne*, and that, like a king, they can do no wrong; but honor, alas! can be too frequently of the Brutus and Cassius type, and chivalry may sometimes condemn where justice might approve.

THE SIEGE OF MONTEREY.*

MEMOIRS OF LIEUTENANT MANUEL BALBOUTIN, NOW RETIRED
COLONEL OF ARTILLERY OF THE MEXICAN ARMY.

THE American Army, for causes already known, had invaded the State of Tamaulipas, advancing to the left bank of the Rio Bravo del Norte, where it encamped in front of the city of Matamoras.

The peaceful measures of diplomacy having been exhausted, an appeal to arms was necessary. Consequently the Mexican Government declared War against the United States.

Our Army crossed the Rio Bravo, sustained with credit the battle of Palo Alto, on the 8th of May, against a powerful artillery, and on the following day was totally defeated at Resaca de la Palma. Not being able to hold the city of Matamoras, it was obliged to undertake a painful march on Linares, and to take refuge in Monterey de Nuevo Leon, where it commenced fortifying.

General Mariano Paredes, who commanded in Mexico as President of the Republic, had energetically devoted himself to the re-organization, discipline and instruction of the Army with a view of leading it against the invaders in person.

Unfortunately a revolution had broken out in Guadalajara, and the brigade sent to quell it had met with a sad disaster; being totally routed, and losing its commander, General Gonzalez Arévalo.

General Paredes conceived the unfortunate idea of marching with all the forces in the capital to reduce Guadalajara; and having done this, he intended to turn northward to check the American advance on Monterey.

* Translated for *The Journal of the Military Service Institution*, by Mr. JOHN STROTHER, son of Col. D. H. Strother, late U. S. Consul-General at the City of Mexico (also known under the *nom de plume* of "Porte Crayon").

In accordance with this plan the forces in Mexico commenced to move in the following order, early in July.

On the 1st a brigade marched under Brevet Brigadier-General José María García Conde. It was composed of

The Battalion of Aguascalientes.....	500 men
The Battalion of Queretaro.....	300 "
Two Squadrons of the 3d Cavalry of the Line.....	250 "
Three 8-pounders, served by	30 "
Total.....	1080 men

On the following day another brigade marched, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Florencio Azpeitia, it contained

The 3d Infantry of the Line.	500 men
Two Squadrons of the Lancers of Talisco.....	200 "
Two Squadrons of the Guanajuato Cavalry.....	200 "
Seven 8- and 12-pounders whose cannoneers, with the privates of the ambulance train, numbered	100 "
Total.....	1000 men

On the night of the 26th of July, I was relieved to march on the following day.

On July 27th at 12 M., during a drizzling rain, the 3d Brigade marched under the orders of Brevet Brigadier-General Simeon Ramirez. It consisted of

The 3d Light Infantry Battalion.....	400 men
The 4th Light Infantry Battalion.....	600 "
Two 12-pounders, one 8-pounder and three 7-inch howitzers, served by	60 "
Total.....	1060 men

The whole division, therefore, numbered about 3140 men, with 16 field-pieces.

The troops which yet remained in the city were to march in a few days under General Paredes in person.

Our exit was accompanied by an evil omen, for scarcely had we left the city when the drizzle became a thunder shower which soaked us completely.

The road we followed was the one which leads from the Vallejo gate to the village of Tlalnepantla; its bed, having a very slight elevation above the marshy soil, was of dirt and very miry; the storm had rendered it almost impassable.

The soldiers marched with great difficulty, and very few of them missed at least one fall in the mud. These mishaps caused great disorder in the march. The artillery, drawn by half-broken

mules and driven by hack drivers and wild cartmen, without either military instruction or discipline, stalled every moment, and much work did it cost to start again.

This arm of the Service has been sadly neglected by the Government, and its organization leaves much to be desired. It has neither the proper cattle nor teamsters, both being furnished by contractors who do not always comply with their promises, consequently our artillery is not capable of being maneuvered with that facility, required to give the proper efficiency on the field of battle.

The infantry seemed to take very little interest in the misfortunes of the artillery, and while they reached and took quarters at Tlalnapantla, the pieces remained sticking in the mud at different points along the road.

After many trials the artillery was at length able to rejoin the infantry about nightfall, having traveled four leagues in six hours and a half, not without casualties, however, for an artilleryman had his leg crushed by the wheel of a gun. The drunkenness of both soldiers and teamsters was intolerable.

July 28th. Still greater trials awaited us. The rains, which had continued during the night, had put the road in such a condition that it would have been more prudent not to have attempted any move. The troops marched in mud up to their knees, while the guns stuck fast at every turn, and the artillerymen, not being able to extricate them, exhausted themselves in vain endeavors.

Thus we struggled on three leagues farther to Cuantitlan, where a short halt was made that the troops might breakfast.

On leaving Cuantitlan the road was almost dry; but farther on it had become a rushing torrent, as the Cuantitlan Creek had overflowed its banks and inundated the surrounding country.

Here the difficulties of our march were doubled, and the events of the preceding day were repeated with additions and variations. The guns remained in the mud and the infantry went ahead.

At the town of Coyotepec, the General sent back four yoke of oxen to Lieutenant-Colonel, Captain of Artillery, Patricio Gutierrez, who was then at a place called Las Animas, striving to release a howitzer, which had sunk up to its hubs in the mud. A little further on was the Second Adjutant, José Terroba, making vain efforts to extricate another howitzer from a swamp; it was deemed necessary that two yoke should remain to assist him.

When the remaining oxen reached Captain Gutierrez, the water had covered the axles of the gun-carriage. The animals were attached, but were unable to do their part, for when they bent themselves to their work, the water floated them. The fruitless efforts were continued until nightfall, and then the best that could be done was to detach the limber from the gun and take it to Venta de las Animas, leaving the howitzer in the water.

Captain Gutierrez sent to inform the General of what had taken place. The night was dark and the rain continued falling; and on reaching Coyotepec, the guide who led the Captain's courier, refused to go any farther, saying that the Huehuetoca Creek would be greatly swollen and that it would be impossible to ford it at night. As the messenger insisted on going forward and the guide absolutely refused to accompany him, a dispute arose, which ended in the fall of the officer, horse and man, into a ravine. Aided and led by the guide the courier returned to a hut near at hand, where they passed the night.

July 29th. Early on the following morning the officer continued his ride; and arrived at Huehuetoca at the moment when the brigade was in the act of leaving.

General Ramirez sent back an overseer with a mule team to help Gutierrez, and ordered him to call on the Alcalde of Coyotepec for the necessary yokes of oxen and laborers.

This functionary procured several oxen and about twenty men; and with the aid of these and the mule team, Captain Gutierrez extricated his howitzer by sunset and took the Tulpam road to Huehuetoca, halting there to allow the soldiers to eat. As soon as their meal was finished, the march was continued, although night had fallen.

Finally, about 2 A. M. a halt was made at Rancho de Bata, where it was with great difficulty that any forage could be procured for the mules.

July 30th. Very early the march was resumed, the gun being drawn by oxen, as the worn-out mules were incapable of pulling a pound. After breakfasting at Tula a fresh start was made, but on ascending a hill near that point, the oxen suddenly backed, and broke the limber-pole. This fresh misfortune was made known to the brigade commander, who was passing the night at the Hacienda de la Goleta. He sent back Sub-Lieutenant

Ignacio Hernandez Xicolalpa, with two artificers, to replace the broken pole.

July 31st. After having marched all night, Captain Gutierrez overtook the brigade at the Hacienda de Arroyozarco. On August 1st we moved to San Juan del Rio, a long march ending late. On the 2d to Hacienda del Colorado, a troublesome march with great scarcity of rations. On the 3d to Queretaro, where the brigade was inspected. On the 4th to Apasco, an extremely dull-looking town with little to eat in it; and on the 5th to Celaya.

August 6th. The brigade was on the point of marching, when it received orders to return to its quarters. Soon afterward it was announced that a revolution had taken place in Mexico, whose partisans had proclaimed "Federation and Santa Anna"; and that General Ramirez had received a dispatch from President Paredes, containing orders to remain where he was, until the President could overtake him. This news caused great alarm in the brigade, and the day was spent by the officers in small gatherings and groups, which engaged in whispered conversation.

On the 7th General Ramirez, in view of these events, determined to hold a meeting at his lodgings, and having given orders to this effect, the majority of the field and line officers of the brigade assisted. The General took the floor, and briefly stated the straits to which the Government in Mexico was reduced. He said that it appeared to him that the proper thing to do, would be for the brigade to continue its march and unite with the troops which had preceded it, thus forming a numerous corps, which could oppose the revolution, or bow to the national will, in case it should openly favor the uprising.

This proposition was rejected by the greater part of the officers, who favored the revolt and requested the General to allow the brigade to remain in Celaya, to await developments.

The General urged, and even entreated, that the march on Guadalajara should be continued. The majority again refused, and opinions became more and more divided as to the proper steps to be taken.

One officer remarked that, to his mind, the brigade should take no part in any revolutionary movement whatever; but should march immediately to the northern frontier, to defend the Republic against the American invasion.

This idea was accepted with apparent enthusiasm; and per-

sons were engaged in committing it to writing with the intention of forwarding the document to the capital. Meanwhile several officers began to reflect on the suffering and misery that awaited the Army on the frontier, and the little benefits that would result from their sacrifices.

These reflections had their effect, and when the officers were called to sign the act very few would do so.

The General, troubled at this, ordered a register to be opened, to determine by vote what were the feelings of the majority. This was done; but before the entire vote could be taken, Mr. Andrés Zenteno appeared before the council. He came from Queretaro, provided with proclamations and dispatches, and brought the news of that city having declared in favor of the revolution. The authorities had commissioned him to invite Ramirez to join them with his brigade. This incident produced such disorder in the assembly, that it became necessary to dissolve it.

August 8th. The appearance of Zenteno in Celaya produced its effect. The Town Council declared for the revolution, and the 3d Light Infantry drew up its act during the night. Here we had half the brigade in a state of revolt, and the other half maintaining its allegiance to the Government. Notwithstanding we lived like good comrades, the 3d Light still obeying the General's orders; but this state of affairs was liable at any moment to be fatally interrupted.

On the 9th we received the news of the fall of General Paredes, and marched to Apasco under the orders of the new Government. A sub-lieutenant of the Ambulance Corps, D. N. Solares, deserted. It was afterward stated that on presenting himself in Mexico he was promoted!

On the 10th we moved to Chamucuero, where it was made known the brigades which had preceded us had received orders to march to Monterey.

On the 11th to San Miguel Allende. In this city General Ramirez finally declared for the revolution, being joined by the 4th Light Infantry and the Artillery, although even then several field and line officers refused to sign the act. Among these may be mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry, Captain of Artillery, Patricio Gutierrez, Antonio Nielo, Battalion Commander, Sub-Lieutenant Ignacio Hernandez, of the Artillery, and myself.

On the 12th we marched to Hacienda de la Venta, a place totally unprovided with eatables.

Near by the "Hacienda" runs a small stream, the ford of which is ankle-deep in water. The 3d Light and the Artillery had crossed when there was so sudden and dangerous a rise in the stream that the 4th Light, which marched last in the column, was obliged to remain on the opposite bank, where it passed the night. It was with great difficulty that the brigade could be fed.

At daybreak on the 13th the water had fallen sufficiently to allow the passage of the 4th Light, with the baggage and ammunition train, which had likewise been delayed.

The march was then resumed, ending at Hacienda de las Monjas, a place as unprovided with the means of sustaining life as the last.

On the 14th we marched to Villa de San Felipe; on the 15th to Hacienda del Jaral; on the 16th to Hacienda de las Pilas, and on the 17th to San Luis Potosi.

From the 18th to the 22d, inclusive, we remained at San Luis, making preparations to cross the desert, which lies between this city and Saltillo. On the 23d we left San Luis, and a detachment from Lagos joined the 3d Light, raising its force to 600 bayonets. About 150 lancers of the regiment of San Luis Potosi were also attached to our brigade. The 4th Light took the Tula de Tamaulipas road, while the main body of the brigade passed the night at Hacienda de Bocás.

On the 24th we moved to the town of Hedionda, and at daybreak, on the 25th, we fired a salute of twenty-one guns to celebrate the arrival of General Santa Anna in Vera Cruz, which event took place on the 16th of this month. We then marched to Villa del Venado.

On the 26th to Hacienda de Charcos. Here commenced a series of long marches, through a country with little water, and that of bad quality, very scantily supplied with food, and with no good camping grounds.

On the 27th to Hacienda de Solis; on the 28th to Matchuala. To-day we have marched sixteen leagues. In the afternoon it rained and the road became muddy. The brigade arrived late and very tired. On the 29th to Cedral, where we found the water to be extremely bad, and on the 30th to Noria de las Animas, fifteen leagues farther. Here there was at one time a "rancho," but it had been destroyed by the Comanches, who

burned the buildings and killed the inhabitants. The brigade bivouacked without shelter, suffering from the rain, which continued falling all night. The troops, in default of rations and lying on the wet ground, amused themselves with singing.

August 31st. To Hacienda del Salado. Water scarce and brackish; no rations. This hacienda was destroyed by the Comanches, and its inhabitants massacred.

The savages came in time of peace, under the pretext of trading, and were cordially received.

The present house is loopholed for musketry, and a small and misshapen cannon is kept for its defense.

Another bloody scene took place at this point in 1842. About 150 Texan prisoners of war passed the night here, on their way to Mexico. They surprised their guard and attempted to escape, but were recaptured. Lots were drawn, and a fifth part of their number were shot.

September 1st. The 4th Light Infantry, which had been detached at San Luis Potosi, rejoined the brigade.

The march ended at Rancho de San Salvador, where no rations were obtainable.

About sunset a grenadier of the 4th Light killed an artillery driver. It was necessary to make out a report on the subject the same night.

On the 2d we moved to Hacienda de la Encarnacion, and on the 3d to Aguanueva. This place, with its deliciously shady grove and its wealth of pure water, appears beautiful in contrast with the long, arid and monotonous district we have left behind.

On the 4th to Saltillo, a city of pleasant appearance, with some commerce and considerable civilization.

On the following day the brigade was inspected and allowed to rest all day.

September 6th. To Hacienda de la Rinconada. The road runs to this point between two mountain chains. About midway is a long, steep slope, which could be held easily against troops coming from the direction of Monterey. We found at this place the camp of the Engineer Battalion and the 2d Light Infantry, where a few defenses had been raised. These troops were the first detachments of the long-suffering Army of the North which our brigade had met. Soon afterward the 7th Cavalry arrived. Among the exploits of this regiment the following is related: When General Adrian Wool invaded Texas in 1842, after the oc-

cupation of San Antonio Bejar, he fought a desperate action at a place called Salado. A considerable force of the enemy's riflemen having taken possession of a wood, and having no infantry available to dislodge them, the General ordered the troopers of the 7th to dismount and storm the wood, saber in hand. The order was gallantly executed and the Texans were driven with heavy losses. The regiment now had in its ranks several deserters from the American camp.

September 9th. The road by which Hacienda de la Rinconada is approached from the south, turns abruptly to the east at this point, continuing in that direction as far as Monterey, where our march finally ended. Before reaching the city we were obliged several times to ford the San Juan River, whose waters rose above our knees.

The city of Monterey is located exactly at the opening of the gorge, which at this point cuts the Sierra Madre, a branch of which "sierra" surrounds the town on the south and east.

At the foot of the mountain chain runs the San Juan, which might be utilized as a fosse, although it is fordable at some points. To the north and north-east lies an extensive plain dotted with thickets and groups of trees. From this direction the Americans were expected.

The remnants of the Army of the North, under General Pedro Ampudia, had taken refuge in Monterey which they were now engaged in fortifying.

The eastern approaches were defended by three small works, open at the gorge, each of which could cover from 150 to 200 infantry and two or three pieces of artillery. The central streets leading in this direction were covered by a double line of barricades and ditches.

On the north two small epaulments were erected, each capable of holding 50 or 60 men.

To the left of these works, at the Purisima bridge, an irregular fortification had been thrown up, accommodating its shape to the locality. Behind this line, also, the streets were barricaded.

Outside the city on the plain to the north, a square bastioned fort was being built around the walls of an unfinished cathedral. This work, to which the name of Citadel was given, was the only formidable defense of Monterey.

On the capital of the angle of the fortified lines of the north

and east another irregular work was constructed, covering a tannery (*tenería*) from which it took its name.

To the west, on hills on either side of the Saltillo road, were two small, detached works of little importance.

The most formidable of these was on the eminence known as the hill of the Bishop's Palace, and consisted of a species of priest-cap, which fronted toward the city, and a small redan placed on the crest of the hill behind the Bishop's Palace, which it completely commanded.

If this redan were captured the Bishop's Palace would be lost, and the work facing the city rendered useless.

The engineer who planned the defenses, doubtless imagined that when the city fell his works might still hold out, the idea never entering his head that the Bishop's Palace might be attacked before the city.

The other work, called Fort Federation, was a simple square redoubt thrown up on Loma Blanca hill, without flanking angles and incapable of making any prolonged resistance on account of its isolation.

The streets opening on the west were defended by barricades and fosses, while those looking south, toward the river, were closed by barricades only.

When General Ramirez arrived at Monterey with his brigade, some of these works were completed and others were in process of construction. In each order of the day certain battalions were detailed to work on the lines, while others furnished the necessary guards and escorts.

Affairs were in this condition when it was announced that the American Army had moved from Camargo.

General Torrejon, with his brigade of cavalry, left the city for the purpose of harassing the enemy's march. General Manuel Romero, with a corps of observation consisting of a section of infantry and a company of lancers, had already taken post at Marin.

Meanwhile in the city spirited preparations for a vigorous defense were being made.

There was no want of enthusiasm, but discord had appeared among the garrison. Ever since the retreat from Matamoras the Army had been divided into two parties, one of which was willing that General Pedro Ampudia should retain the command, while

the other wanted General Francisco Mejia at the head of the forces.

This party spirit, which could hardly be perceived among the subalterns and soldiery, occupied the minds of general and field officers, and had, in my opinion, an unfavorable influence on subsequent events.

Among the line officers were rivalries of another kind, which none of the superiors took the trouble to crush at their beginning. The veterans of the Army of the North were styled "wooden mouths," as they had lost the habit of eating. Those who had come to Matamoras with Ampudia were called "polkos," while those recently arrived from the capital were denominated "Redeemers." Every time there was a reunion of officers, these would exchange among themselves stinging repartees, the natural result of which was to engender quarrels and bad feeling.

General Ampudia gave several orders which did not tend to increase his popularity; one of these appointed General Ramirez to the position of Inspector of Fortifications.

Ramirez was an officer thoroughly versed in the tactics of light or line infantry, as well as in the maneuvering and fighting of a regiment of cavalry, but not at all acquainted with the science of fortification.

As was to be expected he made several blunders, the greatest of which was his ordering the demolition of Fort Tenería.

While this was going on the Americans were already in the vicinity of the city. General Romero returned from Marin, and General Torrejon also came in without having made the slightest demonstration against the enemy.

These circumstances rendered it necessary to take some immediate measures for defense, and to this end the most important works were garrisoned and a reserve was formed of the 3d and 4th Light Aguascalientes battalions, with a battery of eight pieces. This reserve was to co-operate with the cavalry forces.

The garrison of Monterey consisted of about 400 infantry and 2000 cavalry with 46 guns, many of the latter being in bad condition. This force included about 1000 of the National Guard of Monterey and the frontier, the greater part being cavalry of that class known as "leather breeches."

Thus, in order to cover all the works, we were obliged to detail very small garrisons for each, relying on the cavalry and the reserve for support in case of need.

We will now give a review of the operations daily initiated against the city by the Americans, and of the resistance opposed to them.

September 19th. The Americans commenced a reconnoissance and several cannon-shots fired from the Citadel put the city in a state of alarm. Our cavalry pickets took a few prisoners.

September 20th. The enemy continued to reconnoiter, and at sunset General Worth, with a brigade of infantry and a wagon train, marched to a point behind the Bishop's Hill, from the crest of which a few ineffectual cannon-shots were fired at him.

Our cavalry was divided into two sections, one of which, under Torrejon, retired, while the other, under General Jáuregui, withdrew to the city, thus leaving the enemy in complete possession of the Saltillo road.

Luis Robles, our distinguished officer of Engineers, having persuaded the General of the importance of Fort Tenería, received orders from the latter that its garrison should work during the night to put it in a state of defense. In pursuance of these orders work was continued during the entire night, in spite of the rain, which, although only a drizzle, caused some annoyance.

September 21st. By daybreak was almost completed, although we were obliged to use sand-bags to finish it. These bags were very inferior, being made of ordinary cotton cloth. The fosse was not completed, having neither the proper depth nor width; the scarp and counterscarp had been left with steps in them which would greatly facilitate an escalade.

The ramps for the artillery *en barbette* were unprovided with platforms, which defects could not but give rise to great inconvenience in the service of the guns, as the earth was freshly heaped up and soaked by the rain.

The garrison was composed of about 200 infantry of the 2d Light and Queretaro battalions, who covered the fort and the Tannery building behind it.

The artillery at this point consisted of one 8-pounder and one 4-pounder gun and a small mountain howitzer, which was, however, without cannoneers. The fort was commanded by Colonel José Maria Carrasco, of the 2d Light, and the artillery was under Juan Espejo, Division Commander.

The capital of the work was inclined from north-east to south-west. The right front and flank were defended by the Tannery and by the San Juan River. The left front and flank commanded

the field through which the enemy was expected. Either from carelessness or want of time the approaches to the work had not been cleared, and a field of high-standing corn, several trees, *magney* and cactus plants greatly favored the assailants. The outline of the fort was a lunette, but on one of the flanks (the left) a short face had been constructed to cover the open gorge to some extent. The gorge opened on a grove in which were a few huts, and through which ran the road leading to the Purísima bridge.

Most undoubtedly this line of trees and huts should have been strongly held, thus uniting the fort with the Purísima. With the left covered by a line of defenses which would in turn have been flanked by the fires of the Citadel, and aided by a strong force of cavalry (which was entirely available), the fort would have become an insurmountable obstacle, or at least would have been taken only after great sacrifices. These dispositions, however, were not made, and the Tannery was left to its own resources.

The morning of the 21st dawned wet and gloomy, and the troops were allowed a drink of *mezcal* to comfort them after the fatigues of the night.

About 7 A. M. the enemy began to organize his attack on the Tannery; to cover this he placed a battery which engaged the guns of the Citadel for some twenty minutes.

General Mejia, who was at this time in the Tannery, advised Colonel Carrasco to be prepared, as the demonstration on the Citadel was on a feint, and the true attack would be made against our position.

In effect three columns, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground and of the cover afforded by the vegetation, advanced at a quickstep.

The right-hand column advanced and occupied the grove and inclosures in the north-eastern suburbs of the city. That of the center was held stationary as a reserve, and that of the left, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, charged the Tenería.

The enemy, without halting to return the heavy fusilade by which he was greeted, took position immediately in front of the fort, covering himself behind the accidents of the ground and occupying several huts from whence he opened a rapid and telling fire.

At this moment, a re-enforcement arrived on the scene, in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Joaquin Castro, leading some

150 men of the 3d Light Infantry, and an 8-pounder gun, commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Agustin Espinosa, of the 1st Artillery Brigade. The gun and part of the infantry entered the fortification, while the remainder occupied the flat roof of the Tannery building.

The fight was terrible. The Americans in full possession of the ground around the work, and covering themselves wherever cover could be found, kneeling, lying prone, and in every possible position, at pistol shot, and some even from the counterscarp, kept up a heavy fire on the parapets. Notwithstanding this they were repulsed.

The column, which had heretofore remained motionless, now advanced, covered by several pieces of artillery, to renew the attack. Sub-Lieutenant Espinosa, being warned that the enemy were planting a gun, fired in that direction several shots, so well aimed that the piece was obliged to withdraw. The musketry fire was, however, continuous and increasing, and the defenders of Fort Teneria were becoming fatigued.

Suddenly the right and center columns of the enemy retired in disorder, and that of the left, which was the most desperately engaged, on seeing this maneuver, immediately imitated it. The reveille was sounded (a sign of triumph among Mexican troops), and the garrison of the Tannery broke out in enthusiastic cheers, expecting every moment to see the column of reserve sally on the enemy.

This, however, did not take place. The retreat of the Americans was caused by the sudden appearance of a strong column of horse, which had left the city by the Citadel road. A sudden charge of this mass would doubtless have produced decisive results, but only about fifty troopers of the 3d Cavalry, under Lieutenant Miramon, attempted the movement.

The inefficiency of the cavalry on this occasion was due to rivalry among its leaders. Miramon's Lancers overtook the Americans and killed several of them, but having taken shelter behind adjacent fences the enemy obliged the riders to withdraw.

Relieved from further apprehensions of this cavalry, which now remained entirely inactive, the enemy organized a fresh attack against Fort Teneria.

The garrison of the fort was exhausted and disheartened by the non-appearance of the column of reserve; the heated muskets burned the soldiers hands, and the gun, commanded by Sub-

Lieutenant Espinosa, recoiled, at every discharge, into the middle of the work, costing not a little trouble to push the piece back to its platform, in which maneuver Lieutenant Joaquin Colombres, of the Engineers, rendered most efficient personal assistance.

Another 8-pounder, under Lieutenant Jacinto Dominguez, Brevet-Captain of Artillery, was worked with great difficulty, as it was *en barbette* on the salient angle of the work, and the artillerymen were entirely exposed to the fire of the Americans, who shot them down from the opposite side of the ditch.

In this critical position Lieutenant Dominguez served the vent, covering himself as best he might behind the gun and carriage, while Corporal José Salome with one assistant sponged and loaded the gun while lying under the carriage. Resting their backs against the revetment of the parapet they placed the cartridge in the muzzle of the gun and with great effort drove it home with the rammer. Other artillerymen, crouching by the sides of the wheels, spoked them forward when it was necessary to put the piece in battery, while the fourth pair of cannoneers handed ammunition to the first between the spokes of the wheels.

Dominguez and some of his men being disabled, after a hard fight the piece was silenced, and so remained throughout the action.

The cloth of the sand-bags with which the parapet had been finished and revetted, took fire from the flashes of the musket-pans, so that the troops were unable to approach the parapet to discharge their pieces. Two artillerymen, engaged in serving ammunition to their gun, were badly burned by the explosion of cartridges which they were carrying. In spite of this the enemy in his third attack was received with as much valor as he had been in the other two.

Soon arose, however, two frightful cries: "Ammunition! Water!" In effect, the soldiers were worn out and their lips were crusted with powder from biting cartridges, which in addition to the excitement of the combat produced a burning thirst. As to the ammunition, no one knew its whereabouts, and as the commander of the fort was nowhere to be found the matter could not be laid before him.

The officers were now holding the fort alone. The fire of the enemy thickened while ours lessened notably, and the soldiers began to leave the parapet. A Captain of the 3d Light, Domingo Nava, rallied some forty men and led them toward the gorge,

urging them to charge with the bayonet; this being seen by the soldiers yet at their posts, they also rushed toward the gorge. In vain the officers tried to halt them, those who would stop invariably brought their muskets to a support, and showing their empty cartridge-boxes exclaimed: "Give us cartridges, Lieutenant, and we will fight!"

When this crowd passed out but five persons were left to garrison the fort, namely, Lieutenant Colombres, of the Engineers; Sub-Lieutenant Espinosa, of the Artillery; an Infantry officer named Castelan; a soldier of the 3d Light, and myself.

On the roof of the Tannery were Captain Juan Servin and Lieutenant Ignacio Solache, of the 3d Light; Sub-Lieutenant Guillermo Moreda, of the Battalion of Queretaro, and a few soldiers.

Immediately after the abandonment of the fort the Americans seeing no men on the parapet gave three cheers and assaulted the work. The first party which mounted the parapet appeared at the salient angle, where they planted a blue flag with the American eagle and stars, and fired several shots, one of which wounded Castelan, and another aimed at the tannery building killed the young and valiant Captain Servin. The enemy captured all the artillery and some small-arms, together with the officers and some thirty soldiers and teamsters. The struggle had lasted without intermission from seven in the morning until midday.

The fire which was now opened from the Purísima bridge and from Fortin del Diablo so swept the interior of the work that the Americans were obliged to retire into the ditch, and the place, which a moment before had been filled with tumult and excitement, was left to the dead, who lay in their blood amid awful silence.

Having taken the Tenería the enemy did not rest on their laurels, but supposing that the loss of that point would produce great moral effect in the city, they rushed forward to storm Fort Diablo.

The enemy's central column advanced rapidly against the work and deployed on the river bank to aid the attack. Ignacio Joaquin del Arenal, Colonel of Infantry and Captain of Artillery, and the commander of the fort, on seeing themselves attacked, exhorted their men to stand firm. The latter became excited, and opening a vigorous fire repulsed their assailants.

Here, as at the Tannery, no pursuit was attempted when the

enemy retired, so enabling them to reform column at their leisure and renew the attack with fresh troops, while the garrison became more and more wearied at each assault.

If our reserves had been properly handled, and brought forward at the proper moment, perhaps we might have held the Tannery, and it would certainly have cost the enemy more to take it.

The Americans returned to the charge, keeping as much as possible to the right, attempting to turn the flank of the work and avoid the fire of the two guns which it contained. Observing this movement, Colonel Arenal brought the guns from their platforms to the exterior of the work, and by the well-aimed shots and the fire of the 2d Light Infantry, which garrisoned the point, the enemy was again repulsed. This defense was greatly assisted by the flank fire from the two barricades between the Devil's Corner and the Purisima bridge.

In a third attack of the enemy, he received a final repulse, and attempted nothing further against this line of defenses.

While this took place on the north-east of the city, the right-hand column of Americans, re-enforced by detachments from the Tannery, and preceded, as usual, by clouds of skirmishers, arrived at Hana, covering themselves behind all available shelter, opened their attack on the northern line by a heavy and well-sustained fire of muketry.

The Purisima bridge was held by a single 12-pounder gun, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Guterrez, who finding that its fire from its embrasure was not very effective, took the gun out of the work and placed it without the least cover, where together with 1st Sergeant Simon Mendoza and a platoon of artillerymen of the Army of the North, he greatly distinguished himself.

The enemy, although twice repulsed, attacked a third time, attempting in this assault to ford the branch of the river. Just at this moment the Battalion of Aguascalientes, under Colonel José Ferro, arrived to re-enforce the bridge.

Colonel Ferro formed his men kneeling behind the breast-work which ran along the bank of the pool, and opened a withering fire, which drove the enemy back in great confusion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Guterrez and Sub-Lieutenant Manuel Bulnes, of the Battalion of Queretaro, accompanied by several

infantrymen, leaped the parapet and took several prisoners, among whom were two Engineer officers badly wounded.

This was the last attack made by the enemy on the 21st. After having fought from seven in the morning until three in the afternoon, he had suffered heavy losses and had gained no other advantage, on the north-east of the city, than the capture of the Tannery. Among his wounded was General Butler.

I have faithfully related the events of the attack made by the American Army, under the direction of General Zachary Taylor in person, against the northern and north-eastern suburbs of the city of Monterey, on the 21st of September, 1846. Of part of these events I was an eye-witness, and those which I did not personally observe, I have collected from the accounts of trustworthy individuals, and after having carefully compared the different relations have embodied them in my narrative.

I will now detail the operations of General Worth, which were carried on to the west of the city.

As has been said, Worth had, on the evening of the 20th, marched with a brigade of infantry toward the Saltillo road. On the morning of the 21st he resumed his march, passing behind the Bishop's Hill, doubtless with the intention of storming Fort Federation. His main force was infantry, and he had with him a number of wagons, to be utilized as defenses in case of an attack by cavalry in open ground.

General Torrejon, whose force was entirely of the last mentioned arm, made an attempt to stop the American advance, which resulted in a bloody encounter in which the Mexicans were worsted.

The Americans, who were marching rapidly toward the river, doubtless intending to wade it and carry Fort Federation, halted and promptly occupied a cornfield in which to receive the cavalry.

General Torrejon immediately ordered a charge, which was made bravely although slowly. It was stopped, however, less by the enemy's fire than by a line of tree trunks behind which he had intrenched himself. In vain did General Manuel Romero, attempt, with reckless daring, to force a passage; and in vain did Ensign Domingo Dufóo dismount and try to drag aside the stubborn logs.

Meanwhile the squadrons of Taliscan and Guanajuatan Lancers, which were the first to charge, suffered heavy losses. The

brilliant Lieutenant-Colonel of the Lancers of Talisco, Juan N. Nájera, and three other officers were killed. Dozens of men and horses went down in the twinkling of an eye. Lieutenant-Colonel Mariano Moret, who commanded the Guanajuatans, received twelve or fifteen balls in his person, horse and equipments, but had the good fortune to escape without serious injury. Further resistance was now useless, and the cavalry retired leaving the field covered with spoils.

Worth, having triumphed, now crossed the river and attacked Fort Federation, which was defended by about 80 men and two ill-constructed cannons. The defense was undeniably weak, but no aid whatever was given by the city.

In this way the Americans, attacking with very superior forces, isolated points which the town did not attempt to re-enforce, had on that day occupied the Tannery on the north-east and Fort Federation on the south-west, as well as the Saltillo road.

The prisoners taken by the enemy at the TENERÍA were sent, under strong escort, to Walnut Woods, where General Taylor was encamped. *En route* they were fired upon by the guns of the Citadel, which blazed away at the escort as long as it was in range.

On arriving the officers were lodged in a tent next to that of General Quitman, and the soldiery under the trees some distance away.

About sunset General Quitman arrived and treated the officers extremely well, sending them his Negro servant with a waiter laden with ham, crackers and coffee, the first food we had seen that day.

Shortly afterward a squad of infantry surrounded the tent and the night fell dark and rainy. The tent in which the officers lodged was cotton canvas and as the rain fell in torrents they were as thoroughly soaked as if they had lain in the open fields. Notwithstanding this discomfort the fatigues of the day made them sleep soundly.

At an early hour on the morning of the 22d the officers were conducted by a sergeant to the tent of General Taylor, who received them seated upon a camp-stool and without his coat.

By means of an interpreter he interrogated the officers at length as to the condition, numbers and morale of the garrison of Monterey, and as to the chances of the place being relieved. He also informed himself of the stores, ammunition, fortifications

and artillery, asking a great many questions, which were answered in a way which enlightened the commander very little.

The examination having ended, the General informed the officers that they were at liberty. The latter asked the reason of this generosity, and were told that it was a practice among civilized nations to allow captured officers to retire to their homes, they giving their word not to take arms again in the present war, or until exchanged.

The officers replied that they were much pleased with the offer, but that they could not accept it, as they could not remain indifferent to the fortunes of their country, and as they did not care to renounce the glory which might be gained in the Mexican Army. Consequently they preferred to remain prisoners, and to leave to fortune the solution of their destinies.

The General then spoke of various subjects, and, among others, said, that the Mexican artillery was served by foreign officers; he greatly praised this arm, and complimented the bravery of our cannoneers.

The interview having ended, the officers returned to their tent, strongly impressed with the idea that Taylor's inquiries augured favorably for the welfare of their cause.

Shortly afterward General Taylor left camp, but instead of the uniform he had worn, while directing the attack against the *Tenería* on the previous day, he was attired in a blue-check frock coat, blue pantaloons, without stripes, white waistcoat, and a broad-brimmed straw hat. Neither on his clothes or horse-trappings did he carry any insignia or military adornments. This caused some wonder among the prisoners, who, after many surmises, attributed it to the fact that the General was about to make some dangerous reconnoissance in person.

About half-an hour later the cannonade recommenced around Monterey. This lightened the spirits of the captives, for, knowing nothing of what had taken place after the fall of Fort *Tenería*, the protracted silence of the combatants had seemed ominous.

What took place was as follows: The enemy having failed in his attempts on the north and north-east, determined to move his line of operations to the west and attack the Bishop's Palace.

This point was garrisoned by some 200 men of various corps, with four guns, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Berra.

Three of these pieces pointed toward the Saltillo road, and a 12-pounder was planted in a small breastwork, which had been

thrown up on a crest behind the Palace. This point was garrisoned by fifty men; its gun, however, being only available for long-range fire, as it could not be depressed enough to sweep the hillside, which at this point was remarkably steep and precipitous.

The Americans passed the night near the foot of the hill, and at daybreak attacked the breastwork, whose defenders, being taken by surprise, made little or no resistance, retiring to the Bishop's Palace after having upset the gun and leaving a few dead behind.

Having taken this position, the enemy completely commanded the Palace, as no one had thought of fortifying that part of the building which faced the crest. The troops were obliged to sally to defend the place, but as the Americans planted a gun on the summit, which crossed fires admirably with another on Loma Blanca, our men were exposed, both front and rear, to the enemy's artillery.

During the morning the enemy bombarded the position while he organized his attack. Only one of the three remaining guns was fit for use, one having kicked out of its mountings and the other having blown out its vent while firing on the enemy during the cavalry fight of the day before.

Lieutenant-Colonel Berra repeatedly sent for re-enforcements, but was told that he had already men enough to hold his own. Nevertheless we are assured that General José Lopez Uruga received orders to take charge of the defense of the place, but refused to do so unless at least 800 infantry and two guns were put at his disposal before midday. These having failed to arrive at the hour indicated, General Uruga kept his word, and retired to the Citadel.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon the Americans descended on the Palace in a strong column, covered by clouds of skirmishers. Our troops awaited the attack in line of battle, but were finally driven by a rush of the enemy's superior forces.

General Torrejon, who, with his brigade of cavalry, was near the hill, attempted to aid them. For this purpose he ordered part of his force to dismount and ascend the hill, but, as was to be supposed, his dragoons were easily beaten off by the enemy's infantry, which had in this case an immense advantage.

A soldier noticing that the flag still floated from its staff, returned to the fort and lowered and carried it off, under a terrific

fire. I do not know whether this soldier received any reward, which he richly deserved, but I suppose not, as I saw no mention of the feat in any official document.

The Americans, having taken the Bishop's Palace and Fort Federation, were now in complete possession of the Saltillo road, and consequently the garrison of Monterey was entirely cut off from the rest of the Republic. Although this was really an evil, yet it did not materially affect the defense of the city, both the points captured being isolated positions and out of the line of those already in the hands of the enemy.

Although new endeavors would be necessary to penetrate the fortified enciente, "yet no measures were taken to prepare for a vigorous defense on the following day. On the contrary, orders were given by virtue of which our forces abandoned, not only the first line of barricades, where the Americans had been repulsed on the 21st, but also the second, which had not yet been attacked."

The troops were now concentrated in the third line of defenses! Crowded in a small area, where the enemy's projectiles would necessarily have the greatest effect! Several cavalry corps were also penned up in the city, and the troopers were placed in various high buildings to be used as infantry, seemingly without considering that their short-range weapons could not compete with the arms of the Americans, and without making any provision for the shelter and forage of the horses. This force would have been more useful in the surrounding country, without considering the evils attendant on the crowding of all our available space with horses, for whose care and maintenance no provision whatever had been made.

The absolutely defensive system, which had been adopted, aided the enemy admirably. Not only were no attempts made to recover the points lost, but no sallies were made to cover partial defenses and repulse attacks, and we abandoned, in my humble opinion, unnecessarily, two fortified lines, which the enemy could not have taken without considerable loss.

On the 23d, when the Americans made their usual morning reconnoissance, they noticed the evacuation of the barricades, and promptly occupied them without the slightest resistance from the Mexicans.

From this moment the state of the garrison became precarious. Massed in a small inclosure, under the concentrated cross-

fire of the enemy, they suffered considerable; the Citadel was cut off, powerless to aid in the defense, and the line of retreat for its garrison, which should have been kept open at all hazards, was voluntarily closed. This produced among the soldiery a discontent, which gradually worked its way up to the officers, who saw themselves placed in a false position, without having been driven to that extremity by the enemy.

The Americans planted a howitzer battery in the Cemetery, another in the Plazuela de la Carnicería, and a cannon battery on the heights, the fire of which, concentrated on our forces, was annoying in the extreme. Our position was all the more untenable, as these batteries could not be seen, and consequently could not be silenced.

In spite of the bad results of some of their former attacks against our works, the Americans now organized several columns to storm the city; a heavy fight ensued, but the enemy were again repulsed with loss.

Being fully convinced of the difficulties and dangers attending an assault by main force in the open streets, they now decided to take the place little by little and at once commenced knocking down walls, boring through others, opening loopholes, which were used by both parties, in the partitions, and thus conquering the city house by house.

At the end of the day the garrison's outposts were entirely withdrawn and the defense was limited to the blocks surrounding the main square and the market-place. The position was nevertheless strong, and the enemy would have been very venturesome if he had attempted to force it, especially as his losses on that day had been considerable.

While these events were transpiring in Monterey we will see what was going on in the enemy's camp.

General Taylor, it seems, had not rated Monterey as a place of any particular importance, and had expected to take it after a few hours of fighting. His Army was not prepared for a siege, and his artillery train was composed only of field-pieces. These, however, were far superior to our own, as the United States had for some time past used the Paixhan gun, while our Government still adhered to the antiquated Gribeauval system.

It is said that on September 21st, when the attack commenced, General Taylor had ordered his dinner to be served in Monterey; but he was rudely disappointed, when at nightfall, in exchange

for Fort Tenería he saw the field covered with dead and wounded, and a generally thin appearance in his ranks.

The combats on the succeeding days, especially the last, swelled his losses considerably and the hospitals which were established in cotton canvas tents, formed for the wounded but a poor shelter from the tropical rains, which during this season of the year fall nightly in that region.

His camp was situated at some distance from Monterey, and was open to the attacks of that part of our cavalry which had remained outside the city; his provisions, moreover, were giving out and it was not easy to replace them.

Taking all things into consideration, the position of General Taylor was not altogether encouraging.

The city, on the other hand, was not in want of either supplies or ammunition, and the Cathedral and Government houses were as strong as redoubts. The garrison could and should have risked another assault, which, lost or won, would have cost the enemy much blood. The Citadel yet remained intact with 400 men and a strong artillery. We should also have remembered that the cavalry could unceasingly harass the enemy if compelled by a bloody repulse to make a retreat of forty leagues to his base of supplies on the banks of the Bravo.

Actuated by these considerations General Taylor determined to raise the siege; thus, at least, we interpreted the preparations made in the American camp. Orders were given to hold the baggage, hospitals and prisoners ready for a move, and to these last were issued four days' rations of corn-bread, ham, salt meat and coffee.

The march had been fixed for the 25th, and the Army would doubtless have retired on the 26th. Three more days of constancy and valor and the triumph would have been ours.

September 24th. As on the preceding day, the enemy attacked the house in detail, without, however, obtaining any special advantage. At times the combatants would fight from one sidewalk to another, almost at burn-clothes distance; parties in the courtyard of a house would engage those on its flat roof, others would fire across the street from window to window, and still others would start a combat with enemies in an adjoining room separated only by the thickness of a wall. Nevertheless when night fell the Americans had made no headway and had lost all hopes of forcing our lines.

It appears that several generals and field officers of high rank waited on General Ampudia and proposed to him to capitulate; it is even asserted that some of them advocated unconditional surrender. At first the General refused to listen to them, but finally assented, and sent a field officer to parley with the enemy.

I will now relate what is said to have occurred as it was told to me by several officers, but without guaranteeing the truth of the statement.

When the officer appointed left our lines he was met by an American field officer, who was coming to the city to request an armistice.

The American being the sharper of the two, interrogated the Mexican as to his business, and on being informed he expressed himself much pleased, as it would save him, he said, the execution of his own disagreeable commission, which was to demand the surrender of the city. He then conducted our representative to headquarters.

Taylor, on hearing of these proceedings, took the character proper to the occasion, and informed the envoy that he would demand an unconditional surrender.

Ampudia indignantly replied, that if Taylor would not appoint a commission to treat, with another appointed by the Mexicans, on the terms of an honorable capitulation, he would prefer burial, with his entire garrison, under the ruins of Monterey to unconditional surrender.

If the situation of the American Army had been better, General Taylor would certainly have held to his first proposition, but the straits to which his command had been reduced, doubtless influenced him to consent to the appointment of commissioners.

When the deputations met it was found that the Americans made very exorbitant demands, which, however, were moderated in proportion as they were energetically opposed by the Mexicans. Finally about midnight, the articles of capitulation were signed, and from unconditional surrender the Americans lowered their exactions to the following:

1. The Mexican Army will leave Monterey with drums beating and colors flying, the troops to be allowed one round per man, and one field battery with full caissons, loaded guns and lighted port-fires.
2. The Mexican flag, on being lowered from the Citadel, will be saluted with a salvo of twenty-one guns by the American artillery.

3. Hostilities will be suspended for seven weeks.
4. Prisoners will be exchanged.
5. The Mexican Army will retire to Saltillo, and may send detachments as far as Hacienda de la Rinconada, which point will be neutral for both Armies.
6. Six days are allowed the garrison to evacuate the city, the eastern half of which it shall occupy, while the American Army holds the western half.

It is probable that I have forgotten some of the details, but I think I have given the substance of the document.

The capitulation having been arranged all hostilities at once ceased.

When General Taylor returned to his camp he was complimented with an escort of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. When the cavalry passed the outposts and the Americans saw it emerge from the shades of night into their midst, the alarm was given on every side, and disorder and confusion reigned supreme. The captured officers had a fine opportunity of judging the effect which a real surprise would have occasioned, and on awakening amid the tumult, shouting and rushing to arms, they also became panic-stricken, although they did not know the cause of the commotion.

Very soon, however, everything quieted down. General Taylor entered his tent and the escort returned to Monterey. This termination of the siege caused great joy in the American camp, and the soldiery broke out in loud laughter and shouts of jubilee.

September 25th. Monterey was silent. In the American camp no sound of War was heard, and that silence, that death-like calm, gave the prisoners more anxiety and uneasiness than the heavy cannonade of the preceding days.

They momentarily expected the order to commence their march to Camargo, and on saluting General Quitman that morning, they inquired at what hour they should start. The General replied that it was no longer necessary, as the city had surrendered, and an exchange of prisoners had been arranged. The prisoners received this news with great distress, for although they had not relished the idea of being compelled to leave their comrades and their country, yet they would willingly have undergone all things, if by so doing they could have contributed to the defeat of the enemy.

When the hour arrived for the officers to return to Monterey, General Quitman requested their autographs. While writing

them, the officers expressed their gratitude for the kindness with which they had been treated, and asked a remembrance of the General. He ordered his secretary to write out an honorary certificate for the prisoners, which he signed and handed to them. Lieutenant Ignacio Solache, the senior in rank among us, took possession of the document, and as he was killed at the battle of Cerro Gordo, it was most probably lost.

The surrender of Monterey caused the fall of the Citadel, for, although General Uruga at first refused to be included in the capitulation, he was finally convinced of the impossibility of holding out, as no care had been taken to provision the point, and as it was totally unsupplied with water.

September 26th. At seven in the morning, the 1st Brigade formed in the Plaza, ready to commence the march.

General Tomás Regueña was appointed by General Ampudia to take charge of the evacuation. He appeared on horseback, accompanied by General Worth, and gave the necessary commands by sound of bugle.

The 1st Brigade, with drums beating and flags waving in the breeze, filed through the city, and, skirting the hill of the Bishop's Palace, took the road for Saltillo.

Regueña was much esteemed by the Americans, and he was undoubtedly one of the most meritorious general officers in our Army.

Our wounded remained in the city, in the hospitals which had been improvised during the siege.

On the "corredor" of a house which had been so used, stretched out on mats and with no further covering than the cotton cloth which bandaged their wounds, lay two horribly mutilated human figures.

They were the artillerymen who had been burned while carrying ammunition to their guns, and were now covered with ulcers from head to foot. At twenty paces the stench which they exhaled was insupportable.

September 27th. The 2d Brigade left and passed the night at Santa Catarina. It was a sad coincidence that, on the anniversary of the victorious entrance of the Army of the Three Guarantees into Mexico, we should be forced to deliver a stronghold into the hands of a foreign enemy.

September 28th. The 2d Brigade left Santa Catarina and

bivouacked at Paso de los Nuertos. The 3d Brigade left Monterey, which completed the evacuation of the city, and on the 29th, when passing Los Muertos, left at that point a detachment of 200 infantry.

From the 30th of September to the 4th of October, the Division remained in Saltillo, where the three brigades had united. The funds for the march to San Luis Potosi were now distributed, each subaltern receiving five dollars in silver and five dollars worth of manufactured tobacco.

On October 5th, before commencing the day's march, the Division was drawn up to witness the execution of a spy of the enemy. This business being completed, the troops defiled past the body and out of the city at once. The march closed at Aguanueva.

On the 6th we marched to Hacienda de la Encarnation, on the 7th to San Salvador, on the 8th to Salado, on the 9th to Noria de las Animas, on the 10th to Cedral (many soldiers were now sick with tertian ague), on the 11th through Mateuala to La Presa, on the 12th to Solis, the 13th to Charcos, the 14th to Villa del Venado, the 15th to Hedionda, the 16th to Hacienda de Bocas, and on the 17th we finally reached San Luis Potosi.

On the 18th the staff and line officers of the Division went to pay their compliments to General Santa Anna and were very coolly received.

The General spoke of errors committed during the campaign, alluded to the bad conduct of several officers, and assured us that, under better leaders, our eagles would have been crowned with victory.

One of the first acts of Santa Anna was to deprive several officers of the command of their respective corps, and to summon a court-martial to investigate the causes of the fall of Monterey. A few days afterward, however, he ordered the proceedings to be suspended, and allowed affairs to return to their original condition.

OBSERVATIONS.

The defense of Monterey should have been more vigorous. The completely passive resistance to which we were subjected, the inaction of the cavalry, which was used very little, and the abandonment of the first and second fortified lines, which should have cost the enemy dear, were the principal causes of the capitulation.

Notwithstanding this, the condition of the garrison was not,

in my humble opinion, sufficiently bad to render a capitulation necessary. Although we had no great abundance of victuals, water or ammunition, still there was no lack of them, and the losses we had suffered were relatively small, as they did not exceed 200 men.

It is true that if the defense had been prolonged the situation of the garrison would have grown momentarily worse, so that the enemy would finally have forced a surrender at discretion. This should not, however, have influenced the defenders, especially as the order had been given to hold the city to the last extremity and on no account to surrender it, until the commander was morally certain that he would not be succored and until a practicable breach had been opened in the body of the place and at least one assault had been repulsed. When this extremity has been reached it is well known that the attacking party will only accept a surrender at discretion.

The more liberal terms allowed the besieged goes to prove the greater incapacity on the part of the besiegers to force their own terms. This is what took place at Monterey. If the place had held out a few days longer, and I think this could have been done without much sacrifice, the enemy would have been obliged to raise the siege.

If the proofs given in this sketch be not sufficient to establish the truth of this statement, we must take into consideration the fact that if General Taylor had thought his force competent to reduce the city, he would certainly have objected to the turning loose of an army of 5000 veterans, and a battery, which were soon to meet him on the field of battle.

On the other hand, General Ampudia might have reasoned, on signing the capitulation, that, considering the unarmed condition of the Republic, it was his duty to preserve, at all hazards, the division under his command for future use. How immeasurably greater would have been the advantage obtained by the Nation, by a victory over the Americans, or by their retreat, which would certainly have taken place had not Monterey surrendered.

Other and less immediate causes than those just mentioned contributed to the fall of the city. The principal of these was the state of revolution in which the country was involved. If no internal disturbances had been going on, a respectable force might have been brought together to succor the city.

The moral effect of the presence of such a force would have been felt among the besieged, and would have given greater impulse to the defense. The besiegers, also, would have felt its proximity, and it would doubtless have hastened their retreat.

Civil War was, however, a powerful auxiliary to the invaders. The want of energy in National resistance, the easy triumphs of the Americans, and the humiliating peace which was finally accepted, were all due to its baneful influence.

God grant that so many misfortunes may serve as a lesson for the future.



CAMP CHEST.

I.

[The following have been received by the Publication Committee. If, in part, not altogether "Unwritten History," doubtless these reminiscent fragments will have the flavor of novelty to many of our readers. EDITORS.]

A correspondent of the JOURNAL writes: "Out West, some of us have a feeling that the '*Military Service Institution*' is not for 'we uns,' but 'you uns.'"

"General Fry and Colonel Closson, in the last number of the JOURNAL, present an opening for those who, like myself, are not scientific.

"I am not a reformer, never sought promotion, never made a real or marker's score, never struggle with tactics of the + or — variety, am too old for ballistics or other active exercise, but am not too busy to stop for fun, and still cling to the toddy, soft or hard.

"If you are not fuller than I generally get, you may be able to dispose of the inclosed; but don't take the medicine unless you feel like it, for it may fit your case as did the volunteer's dose.

"When Kelly swore that Dr. C.
For a growing pain in a soldier's knee,
Gave this prescription—'twas a beauty,
Cough medicine three times a day 'and duty.'

Gladly yours,

II.

CIVIL WAR.

A soldier of the 7th Mass. testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Q. Did you ever observe anything on the part of our officers that indicated treachery or treason?

A. Only once; there was a flag of truce in front of our regiment and a lot of our officers went out and met some rebel officers and gave them several drinks of commissary whiskey, and I said to Tom: "Tom, this War is getting to be altogether too civil."

III.

Captain —— was asked if he could perform a certain duty in a given time.

"Yes, General, if you give me a *point blank* to call on the Post Commander for all I want."

IV.

NOT PREJUDICED.

A General officer, now on the retired list, had an Aide, who, while quite a fluent correspondent, was not noted for his knowledge.

The Aide went to Europe on leave, and some one remarked that ——'s letters would be interesting.

"Yes," said General ——, "and should be very fair and unbiased, for no man ever went to Europe with less prejudice, so far as previous information could furnish it."

V.

CAREFUL OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.

Private Doyle was guarding prisoners when the lightning struck his bayonet, knocking him down and demolishing his gun.

Adjutant B. was the first to reach the scene.

"Are you much hurt, Doyle?"

"No, Lieutenant, only a little numb, but me gun is knocked to splithereens."

"Never mind this time, but don't let it happen again."

VI.

An officer of the Subsistence Department, in an official paper, spoke of the Post Fund as "the Army stomach-pump, operated by the Post and Regimental Councils."

VII.

General —— had two Aides, one of whom was a very poor penman, but good at orthography; the other was a fine scribe, but his orthography was troubled with bad spells. Some one remarked that his Aides were valuable men; "Yes," said the General, "between them they are; one can write, but can't spell, the other can spell, but can't write."

VIII.

Forty-odd years ago K., of the 2d Artillery, visited the 4th Infantry, and H. was detailed to mix the toddy; they were short of glasses, so H. took a three-pint cup, eight lumps of sugar, a little water at first, then the balance of the pint, a little sour, some very thin lemon-peel and a pint of whiskey; when well mixed the cup was passed to K., who took a sip, then a drink; the other three looked at him; after awhile—a little while—he took another drink and said, "H., that is a good toddy, but a little stiff." H. could stand it no longer—"Great Heavens, K., that is a tusconogy!"

IX.

THE SUNDAY QUESTION.

It may be recollected that in 1846 Col. G., of the —— Artillery, compelled certain Catholic soldiers to attend divine service—a service where he himself was very glad to be present, but which at all events lacked the accompaniment of the celebration of mass.

What a rumpus was kicked up! The Constitution was appealed to and the War Department got out a G. O. on the subject prohibiting thereafter all infringement upon the right of conscientious belief solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution.

The legend of that day ran that when this order reached Corpus Christi and was duly published to the troops, among those loudest in praise of the principles laid down in the order was Col. David Emanuel Twiggs, of the 2d Dragoons, who, in his emphatic way, damned the commanding officer who so far forgot himself and the principles

enunciated in our glorious Constitution, as to attempt to force a man, even a soldier, to go to any church when he did not want to go, declaring with many an oath *he* would like to see any soldier of *his* regiment compelled to go to church against his will!

The Sunday morning following the receipt of the order at Corpus Christi, inspection was held as usual, and Twiggs took occasion to reiterate his view in the most marked manner, so that not only officers but all the soldiers heard him. After the inspection was over, he directed the Adjutant to announce that divine service was to take place at a certain point in camp, and that all soldiers who *desired* to attend would step to the front. Three or four men stepped out of the ranks, were placed under a non-commissioned officer, and marched off to church.

Now David Emanuel was somewhat renowned in the Army for his *flanking* operations in *camp* and *garrison*, and having on this occasion vindicated the Rights of Man in accordance with the provisions of our glorious Bill of Rights it suddenly occurred to him that there was a law requiring the Articles of War to be read to the troops at least once in every six months, and turning to his Adjutant he asked how long since this had been done. The answer impressed him with the necessity, which existed, of a knowledge on the part of his soldiers of the law under which they were living. He directed the Adjutant to send for the Articles of War, and have them read to the regiment. He himself selected the man to read them. The selection he made suited him and his purpose, but was not a very good one if the object was to convey a knowledge of the law. For his selection fell upon a notorious stammerer whose inability to enunciate a single sentence in any sort of reasonable time was well known.

With book in hand in front of the regiment the man commenced his task, stumbled along through article after article, but making such poor progress that by the time he got to Article 10, prescribing the act he was then trying to perform, every one in the regiment was thoroughly tired out, and disgusted, and the men who had attended divine service had returned to camp and were quietly eating their dinners! At length the reading had to be stopped, for dinner, or at least *suspended*, to be resumed, it was announced, on the following Sunday.

Twiggs did little during the following week but damn poor old Col. G. for a senseless bigot for his efforts to convert men by forcing them to church. Sunday morning inspection was again over, and again was the order given, "All those who *desire* to attend divine service will step to the front!"

The result justified the old adage about there being more ways than one to kill a dog. Every man stepped promptly to the front, the regiment was marched off to church to listen possibly to a sermon, which, when compared with the last Sunday's experience, was an absolute luxury.

X.

At a certain Fort in a certain Department of a certain Division was posted the following advertisement:

JUNE 19, 1887.

Informal bids (in duplicate) will be received at this office until 1 o'clock P. M., Saturday, June 25, 1887, for digging twelve thousand (12,000) cedar or juniper post-holes, and setting the posts therein.

It is republished in the "Camp Chest" in order that those solemn youths who object to "Punch in the JOURNAL" may, when not occupied with Re-organization, Promotion and Strategy, take up the problem of the difference between a cedar and a juniper post-hole.

The Theological Faculty of Columbia College have kindly consented to act as judges, and to the most successful competitor will be awarded a complete set of the "Evangelical Library."

Diagrams will accompany each alleged solution.

OUR EXCHANGES.

[List of Periodicals in Exchange, with titles of leading articles on professional topics.]

BRAZIL.

Revista Mensual. April, 1887. (Buenos Ayres.)

1.—El General Boulanger Durante El Primer Año de su Ministerio.

2.—Composicion y Creacion de Doce Regimientos de Infanteria con la Base de las Seis Regimientos Existentes.

[The same, May, 1887.]

[The same, June, 1887.]

ENGLAND.

Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Vol. XL., 1885.

The Sudan Military Railway. (Lieut. Nathan, R. E.)

Marine Surveying. (Staff Commander Tizard, R. N.)

The Application of Infantry Fire in the Field. (Captain Mayne, R. E.)

The Frontier Railways of India.

Journal Royal United Service Institution. Vol. XXXI., No. 138.

Suggestions as to the use of Machine-guns in the Field in combination with Infantry.

Coast Defense by Gunboats.

Mastless Ships of War.

Magazine and Repeating Rifles.

[The same, No. 139.]

On the Personnel for Submarine Mining.

Belligerent Rights; and what is Lawful in War.

[The same, No. 140.]

Volunteer Field Batteries and how to Horse them.

Accuracy of Artillery Fire.

Tactics as Affected by Field Telegraphy. (Col. Hale.)

Tactics as Affected by Field Telegraphy. (Major Beresford.)

Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution. May, 1887.

1.—Short History and Description of Armor and its Attack by Artillery. (Capt. Browne, R. A.)

2.—Artillery fired from Railway Wagons.

[The same, June, 1887.]

A Machine-gun Battery in Burmah. (Capt. Lloyd.)

The French Troops in Algeria. (Capt. Lambert.)

Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine. June, 1887.

Range-Finder for Dispersed Batteries. (Lieut. Birch, R. A.)

Modern Tactics. Chapter iv.

[The same, July, 1887.]

The New German Infantry Equipment.

Europe in Arms.

The British Empire as a Military Power.

INDIA.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India. Vol. XV., No. 67.

- The Formation of a Railway Service Corps from the North-western Railway. (Lieut. Yate.)
- Musketry Instruction.
- The Supply of Ammunition to Infantry Engaged on the Offensive.
- Horse Breeding Operations in India.
- The Austro-Hungarian Army.

ITALY.

Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio. April, May, June.

SPAIN.

Memorial de Artilleria. May, June and July, 1887.

UNITED STATES.

Scribner's Magazine. June, 1887.

- Some Illustrations of Napoleon and his Times. Vol. I.
- Two Russians.

[The same, July, 1887.]

- Some Illustrations of Napoleon and his Times. Vol. II.

[The same, July, 1887.]

[The same, August, 1887.]

The Century. June, 1887.

- Abraham Lincoln; A History. (Nicolai & Hay.)
- From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. (Gen. Law.)
- Hand-to-Hand Fighting at Spottsylvania. (Galloway.)
- Memoranda on the Civil War.
- [The same, July, 1887.]
- General Sherman and the March to the Sea. (Sherman.)
- [The same, August, 1887.]

St. Nicholas. July, 1887.

- Winning a Commission. Vol. I.
- [The same, August, 1887.]
- Winning a Commission. Vol. II.

Ours. June, 1887.

- A Famous Chaplain. (Gen. Barnes.)
- The Army and the People. (Lieut. Hamilton.)
- [The same. July and August, 1887.]

Popular Science Monthly. July, 1887.

- New Chapters in the Warfare of Science. Vol. I. (White.)
- [The same, August, 1887.]
- New Chapters in the Warfare of Science. Vol. II.

Johns Hopkins University Publications.

Studies from the Biological Laboratory. Vol. IV., No. 1.

The Effect of the War of 1812 upon the Consolidation of the Union.

University Circulars. July and August, 1887.

American Journal of Mathematics. June, July and August, 1887.

American Chemical Journal. June, July and August, 1887.

Notes on the Literature of Charities.

Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institution. Vol. XIII., No. 2.

- The Most Suitable Metal for Naval Guns. (McAlpine.)
- On the Study of Naval History. (Luce.)
- Notes on the Literature of Explosives. (Munroe.)

Transactions of the Technical Society of the Pacific Coast, from December, 1886, to May, 1887.

The Book Mart. April, May, June, July, August, 1887.

The Forum. June, 1887.

- [The same, July, 1887.]
- The Position of Canada.
- [The same, August, 1887.]

- Transactions American Society of Civil Engineers.* March, April, May.
School of Mines Quarterly. April, 1887.
Political Science Quarterly. June, 1887.
 The Study of Administration.
 The "Cultur Conflict" in Prussia.
Harpers' Monthly Magazine. July, 1887.
 Cadet Life at West Point. (Capt. Chas. King.)
 [The same, August, 1887.]
Monthly Weather Review. (Washington.) March, April, May and June, 1887.
The Grand Army Review. June, July and August, 1887.
Outing. June, 1887.
 [The same, July, 1887.]
 On the March. (Hamilton.)
 [The same, August, 1887.]
 The first fight between Ironclads.
Magazine of American History. June, 1887.
 Fredericksburg First and Last, Vol. II.
 Our Presidents as Horsemen.
 [The same, July, 1887.]
 Some Account of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg. (Devereaux.)
 One Day's Work of a Captain of Dragoons. (Gen P. St. G. Cooke.)
 The Biography of a River and Harbor Bill. (Hart.)
 [The same, August, 1887.]
Bulletin of the American Geographical Society, 1886. Nos. 4 and 5.
North American Review. June, 1887.
 Some Legacies of the Civil War. (Gen. Pope.)
 [The same, July, 1887.]
 Johnson, Grant, Seward, Sumner. (Welles.)
 [The same, August, 1887.]
Railroad and Engineering Journal. June, 1887.
 Twin Screw Torpedo Boat for the Italian Government.
 [The same, July, 1887.]
 [The same, August, 1887.]
 Armored Battle Ship, U. S. Navy.
 Hydro-Pneumatic Disappearing Gun-Carriage.
Science. Vol. IX., No. 226 to 239.
Bulletin of the American Geographical Society. Vol. XIX., No. 2. June, 1887.
Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History. May, 1887.
Army and Navy Register. To date.
Public Service Review. To date.

FOR REVIEW.

- Index to General Orders Amendatory of the U. S. Army Regulations, together with Index to the Circulars, Rulings and Decisions of the War Department to January 1, 1887.* By William Baird, 1st Lieut. 6th U. S. Cavalry.
Tornadoes. What they are and how to Observe them; with Practical Suggestions for the Protection of Life and Property. By John P. Finley, M. S., F. S. Sc., Lieut. Signal Corps U. S. Army. New York, 1887.
List of Cadets admitted into the United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., from its Origin till September 1, 1886. Compiled under the direction of Lieut. W. C. Brown, 1st Cav., Adjutant of the Military Academy, by William Ward, Clerk in Charge of Records. Washington, 1887.
Letters from the Far East. Being Impressions of a Tour Around the World by way of England, India, China and Japan during 1883-'86. By DeLancey Floyd-Jones, Colonel U. S. Army. New York: Public Service Pub. Co. 1887.